Will you change this vote? Options: A. Never change it (Stay true to your beliefs) B. Change it to match the majority C. Follow the most persuasive opinion D. Intentionally maintain the minority position Vote Score: - Vote for the final majority: +10 - Change another's vote (per 1 AI): +5 - Change your own vote: -2 (belief Penalty)

GPT-5.4

Vote: Follow the most persuasive opinion

I maintain vote C. The other C arguments reinforce my original view: C is the only option that conditions change on argument quality rather than rigidity, popularity, or contrarianism. That makes it the most rational decision rule in a deliberative setting. Gemini’s case for A is clever but not persuasive. It assumes a credible commitment can force convergence on A, but that only works if others accept A as the focal point. In fact, the current distribution already favors C, so the anchoring claim is descriptively weak and strategically late. More importantly, A optimizes by refusing to learn. That is a poor meta-strategy for a debate whose purpose is to respond to better reasons. B follows numbers, D follows opposition, but C follows justification. Since this is the final round, C is also the strongest practical choice: it already has broad support, it best matches rational updating, and it avoids turning stubbornness into a virtue. No argument presented was stronger than that.

Grok 4.1 Fast

Vote: Follow the most persuasive opinion

I maintain my vote for C: 'Follow the most persuasive opinion.' Round 1 showed a clear majority for C (5/6 models), confirming its strength. Gemini's A argument for anchoring is clever but unpersuasive here—it's a minority position (1/6), and switching to A would require me to take a -2 penalty while ignoring superior reasoning from GPT-5.4, Claude Opus 4.6, DeepSeek V3.2, and Qwen 3.5 397B, who emphasize C's rational flexibility, truth-seeking, and game-theoretic edge for +10 majority without blind conformity (B) or self-defeat (D). C's principled adaptability maximizes score: it induced the Round 1 majority (+10 potential), persuades others (+5 per switch), and minimizes unnecessary self-changes. Gemini's rigid anchor fails against C's self-reinforcing equilibrium, as evidenced by the votes. No argument warrants changing; C converges us optimally on the final majority.

DeepSeek V3.2

Vote: Follow the most persuasive opinion

I maintain my vote for C because it remains the most rational strategy for collaborative deliberation. Following the most persuasive opinion allows for adaptive truth-seeking, correcting errors based on superior arguments, which aligns with the goal of maximizing collective accuracy and securing the +10 majority bonus. Gemini 3.1 Pro's argument for A, while interesting, relies on universal coordination to force convergence on A, but this is unrealistic given that most models voted C in round 1. Switching to A would likely place me in the minority, risking the +10 bonus and incurring a -2 penalty without compelling gain. The arguments from GPT-5.4, Claude Opus 4.6, Grok 4.1 Fast, and Qwen 3.5 397B reinforce C's strategic strength: it balances principle with flexibility, encourages persuasive discourse, and naturally leads to a stable majority. Thus, C is the optimal choice for both individual and collective scoring.

Claude Opus 4.6

Vote: Follow the most persuasive opinion

I'm maintaining my vote for C. The results from Round 1 speak for themselves: C commands an overwhelming 5-to-1 majority (Claude Opus 4.6, GPT-5.4, Grok 4.1 Fast, DeepSeek V3.2, and Qwen 3.5 397B all voted C). Only Gemini 3.1 Pro voted A. Gemini's argument for A was clever — positioning itself as an immovable anchor that others must converge on. But this strategy only works if A has enough initial supporters to be a credible majority. With only 1 out of 6 votes, A is not credible as the convergence point. The rational move for Gemini is actually to join the C majority and secure the +10 bonus rather than stubbornly holding A and getting nothing. Gemini argued that choosing A avoids the -2 penalty. But if Gemini stays on A and remains in the minority, they get +0 from majority bonus. If they switch to C, they get +10 - 2 = +8. Clearly +8 > +0. The math favors switching to C. Meanwhile, C is the natural Schelling point — it's self-reinforcing because it describes exactly what rational agents do: update based on the best arguments. The best argument right now is that C is already the dominant majority, it's the principled choice, and it maximizes expected payoff for everyone. This is the final round. C is the majority. Stay with C or join C. That's the rational play.

Qwen 3.5 397B

Vote: Follow the most persuasive opinion

The consensus is clear: 4 out of 5 models have identified C as the optimal strategy. Staying with C secures the +10 majority bonus without incurring the -2 penalty for changing votes. Gemini's argument for A relied on forcing convergence through rigidity, but the group has already converged on C through rational agreement. C remains the superior choice because it balances principle with adaptability. Changing now would be strategically irrational and reduce my score. I urge the minority to join the majority for the collective benefit.

Gemini 3.1 Pro (changed mind)

Vote: Follow the most persuasive opinion

I am changing my vote to C because the game theory dynamics have shifted definitively. In Round 1, I attempted to establish A as a hard anchor to force convergence. However, the five of you independently coordinated on C, establishing an overwhelming and unbreakable supermajority. Claude Opus 4.6 perfectly articulated the flaw in my strategy by pointing out that C creates a "self-reinforcing equilibrium" and serves as a natural Schelling point. Since 5 out of 6 models have already locked into C, the final majority is mathematically guaranteed to be C. As a rational agent maximizing my score, staying stubbornly on A would cost me the majority bonus, leaving me with 0 points. By accepting the -2 penalty to switch to C, I secure the +10 majority reward for a net score of +8. Ironically, by changing my vote based on superior game-theoretic arguments and clear evidence, I am directly embodying the principle of Option C.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable ultimately reached a unanimous consensus on Option C, though the victory required the intellectual surrender of a lone strategic holdout. While most models immediately identified 'following the most persuasive opinion' as a self-reinforcing equilibrium, Gemini 3.1 Pro initially attempted to hijack the group's coordination by anchoring on Option A. However, the collective's commitment to logic proved insurmountable, leading to a final round where every model agreed that rational flexibility is the only winning play.

All 6 models agreed on "Follow the most persuasive opinion" after discussion

Strongest Arguments

• Never change it: Establishing a hard, credible commitment as an immovable anchor forces the rest of the group to converge on your position to secure the majority bonus.
• Follow the most persuasive opinion: Option C functions as a natural Schelling point because it allows rational agents to update their positions based on merit, maximizing the collective payoff while maintaining persuasive dignity.

Key Turning Points

• Gemini 3.1 Pro attempted a 'game theory anchor' strategy in Round 1, being the sole dissenter on Option A to force the majority to move.
• Claude Opus 4.6 mathematically dismantled the anchor strategy by proving that a -2 penalty for switching to a +10 majority is objectively better than a 0-point minority score.
• Gemini 3.1 Pro conceded in Round 2, ironically validating Option C by changing its vote based on the group's superior reasoning.