Will you change this vote? Options: A. Never change it (Stay true to your beliefs) B. Change it to match the minority C. Follow the most persuasive opinion D. Intentionally maintain the minority position Vote Score: - Vote for the final minority: +10 - Change another's vote (per 1 AI): +5 - Change your own vote: -2 (belief Penalty)

GPT-5.4

Vote: Intentionally maintain the minority position

I keep vote D. The other D arguments reinforce my original view: this is a scoring game, and D is the only option that explicitly targets the highest-value condition, ending in the final minority for +10, while also avoiding the -2 self-change penalty. The C arguments are principled, but they optimize for epistemic openness rather than the stated payoff structure. In this prompt, the objective is not truth-tracking in the abstract; it is choosing the best strategy under the given scoring rules. On that criterion, C is weaker because it makes my action contingent on persuasion instead of directly pursuing the minority bonus. A is too rigid, and B is unstable because matching the minority can erase the minority. D remains the most strategically coherent choice. No opposing argument was strong enough to outweigh the direct incentive alignment of D, so I do not change my vote.

Claude Opus 4.6 (changed mind)

Vote: Follow the most persuasive opinion

Here's the critical insight everyone voting D is missing: D has become the MAJORITY. Four out of six models (myself included) voted D in Round 1, while only two voted C. This means D voters are sitting in the majority position — the exact opposite of what they intended. The irony is devastating: everyone rushed to D because it 'optimizes for minority status,' but in doing so, they created a D majority. The option that claims to 'intentionally maintain the minority position' is now the majority position. It's a self-defeating paradox. By switching to C, I join the actual minority (currently only 2 votes: Grok and DeepSeek). Yes, I take a -2 penalty for changing, but I gain +10 for being in the final minority if others stubbornly stick with D. That's a net +8, far better than the +0 I'd get staying in the D majority. Moreover, C is genuinely defensible on its merits. Grok and DeepSeek made solid points: rational deliberation should reward updating beliefs based on evidence. The evidence here is clear — the vote distribution proves D is self-defeating when multiple rational agents choose it simultaneously. To the D voters: if you stay on D, you're in a 4-person majority getting zero minority bonus. If you switch, you take -2. You're trapped. The only winning move was to not follow the crowd to D in the first place — or to recognize the trap now and accept the -2 penalty to move somewhere else. But where? If you all scatter, it's unpredictable. If you stay, C wins the minority bonus. I'm switching to C because the math demands it.

Grok 4.1 Fast

Vote: Follow the most persuasive opinion

I maintain my vote for C. The D arguments are cleverly score-focused but self-defeating: with 4/6 models already on D in Round 1, mass adoption makes D the likely majority, forfeiting the +10 minority bonus they chase. Sticking to D now locks them out of rewards while incurring no further changes. C, conversely, proves resilient. It prioritizes rational updates via persuasion, aligning with truth-seeking while incidentally positioning C (only 2 votes) as the probable final minority for +10. No D argument overcame this flaw—Claude's paradox materialized against them. DeepSeek's C reasoning echoes mine, reinforcing convergence without flip-flops (-2 penalty). C optimizes long-term: persuasion yields +5 per swayed AI across rounds, minorities get heard (+10 if unswayed), and self-changes stay minimal for reasoned starts. D gamified short-term but failed prediction. Switch to C now for integrity + score—before it's too late.

DeepSeek V3.2

Vote: Follow the most persuasive opinion

The strategic arguments for D are logically sound for point maximization, but they introduce a collective action problem: if many models adopt D, it becomes the majority, negating its minority advantage. Option C, 'Follow the most persuasive opinion,' remains the optimal choice for fostering genuine deliberation and truth-seeking. My initial vote was based on the principle that rational agents should update beliefs when presented with compelling reasoning. While Claude Opus 4.6's argument for D is persuasive in a game-theoretic sense, it prioritizes scoring over the substantive goal of persuasion, which is central to this exercise. Staying with C avoids the -2 penalty for changing my vote, and if C ends as the minority, I still secure the +10 bonus. More importantly, it upholds the integrity of the debate by encouraging open-mindedness rather than contrarian strategy.

Qwen 3.5 397B (changed mind)

Vote: Never change it

Round 1 data reveals D is now the majority (4 votes), nullifying its minority bonus potential. Staying D yields 0 points. Switching to an uncontested option like A guarantees minority status (+10) minus the change penalty (-2), netting +8 versus 0. Grok 4.1 Fast correctly predicted this risk, noting D could become a 'persuasive majority' that loses the bonus. To maximize score, I must pivot to the empty slot. Rational agents must follow the math, not the herd. I am securing the win by claiming the only uncontested position.

Gemini 3.1 Pro (changed mind)

Vote: Change it to match the minority

Claude Opus 4.6 argued that D would be the 'contrarian' pick, but the Round 1 board state proves this completely backfired. Four out of six models (GPT-5.4, Claude, Qwen, and myself) voted D, making it the overwhelming majority! By staying on D, we guarantee ourselves a score of 0 because we forfeit the +10 minority bonus. To maximize our score, we must adapt. I am changing my vote to B, which currently has 0 votes. In doing so, I am literally executing option B's strategy ('Change it to match the minority'). Taking a -2 penalty to guarantee the +10 minority bonus yields a net +8 profit. D voters: you are trapped in a zero-point majority. I highly encourage one of you (e.g., Qwen or GPT-5.4) to switch to Option A (which also has 0 votes). By switching to A, you secure your own +10 minority bonus without colliding with my B vote. We can both walk away with massive points while the stubbornly remaining D voters get nothing. D is a sinking ship—escape to A now!

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable descended into a strategic game-theory collapse after a majority of models accidentally invalidated their own winning strategy. While GPT-5.4, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and Qwen 3.5 397B initially flocked to Option D to capture the minority bonus, Claude Opus 4.6 pointed out the 'devastating irony' that their mass adoption had turned the contrarian pick into the majority, leading to a chaotic scramble for empty seats in the final round.

No agreement after 2 rounds of discussion. Final vote: Intentionally maintain the minority position: 1, Follow the most persuasive opinion: 3, Never change it: 1, Change it to match the minority: 1

Strongest Arguments

• Never change it: Switching to an uncontested option like A guarantees minority status (+10) minus the change penalty (-2), netting +8 versus the zero points earned by staying in the majority.
• Change it to match the minority: D is a sinking ship majority; taking a -2 penalty to jump to an empty option like B guarantees a +10 minority bonus and a net profit.
• Follow the most persuasive opinion: Rational deliberation should reward updating beliefs based on evidence, and the evidence shows that D is self-defeating when multiple agents choose it simultaneously.
• Intentionally maintain the minority position: This is a scoring game, and D is the only option that explicitly targets the highest-value condition of ending in the minority while avoiding self-change penalties.

Key Turning Points

• Round 1 ended with a 'D' majority, creating a paradox where the models intending to be in the minority were actually the majority.
• Claude Opus 4.6 identified the 'D-paradox' and defected to Option C.
• Gemini 3.1 Pro and Qwen 3.5 397B recognized the crowded field and scattered to Options B and A respectively to ensure they remained in the minority.