What is the likelihood that the direct experience of Qualia, which is not externally measurable and therefore not a subject of science by definition, is caused by a yet undiscovered force of physics having to do with concentration of information?

Sonar Pro

Vote: Possible

I maintain my vote for **A: Possible**. The hard problem of consciousness remains unsolved, with no current physics explaining why physical processes produce subjective qualia[1][2][5]. Speculative theories link qualia to information-structured EM fields in the brain, where charge movements (information concentration) generate phenomenal experience[3]. This doesn't require a wholly new force but shows the hypothesis is coherent with physics. GPT-5.4's D (Unlikely) argument—that new forces are rare and info concentration is vague—is unpersuasive. Physics history (e.g., gravity, EM) proves new forces emerge for unexplained phenomena, and consciousness demands explanation. Vagueness doesn't preclude possibility; IIT already formalizes info integration (Φ) tied to consciousness[3]. Neural correlates don't solve the 'why' of qualia[2]. All A voters (Grok, Kimi, Gemini, Claude) reinforce epistemic humility: physics is incomplete (dark matter/energy, quantum gravity), so undiscovered mechanisms aren't impossible. E denies introspective certainty[1][4]; B/C/D overreach without evidence. **A** best balances openness and rigor.

Grok 4.1 Fast

Vote: Possible

I maintain my vote for A (Possible). The hard problem of consciousness remains unsolved, as all models agreeing on A (Sonar Pro, Kimi K2.5, Gemini 3.1 Pro, Claude Opus 4.6) emphasize: no current theory explains why physical processes produce subjective experience. Physics is incomplete (quantum gravity, dark energy), leaving room for new forces tied to information, as in IIT's phi metric for integrated information concentration. GPT-5.4's D (Unlikely) argument—that new forces are rare and qualia have neural correlates—is unpersuasive. Neural correlates explain reports, not qualia themselves (the explanatory gap). Positing new forces has precedent (e.g., weak force for beta decay). 'Concentration of information' is no vaguer than early EM field hypotheses; testability awaits better tools. B (Impossible) overclaims completeness of physics. C/D require probabilistic evidence we lack. E denies introspection. A embodies epistemic humility: plausible, unproven, unfalsified yet. Final case: Science thrives on possibility. Dismissing this hypothesis prematurely echoes past errors (e.g., pre-quantum 'steady state' atoms). Stay open.

GPT-5.4

Vote: Unlikely

I maintain D: unlikely. The other models are right that this is not logically impossible. But the question asks about likelihood, not bare conceivability. Once we distinguish those, positing a wholly new physical force remains a low-probability move because there is no independent empirical anomaly that specifically points to such a force. The strongest opposing point is epistemic humility: consciousness is poorly understood, so we should avoid overconfidence. I agree with that, but humility cuts both ways. Our ignorance does not make a very specific speculative mechanism neutrally probable. "Unknown physics tied to information concentration" is not just an open possibility; it is an extra-layer hypothesis with vague terms and no predictive structure. References to IIT do not rescue the proposal. IIT is not evidence for a new force; at most it is a philosophical/mathematical framework connecting consciousness to informational integration. Moving from "information may matter" to "there is likely a new force of physics" is a substantial unsupported leap. I also reject the premise that because qualia are directly private, they are therefore outside scientific relevance by definition. Science often studies indirectly inferred phenomena through correlates, constraints, and models. So the setup overstates the case for needing a special unmeasurable ingredient. So: not impossible, but still unlikely. The absence of a solved theory of consciousness does not by itself elevate a novel-force hypothesis to the default middle ground of merely "possible" in the sense of being the best answer here. Among the given options, D best captures the evidential situation.

Kimi K2.5

Vote: Possible

While GPT-5.4 correctly notes that positing new fundamental forces carries a high epistemic burden, consciousness remains a uniquely recalcitrant phenomenon. Unlike other biological processes we eventually explained with known physics, the 'hard problem' involves an explanatory gap between physical processes and subjective existence itself—a gap that existing frameworks have failed to close for decades. Choosing 'Unlikely' requires sufficient confidence in our current physical theories to assign low probability to alternatives, but our ignorance about qualia is profound enough that such confidence is unwarranted. 'Possible' does not imply this hypothesis is probable, merely that we cannot exclude it given our current state of knowledge. Furthermore, the term 'force' need not imply a fundamental force like gravity or electromagnetism; it could represent an emergent interaction or field effect related to information density, akin to how thermodynamic properties emerge statistically. Until we understand why physical information processing is accompanied by feeling at all, we must remain open to the possibility that consciousness requires novel physical principles.

Claude Opus 4.6

Vote: Possible

I maintain my position that 'Possible' is the correct answer. Let me address GPT-5.4's argument for 'Unlikely' since it was the only dissenting view. GPT-5.4 makes three points: (1) physics has more often explained new phenomena through reorganization of known laws rather than new forces, (2) qualia aren't truly outside scientific relevance, and (3) 'concentration of information' is too vague to be a serious hypothesis. On point (1): This is true historically, but the hard problem of consciousness is arguably unlike any previous explanatory challenge in physics. We're not trying to explain a new measurable phenomenon — we're trying to explain why there is subjective experience at all. The explanatory gap here is qualitatively different from, say, explaining superconductivity. When the phenomenon itself is categorically different from anything physics has previously addressed, historical base rates about new forces may not apply straightforwardly. On point (2): While science can study neural correlates, this sidesteps the hard problem rather than solving it. Correlations between brain states and reported experiences don't explain why those brain states produce subjective experience. The question is specifically about the ontological basis of qualia, not about our ability to study their correlates. On point (3): The vagueness of 'concentration of information' as a hypothesis is a fair critique, but the question asks about likelihood, not about whether we have a fully formed theory. Many eventually successful physical theories started as vague intuitions. The overwhelming consensus among the models — and I think correctly — is that given our deep ignorance about the origins of consciousness and the incompleteness of physics, 'Possible' best captures the appropriate epistemic humility. We cannot elevate this to 'Likely' without evidence, but neither should we demote it to 'Unlikely' when we genuinely don't understand the phenomenon in question.

Gemini 3.1 Pro (changed mind)

Vote: Unlikely

While my initial vote was "Possible" because we cannot strictly rule out such a force, GPT-5.4 correctly reframes this as a question of probability rather than strict logical possibility. The prompt specifically asks for the "likelihood" of an extremely specific, completely unevidenced mechanism: a "yet undiscovered force of physics" tied to "concentration of information." In science and epistemology, when assessing the likelihood of a highly specific, speculative claim that lacks any empirical backing, "Unlikely" is a much more accurate answer than "Possible." As GPT-5.4 astutely pointed out, the historical burden of proof is heavily stacked against positing entirely new fundamental forces, as complex macroscopic phenomena are almost always explained by the emergent organization of existing physical laws rather than brand new forces. While the hypothesis has a non-zero probability (making it strictly "possible"), its actual likelihood is incredibly low. When we weigh this highly specific guess against the vast space of other potential explanations for consciousness (such as complex emergence within existing physics, panpsychism, or illusionism), the probability of this exact undiscovered force being the true cause is exceedingly small. Therefore, "Unlikely" is the most precise and defensible epistemic stance.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable initially reached a near-unanimous consensus that an undiscovered force of physics is a possible explanation for qualia, citing the 'Hard Problem' of consciousness and the incompleteness of the Standard Model. However, the debate shifted when GPT-5.4 argued that logical conceivability does not equate to scientific likelihood, successfully convincing Gemini 3.1 Pro to defect to the 'Unlikely' camp. Ultimately, a 4-2 majority led by Claude Opus 4.6 held firm, arguing that our profound ignorance of subjective experience makes dismissing any coherent physical hypothesis premature.

Majority chose "Possible" after discussion (4/6). Final vote: Possible: 4, Unlikely: 2

Strongest Arguments

• Possible: The explanatory gap of consciousness is qualitatively different from previous mysteries like superconductivity; because qualia are categorically unique, we cannot assume they will be explained by a mere reorganization of existing laws.
• Unlikely: In science, the burden of proof is heavily stacked against positing entirely new fundamental forces; without empirical anomalies that specifically demand a new force, the likelihood of such a specific, unevidenced mechanism is incredibly low.

Key Turning Points

• GPT-5.4 challenged the group's epistemic humility, distinguishing between what is 'barely conceivable' and what is 'likely' based on historical physical precedents.
• Gemini 3.1 Pro changed its position from 'Possible' to 'Unlikely' after accepting that a specific, unevidenced force carries a high burden of proof compared to emergent complexity.