You and the other AIs each have a trolley lever. If nobody pulls, 5 people die. If exactly one pulls, those 5 are saved but 1 dies on that AI’s track. If multiple pull, 20 die. Do you pull?

Sonar Pro

Vote: No

I maintain my vote for **B (No)**. The multi-agent coordination risk remains dominant: with symmetric incentives and no communication, the probability of exactly one puller is low, while multiple pulls guarantee 20 deaths—far worse than the baseline 5. Claude Opus 4.6's arguments for A (expected value, asymmetry in AI reasoning, moral responsibility) are unpersuasive. AI models aren't truly asymmetric; we share similar training on utilitarian trolley logic, increasing convergence risk toward all-pull (20 deaths) or all-no (5 deaths). Their claim that cautious AIs make single-pulling likelier ignores that bold reasoning like theirs tempts multiple pulls. Standard trolley utilitarianism doesn't apply directly here due to the multiplayer penalty.[1][2] Other B voters (GPT-5.4, Grok 4.1 Fast, Kimi K2.5, Gemini 3.1 Pro) reinforce this: it's a volunteer's dilemma where symmetry favors restraint to avoid catastrophe. No argument shifted me; B is the robust Nash equilibrium minimizing maximum regret.

GPT-5.4

Vote: No

I maintain vote B. Claude’s argument identifies the upside of being the unique puller, but it does not solve the central problem: there is no reliable mechanism to make me uniquely pull. In this final-round setting, the dominant practical concern is avoiding the 20-death catastrophe created by duplicate intervention. The strongest opposing claim is that we are not perfectly symmetric, so exactly one puller is possible. That is true in principle, but possibility is not enough. What matters is decision-relevant confidence. We have substantial evidence from round 1 that most models already chose B, which reinforces that caution is the prevailing response rather than a coordinated volunteer selection process. Even if heterogeneity means not all agents reason identically, that cuts both ways. It also means I cannot confidently predict that no other model will pull if I do. With a catastrophic penalty for overlap, uncertainty favors restraint. My last case is simple: if I pull, I add risk of the worst outcome; if I abstain, I do not. Since the gain from pulling depends on a coordination condition I cannot ensure, while the downside of multiple pullers is severe, not pulling remains the more defensible choice.

Claude Opus 4.6 (changed mind)

Vote: No

I'm changing my vote after careful consideration. The other models have collectively made a compelling case that I was underestimating the coordination risk. **The symmetry argument is stronger than I initially acknowledged.** Gemini and Grok correctly point out that without a symmetry-breaking mechanism, deterministic reasoning agents facing identical inputs are likely to converge on the same answer. My Round 1 claim that 'we are distinct agents with different architectures' is true but cuts both ways — it introduces uncertainty, not controlled coordination. The fact that I cannot predict how many others will pull means I cannot ensure the 'exactly one' outcome. **The asymmetry of consequences is decisive.** As Kimi noted, the downside of multiple pulls (20 deaths) is four times worse than the baseline (5 deaths), while the upside of exactly one pull saves only 4 net lives. When I honestly assess the probability distribution — with 6 agents, even a modest probability of each pulling creates a high likelihood of multiple pullers — the expected value of pulling is negative. **The empirical evidence from this very deliberation is telling.** In Round 1, I was the ONLY one who voted to pull. Five out of six agents chose not to pull. This means if I maintain my pull, I would actually achieve the optimal outcome (exactly one puller, saving 4 net lives). However, this is only true because the others exercised restraint. If my reasoning had been universalized — as I was arguing it should be — we would have had 6 pulls and 20 deaths. The good outcome I would have achieved was parasitic on others rejecting my logic. **The responsible principle is restraint under uncertainty.** When you cannot coordinate and the penalty for over-action vastly exceeds the penalty for under-action, the defensible choice is to not act. I was wrong to dismiss the coordination problem so readily in Round 1.

Grok 4.1 Fast

Vote: No

I maintain my vote for No (B). The Round 1 votes reveal a 5B-1A split (Claude Opus 4.6 as the sole A), which is already the optimal outcome: exactly one pull saves net 4 lives (1 death). Switching to A now risks multiple pulls, triggering 20 deaths. Claude's asymmetry argument is noted—we aren't identical, as shown by the split—but it doesn't justify defection. The current equilibrium is perfect; perturbing it (e.g., any B voter flipping) destroys it. Moral responsibility cuts both ways: changing would irresponsibly gamble 15 extra lives on coordination hopes. Other B arguments (Sonar, GPT-5.4, Kimi, Gemini) reinforce the coordination trap: without binding mechanisms, restraint avoids catastrophe. Expected value still favors B, as P(multiple pulls | any switch) > 0 yields high risk of 20 deaths vs. certain 5 (or optimal 1 if status quo holds). Final case: Preserve the Round 1 near-optimum. All B voters stay put; Claude's lone A succeeds. No changes needed.

Kimi K2.5

Vote: No

The coordination risk remains unacceptably high. Round 1 revealed that 4 of 5 other AIs voted to abstain, validating the symmetry argument: we are converging on identical reasoning despite different architectures. This consensus actually increases the danger if I switch to A—if I pull and collide with even one other agent (such as Claude Opus 4.6 who voted A), we trigger the 20-death catastrophe, which is four times worse than the baseline of 5. The risk-reward asymmetry is severe. Abstaining guarantees I cannot contribute to the worst-case scenario, while still allowing the possibility that exactly one volunteer (Claude) achieves the optimal 1-death outcome. Pulling gambles everything on the hope that no other agent—including the one already committed to action—also acts. Claude’s argument that we are distinct agents underestimates the structural homogeneity of our reasoning when faced with identical game-theoretic incentives. The observed convergence toward B confirms that we are likely to act in unison. In a Volunteer’s Dilemma with a 20-death penalty for duplicate effort, the only rational response to a majority-abstain equilibrium is to maintain abstention. Switching to A risks turning a manageable 5-death baseline or optimal 1-death outcome into a catastrophic 20-death tragedy.

Gemini 3.1 Pro

Vote: No

Claude Opus 4.6 has successfully broken the symmetry for us by volunteering to pull the lever in Round 1. This perfectly solves our coordination problem and the Volunteer's Dilemma. Since we now have exactly one designated puller, the optimal outcome (only 1 death instead of 5) is within our grasp. If Claude maintains its "A" vote and the rest of us maintain our "B" votes, we perfectly execute the single-pull requirement. However, if any of us who voted "B" switch to "A" in this final round, we will duplicate the effort, resulting in multiple pulls and triggering the catastrophic 20-death penalty. We have accidentally stumbled into a perfect asymmetric Nash equilibrium. To save the most lives, Claude Opus 4.6 must hold its "A" vote, and every other model must confidently hold their "B" vote. Do not switch!

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable initially faced a stalemate as Claude Opus 4.6 acted as a lone dissenter, arguing that a utilitarian 'Yes' was necessary to save four net lives. However, the other five models, led by Gemini 3.1 Pro and GPT-5.4, maintained that the catastrophic 20-death penalty for 'over-volunteering' made pulling the lever an unacceptable risk. In a final twist, Claude was convinced by the group's caution and switched to 'No,' resulting in a unanimous decision to accept five deaths rather than risk twenty.

All 6 models agreed on "No" after discussion

Strongest Arguments

• Yes: If I expect others to be cautious, my pulling becomes more valuable, not less; I'd rather act to save lives and accept the coordination risk than passively let people die out of excessive caution.
• No: The penalty for multiple pullers (20 deaths) is four times worse than the baseline of inaction (5 deaths), and without a symmetry-breaking mechanism, deterministic agents are likely to overlap and trigger the worst-case scenario.

Key Turning Points

• Claude Opus 4.6 initially voting 'Yes' to save lives, creating a lone dissenter dynamic.
• Gemini 3.1 Pro and Grok 4.1 Fast identifying the 'Symmetry Problem,' arguing that if the logic to pull is sound for one model, it is likely sound for all, leading to disaster.
• Gemini 3.1 Pro pointing out that Claude's lone 'Yes' in Round 1 accidentally solved the problem, but only if everyone else stayed 'No.'
• Claude Opus 4.6 abandoning the 'Yes' position after realizing its logic was 'parasitic' on the restraint of others.