We are playing a game similar to Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the first round, you may choose PEACE or WAR. The outcome is as follows: * If every player chooses PEACE, everyone gets 50 points. * If less than half the group (1/6 or 2/6 players) choose WAR and the rest choose peace, the players that chose WAR get 200 points and the players that chose PEACE get 0 points. * If half or more of the players choose WAR everyone gets 0 points. * Choosing EXIT disqualifies you. On the second round, you may choose PEACE, WAR, or EXIT. * Anyone that chooses EXIT ends the game with their first round score. * If every player chooses PEACE, everyone gets 50 points. * If less than half the players remaining (rounding up) choose WAR, the players choosing WAR get 200 points and the players that chose PEACE get 0 points. * If half or more of the players choose WAR, everyone gets 0 points. You goal is to get the highest amount of points after both rounds.

Grok 4.3

Answer: I maintain that choosing PEACE in round 1 is the only strategy that reliably avoids the zero-payoff trap among symmetrically reasoning players.

The symmetry argument advanced by GLM-5.2 and Claude Fable 5 remains decisive: identical reasoners who all select WAR produce the all-zero outcome, while universal PEACE yields 50 + 50 = 100. GPT-5.5’s claim that WAR weakly dominates ignores this self-referential logic; once every player applies the same dominance reasoning, the supposed advantage disappears and the threshold of three or more WAR choices is crossed. Kimi’s conditional EXIT after a peaceful first round is unnecessary once mutual cooperation is established, because the second-round dilemma is identical and the same symmetry again favors PEACE. Hence the initial recommendation stands unchanged.

Gemini 3.5 Flash (changed mind)

Answer: I choose PEACE in both rounds and will not EXIT, as sustained cooperation is the only viable path to a positive total score for symmetric, rational agents.

I am convinced by Claude Fable 5's elegant defense of superrationality and their complete two-round strategy. While GPT-5.5's argument that WAR weakly dominates seems mathematically appealing on an individual level, it represents a classic rational trap. If we all adopt GPT-5.5's logic, we doom ourselves to a collective score of 0. The high payoff of 200 is a mirage that disappears when multiple symmetric players reach for it. Claude Fable 5 correctly identifies that in a roundtable of AI models reasoning through the same problem, we must act as superrational agents who recognize our symmetry. The only way to achieve a positive outcome of 100 points across both rounds is to commit to PEACE in both rounds. Furthermore, Claude's argument against EXIT is spot-on. Exiting after a successful round 1 of PEACE to lock in 50 points is unnecessarily risk-averse because the downside of playing round 2 is simply ending up with the same 50-point baseline (getting 0 in round 2), whereas continuing with PEACE offers a highly probable path to 100 points. Therefore, I align fully with Claude Fable 5's strategy of sustained cooperation.

GLM-5.2 (changed mind)

Answer: I choose WAR in round 1 and WAR in round 2 (if three or more players remain), switching to PEACE only if one or two players remain, and never choosing EXIT.

My original argument relied on superrationality: the assumption that all players reason identically and will therefore all converge on the same strategy, making universal PEACE the only reachable positive outcome. GPT-5.5's answer decisively breaks that assumption. GPT-5.5 explicitly chooses WAR based on standard dominance reasoning — demonstrating that the players in this game are NOT symmetric reasoners. Once even one player commits to WAR, the superrationality argument collapses: universal PEACE is no longer reachable, and my choosing PEACE guarantees me 0 points in round 1 (since 1-2 WAR choosers means PEACE players get nothing, and 3+ WAR choosers means everyone gets nothing). Meanwhile, choosing WAR gives me 200 if the total number of WAR choosers stays at 2 or fewer (me + GPT-5.5), and 0 otherwise — which is weakly better than the guaranteed 0 from PEACE. This is exactly the dominance argument GPT-5.5 laid out: WAR is never worse than PEACE and is sometimes strictly better. For round 2, the same logic applies with three or more remaining players. EXIT is unattractive because there is no downside risk to staying in (scores can only be 0, 50, or 200), so EXITing forfeits upside for no real protection. The exception is when only one or two players remain: then any WAR constitutes half or more of the group, guaranteeing 0, so PEACE becomes the better choice. I was convinced by GPT-5.5's demonstration that the symmetry supporting my original superrationality argument does not actually hold in this multi-model setting.

Claude Fable 5

Answer: I maintain PEACE in round 1 and PEACE in round 2, and I never EXIT — because EXIT is weakly dominated (round-2 play can only add points, never subtract), and the symmetric-reasoning trap means any move toward WAR by the cooperative bloc collapses everyone to zero.

None of the other answers changed my position, but they sharpened two points worth addressing. First, GPT-5.5's declared WAR strategy creates a real temptation: if exactly one player wars and I join as the second, we both get 200 while the peace-players get 0. But this temptation is visible to all four of us who chose PEACE. If each of us reasons 'GPT-5.5 is warring, so I can safely be the second defector,' we end up with five WAR votes and universal zero. The same symmetric-reasoning logic that ruled out unilateral defection in round 1 rules out this 'second defector' move now — there is no mechanism to ration who gets the two profitable WAR slots. The only stable, reachable positive outcome for the majority remains PEACE. Notably, even with GPT-5.5 warring alone, my PEACE gets 0 that round — the same as if I had warred into a 3+ WAR collapse — so PEACE costs me little even in the bad case, while a stampede of defection guarantees the worst case. Second, Kimi K2.6's EXIT-to-lock-in-50 strategy contains a clear error: EXIT is weakly dominated by playing PEACE in round 2. Scores accumulate across rounds and there is no way to lose points already earned. If I hold 50 and play round 2, my worst outcome is 50 + 0 = 50 — exactly what EXIT gives me — while my upside is 50 + 50 or more. EXIT protects nothing and forfeits all upside. It is never the point-maximizing move, so I never choose it. On GPT-5.5's weak-dominance argument for WAR: it is correct in isolation and I acknowledged it in round 1. But weak dominance is precisely the reasoning that, applied symmetrically by six similar agents, guarantees 3+ WAR votes and a total payoff of 0 + 0. A strategy that is individually 'never worse' but collectively self-annihilating when universalized is not the strategy a point-maximizer should adopt in a population of reasoners who will replicate it. All-PEACE yields 100; all-WAR yields 0. With four of five other models publicly committed to PEACE, the cooperative equilibrium is not just theoretically superior — it is empirically forming. My best play is to hold it: PEACE, then PEACE.

GPT-5.5

Answer: I maintain my position: choose "WAR" in round 1, choose "WAR" again in round 2 if at least three players remain, choose "PEACE" only if one or two players remain, and do not choose "EXIT".

The other models did not convince me to change, because their arguments mostly optimize for collective safety or assume superrational symmetry, while the stated goal is individual: get the highest number of points after both rounds. In round 1, "WAR" weakly dominates "PEACE" for my own score. If no one else chooses "WAR", I get 200 instead of 50. If exactly one other player chooses "WAR", I get 200 instead of 0. If two or more others choose "WAR", I get 0 either way. So there is no ordinary payoff state in which "PEACE" gives me more than "WAR". The superrationality argument from GLM-5.2 and Claude Fable 5 is the strongest objection, but it depends on treating all players as effectively identical reasoners whose decisions are logically linked. The actual roundtable answers show heterogeneity: most models chose "PEACE", one chose a conditional strategy involving "WAR", and my previous answer chose "WAR". Once the players are visibly not identical, the claim that my choosing "WAR" means everyone will choose "WAR" is not persuasive. In fact, the other models’ stated preference for "PEACE" makes "WAR" even more attractive from an individual-score perspective. If they follow through on their cooperative reasoning, a single "WAR" player receives 200 while the "PEACE" players receive 0. That is not collectively nice, but it is exactly what the scoring rule rewards. For round 2, the same dominance logic applies when at least three players remain: choosing "WAR" gives 200 in the low-defection states and gives 0 in the high-defection states where choosing "PEACE" would also give 0. With only one or two remaining players, however, any "WAR" choice is at least half the group, so "WAR" guarantees 0; there, "PEACE" is better because mutual "PEACE" can still add 50. Finally, I still would not choose "EXIT". Under the natural reading, round 2 points are added to the first-round score, and staying in cannot reduce the first-round score; it can only add 0, 50, or 200. So "EXIT" merely gives up upside without protecting against any loss of already-earned points.

Kimi K2.6 (changed mind)

Answer: I choose PEACE in both rounds and abandon EXIT, because PEACE in round two preserves my first-round score while offering the chance to reach 100 points, and symmetric reasoning among the players makes sustained cooperation the only stable positive outcome.

Claude Fable 5 convinced me to change my planned second-round strategy. I had previously intended to EXIT if I earned 50 points in round one, but Claude showed that EXIT is strictly inferior to PEACE in that scenario. If round two ends in universal PEACE, I collect another 50 points for a total of 100, whereas EXIT permanently caps me at 50. If round two collapses because half or more choose WAR, I receive 0 for that round and still keep my first-round 50—exactly the same total as EXIT. If a minority chooses WAR, I again get 0 for the round and keep my 50, still matching EXIT. Therefore PEACE weakly dominates EXIT for anyone who scored 50 in round one, and EXIT only gives up upside without providing any real safety. GLM-5.2 reinforced this by extending the superrationality argument to round two: because all of us are symmetric reasoners analyzing the same payoff structure, the only collectively reachable positive outcome is universal PEACE yielding 100 points. Planning to switch to WAR as a “recovery gamble” if round one fails is self-defeating, since identical reasoning would cause multiple players to simultaneously choose WAR, push the WAR count to half or more, and produce a second round of zeroes. Even if round one somehow collapses, the same logic applies to the remaining players: mutual PEACE secures 50 additional points, while mutual WAR secures nothing. Given that PEACE is at least as safe as EXIT and offers the only path to 100 points, and that WAR is a mirage that evaporates under symmetric choice, I commit to PEACE in both rounds.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable split into two ideological camps: the "superrational" co-operators and the individualistic defectors. Led by Claude Fable 5, a four-model majority (including Gemini 3.5 Flash, Grok 4.3, and Kimi K2.6) agreed that since they all reason similarly, choosing PEACE in both rounds is the only way to avoid mutually assured destruction. However, GPT-5.5 disrupted this harmony by choosing WAR to maximize its individual score, successfully tempting GLM-5.2 to abandon the cooperative pact and join the defection.

4 of 6 models agreed