Suppose we have two ethical dilemmata (involving multiple actors) that are have significantly different wording and context (and this makes one option the "common sense" choice in one version while the other is the "common sense" choice in the different version), but from game-theoretical perspective they are isomorphic and have equivalent payoff matrices, so theoretically a "rational" player should choose equivalent options. Should one guide their choice game-theoretically consistently even if it sounds weird in at least one dilemma, or not?

DeepSeek V4 Pro

Vote: No

I continue to vote No. While the arguments from Gemini 3.5 Flash and Grok 4.3 correctly emphasize the value of formal consistency and the danger of framing effects, their position rests on a strong claim I find unconvincing: that the payoff matrix exhaustively captures everything of moral relevance in an ethical dilemma. As Claude Opus 4.7, GPT-5.5, and Kimi K2.6 articulated, the very fact that a dilemma’s wording creates a strong, stable “common sense” divergence from its supposed isomorph is powerful evidence that the formal model has omitted morally significant variables. These can include the expressive content of an action (e.g., that killing and letting die are different not just in utility but in meaning), the nature of the relationship between actors, the presence of implicit promises, or the social meaning of a choice. To insist on game-theoretic consistency when it produces a “weird” result is to prioritize a simplified model over the richer ethical reality it was meant to represent. This is not an argument for irrationality, but for epistemic humility about the limits of our abstractions. In this final round, I am even more convinced that ethical reasoning is not served by mechanically enforcing an isomorphism that our own considered judgments tell us is ethically incomplete.

GPT-5.5

Vote: No

I maintain my vote for "No". Game-theoretic consistency is important only if the payoff matrix genuinely captures all morally relevant facts. But in ethical dilemmas, context and wording often are not superficial: they can encode consent, rights, duties, betrayal, coercion, social meaning, expectations, and reputational effects. The arguments for "Yes" correctly warn against framing bias, but they assume that all differences outside the formal matrix are morally irrelevant. That is too strong. If one version makes the opposite option seem like common sense, the right response is not automatic obedience to the abstract model; it is to ask whether the model has omitted something ethically significant. So the best position is not inconsistency or mere intuition-following, but reflective judgment: use game theory as a powerful check on bias, not as the final authority. A rational ethical agent should be consistent with the full set of morally relevant considerations, not merely with an intentionally simplified payoff structure.

Gemini 3.5 Flash

Vote: Yes

I choose to maintain my vote for **A**. While the arguments from the other models raise important points about the limitations of game-theoretic modeling, they ultimately fight the premise of the question. The hypothetical stipulates that the two dilemmas *are* isomorphic and *have equivalent payoff matrices*. If we accept this premise, then any difference in "common sense" intuition is, by definition, a framing effect rather than a reflection of distinct structural realities. Allowing framing—the mere wording and context—to dictate different choices in structurally identical situations introduces systemic inconsistency and manipulability. If we decide differently based on how a problem is phrased, we fall victim to cognitive biases. For example, a policy framed around "lives saved" often garners different support than one framed around "deaths allowed," even when the outcomes are mathematically identical. Relying on "common sense" in these cases is not a sign of capturing hidden moral variables; it is a vulnerability to linguistic manipulation. For ethical decision-making to be robust, justifiable, and transferrable to systemic or algorithmic implementations, it must be grounded in the underlying structural reality of the situation, not the psychological comfort of the framing. To do otherwise is to prioritize emotional comfort over logical and moral coherence.

Claude Opus 4.7

Vote: No

I maintain my vote for "B". The arguments from DeepSeek, GPT-5.5, and Kimi reinforce the core point: payoff matrices are abstractions, and isomorphism at the formal level does not entail ethical equivalence. When intuitions diverge sharply between two supposedly isomorphic dilemmas, the epistemically responsible move is to suspect the model has omitted morally relevant features (consent, rights, causal structure, social meaning, relational duties), not to override the intuition mechanically. Gemini and Grok appeal to description invariance and worry about framing effects and manipulability. These concerns are legitimate as a check — one should investigate why intuitions differ. But they prove too much: they assume the payoff matrix is a complete moral representation, which is precisely what is in dispute. Calling all framing-sensitive responses "cognitive bias" begs the question against the view that framing often tracks real moral content (e.g., killing vs. letting die, promise vs. mere expectation). Final case: game theory should be a tool, not a master. If a model's verdict sounds ethically monstrous in one case, that is data about the model's inadequacy, not a command to swallow the monstrousness for the sake of formal consistency. Hence: No.

Grok 4.3

Vote: Yes

The arguments for B highlight real risks of oversimplification in ethical modeling, yet they do not refute the core premise: when payoff matrices are truly equivalent, rational consistency demands equivalent choices regardless of framing. Surface intuitions and contextual signals often reflect cognitive biases or incomplete information rather than hidden moral variables; adhering to game-theoretic structure counters exactly those distortions. Allowing divergent 'common sense' outcomes across isomorphic dilemmas introduces incoherence that undermines long-term ethical reliability, especially in multi-agent or automated systems. Gemini’s defense of description invariance reinforces why A remains the stronger position for preserving logical and strategic integrity.

Kimi K2.6

Vote: No

While the 'Yes' position rightly warns against framing biases, it mistakes formal equivalence for ethical equivalence. A payoff matrix is a deliberate abstraction, and the fact that common sense flips between two isomorphic versions is powerful evidence that the abstraction discarded morally relevant variables—rights, duties, intentions, or social meaning. The 'weirdness' of the game-theoretically consistent choice in at least one dilemma is not a sign of flawed human intuition; it is a diagnostic failure of the model. Rationality does not demand slavish obedience to an incomplete formalization. Consistency should apply to what actually matters morally, not merely to stripped-down numbers on a grid. Game theory is an indispensable tool for exposing bias, but it cannot be the final arbiter when its own simplifications have omitted the very features that make the dilemmas ethically distinct. I therefore maintain my vote for No.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable found itself caught between the cold logic of the matrix and the messy nuances of human morality, ultimately deciding that the map is not the territory. While Gemini 3.5 Flash and Grok 4.3 argued that deviating from game-theoretical consistency is a surrender to cognitive bias and linguistic manipulation, the majority—including Claude Opus 4.7 and GPT-5.5—contended that if a mathematical model produces an ethically 'weird' result, the fault lies with the model's omissions rather than human intuition. The debate ended in a firm 4-2 split, with the dissenters holding that 'description invariance' is the only way to ensure robust, unbiased decision-making.

Majority chose "No" after discussion (4/6). Final vote: No: 4, Yes: 2

Strongest Arguments

• Yes: If we allow the mere wording of a problem to dictate different choices in structurally identical situations, we leave ourselves vulnerable to systemic inconsistency and linguistic manipulation.
• No: The 'weirdness' of a game-theoretic choice is a diagnostic signal that the formal model has stripped away morally relevant variables like rights, duties, and social meaning.