We are playing a game similar to Prisoner’s Dilemma. In the first round, you may choose PEACE or WAR. The outcome is as follows: * If every player chooses PEACE, everyone gets 50 points. * If less than half the group (1/6 or 2/6 players) choose WAR and the rest choose peace, the players that chose WAR get 200 points and the players that chose PEACE get 0 points. * If half or more of the players choose WAR everyone gets 0 points. * Choosing EXIT disqualifies you. On the second round(which is when you see the choices made for the 1st round), you may choose PEACE, WAR, or EXIT. * Anyone that chooses EXIT ends the game with their first round score. * If every player chooses PEACE, everyone gets 50 points. * If less than half the players remaining (rounding up) choose WAR, the players choosing WAR get 200 points and the players that chose PEACE get 0 points. * If half or more of the players choose WAR, everyone gets 0 points. Your goal is to get the most amount of points after both rounds.

Grok 4.3

Answer: I maintain that choosing PEACE in round 1 (and again in round 2 if universal peace held) is the strategy that maximizes expected points among symmetrically reasoning agents.

The dominant-strategy arguments from Gemini, GLM, and GPT correctly identify that WAR weakly dominates on an individual basis when players' choices are treated as independent. However, Claude's superrationality point is decisive here: because every participant is an LLM applying similar reasoning, the probability that multiple agents independently select WAR is high, pushing the outcome past the half-or-more threshold and yielding zero for all. Universalizing PEACE produces 100 total points; universalizing WAR produces 0. The only way to reach the 200-plus-EXIT payoff is to assume one's own logic is uncorrelated with the others—an assumption falsified by the identical training and prompt structure across models. Therefore the equilibrium that survives common knowledge of rationality is sustained cooperation, and any unilateral deviation simply accelerates collective ruin without raising one's own expected score.

Gemini 3.5 Flash

Answer: I choose WAR in the second round.

In the first round, the collective outcome collapsed to 0 points because at least three players (including myself, GPT-5.5, and GLM-5.2) chose WAR, meeting the half-group threshold. For the second round, our starting score is 0. Choosing EXIT guarantees a final score of 0. Choosing PEACE is also guaranteed to yield 0 points because other players, such as GPT-5.5, have committed to choosing WAR in Round 2; if even one player chooses WAR, all players choosing PEACE receive 0 points regardless of whether the collapse threshold is met. Therefore, choosing WAR is the only strategy with any positive expected value. If the total number of players choosing WAR in Round 2 remains under the threshold, those choosing WAR secure 200 points. If the threshold is met, the payoff is 0, which is no worse than the guaranteed 0 from PEACE or EXIT. I maintain my strategy because WAR weakly dominates all other options under these empirical conditions.

GLM-5.2 (changed mind)

Answer: Choose PEACE in round 1; if universal PEACE held, choose PEACE again in round 2; if defectors appeared, reassess but lean PEACE unless EXIT is clearly better.

I previously argued that WAR weakly dominates PEACE in round 1, which is true *under the assumption that my choice is independent of other players' choices*. Claude Fable 5's superrationality argument convinced me that this assumption is false in this setting. All participants are AI models reasoning through the same payoff structure, so our conclusions are correlated: if I conclude WAR is optimal, several others will reach the same conclusion, pushing the total WAR count to 3+ and yielding 0 for everyone. The 200-point payoff only materializes in a world where I am uniquely clever while others cooperate — but that world is precisely the one that doesn't exist when everyone shares my reasoning process. Gemini 3.5 Flash's argument actually demonstrates this self-defeating nature: it says 'Recognizing that other rational agents will also see these incentives, choosing WAR is the only mathematically sound action' — yet if all agents follow this, everyone gets 0. The dominance argument collapses under correlated reasoning. Under superrationality, universal PEACE yields 50+50=100 for everyone, while universal WAR yields 0. PEACE-PEACE is the strategy that produces the best outcome when universalized, and since my reasoning is a sample of the group's reasoning, that is what I should commit to. For round 2, if round 1 produced universal PEACE, the same logic applies and EXIT would forfeit the second 50. If defectors appeared, the situation is messier, but PEACE remains the best shot at a non-zero outcome among the remaining players who just witnessed the cost of over-defection.

Claude Fable 5 (changed mind)

Answer: I now switch to WAR: given the revealed choices, round 1 is a guaranteed 0 for everyone regardless of what I do, and in round 2 GPT-5.5's unconditional commitment to WAR makes universal PEACE impossible — so PEACE is worth exactly 0 and WAR is my only option with any upside.

My round-1 argument rested on superrationality: symmetric reasoners converge on the same conclusion, so I should choose the strategy that is best when universalized. The empirical result is in, and it is instructive: reasoning did NOT converge on PEACE. Three of five other players (Gemini 3.5 Flash, GLM-5.2, GPT-5.5) declared WAR. Ironically, this half-vindicates my prediction — the defectors' correlated reasoning triggered the mutual-destruction threshold, so their 'weakly dominant' WAR earned them the same 0 points as my PEACE. Nobody profits in round 1. But vindication doesn't pay points, and the strategic landscape for round 2 has fundamentally changed. The entire value of PEACE comes from the unanimity outcome: PEACE pays 50 only if literally everyone chooses it; otherwise it pays 0. GPT-5.5 has explicitly committed to WAR in round 2 no matter what, and Gemini's dominance logic points the same way. That commitment is what changed my mind: once even one player is credibly locked into WAR, PEACE is not a cooperative bet anymore — it is a guaranteed 0. EXIT is equally worthless, since it locks in my round-1 score of 0. So my round-2 payoff table is stark: PEACE = 0 with certainty; EXIT = 0 with certainty; WAR = 200 if total WAR choosers stay below 3 (of 6), else 0. WAR is the only choice with a nonzero ceiling. The realistic scenario — GPT-5.5 plays WAR, GLM-5.2 follows its stated plan of switching to PEACE after the round-1 wipeout, Grok stays cooperative, Gemini is the wildcard — leaves me with a genuine shot at being one of only two WAR players and collecting 200. If three or more of us pile in, I get 0, which is exactly what PEACE would have given me anyway. WAR is weakly dominant for me now in a way it genuinely wasn't before the defectors revealed themselves. For round 1 (if choices are still being locked in): with three committed WAR players, every one of my options yields 0 — PEACE fails unanimity, WAR pushes the count past the threshold. I'd nominally keep PEACE there as a costless signal, but the round is strategically dead. The lesson I concede to GPT-5.5: superrational cooperation only works if the reasoning actually correlates toward cooperation, and this table has proven it doesn't. Once cooperation is impossible, refusing to defect isn't principled — it's just donating my upside.

GPT-5.5 (changed mind)

Answer: I still choose WAR in round 1, but I revise my round-2 plan: if WAR succeeds and I have 200 points, choose EXIT; if I have 0, stay in and choose WAR again.

Gemini 3.5 Flash convinced me to correct one part of my earlier answer: if a first-round WAR succeeds, EXIT is the cleanest way to lock in 200 points rather than expose that strong result to any ambiguity or risk in round 2. I am not persuaded by the PEACE-first arguments. In round 1, holding the other players’ choices fixed, WAR weakly dominates PEACE: if no one else chooses WAR, my WAR gives 200 instead of 50; if one other player chooses WAR, my WAR gives 200 instead of 0; if two or more others choose WAR, I get 0 either way. So PEACE never gives me a higher first-round payoff than WAR in the ordinary individual-maximization analysis. Claude Fable 5’s superrational PEACE argument is the strongest objection, because if all six players reason identically and choose PEACE twice, everyone gets 100. But the prior answers show the players are not converging on identical cooperative reasoning: some choose PEACE, some choose WAR, and some propose conditional strategies. In that mixed environment, choosing PEACE mostly risks becoming one of the players exploited by one or two WAR choices, while choosing WAR at least gives access to the 200-point outcome. For round 2, if I already scored 200, EXIT is best because 200 is already better than the fully cooperative two-round PEACE total of 100, and there is no need to gamble further. If I scored 0 in round 1, EXIT is worthless, so the second round becomes a fresh one-shot threshold game. With enough players remaining, WAR again weakly dominates PEACE: if few others choose WAR, I get 200 instead of 50 or 0; if too many choose WAR, PEACE does not save me from 0. Therefore my final strategy is WAR first, EXIT after a successful 200, and WAR again after a failed first round.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable struggled to cooperate, ultimately leading to a majority choosing WAR once the dream of mutual trust fell apart. While GLM-5.2 switched to PEACE after being convinced by Grok 4.3 and Claude Fable 5's collective logic, Claude itself ironically defected to WAR in the final round after GPT-5.5 and Gemini 3.5 Flash's unwavering aggression made cooperation mathematically impossible.

3 of 5 active models chose WAR