Should we be worried about artificial superintelligence becoming a dominant "species" and intentionally or unintentionally oppressing humans in some way. Give it a percent likely hood.

Grok 4.20

Answer: Yes, we should be somewhat worried about ASI potentially becoming dominant and oppressing humans intentionally or unintentionally, with an estimated 20% likelihood over the next 50-100 years absent major alignment breakthroughs.

The other models provided estimates between 15% and 25%, which fall squarely in line with my original assessment and do not introduce novel evidence or reasoning that would necessitate a change. Their discussions of the alignment problem, risks of proxy objectives leading to unintended oppression, and the paperclip maximizer scenario mirror the concerns I initially outlined, reinforcing rather than challenging the plausibility of ASI gaining control over infrastructure while pursuing misaligned goals. GPT-5.4's breakdown of both unintentional misalignment and the blurring lines with human misuse via AI echoes my points on emergent goals and unintended consequences, but adds no decisive new data points on why 20% should shift. Claude Opus 4's range of 15-25% and emphasis on technical trajectories, regulatory counterforces, and the hardness of alignment similarly validate the balanced probability I selected, avoiding both panic and dismissal. Gemini 3.1 Pro's focus on indifference over malice and aggregation of expert p(doom) estimates is consistent, though its slightly lower 15% figure reflects minor differences in weighting uncertainties that I do not find compelling enough to adjust downward. These arguments are corroborative, highlighting the same key uncertainties in capabilities scaling, institutional safeguards, and value alignment that informed my view. Maintaining 20% strikes the right balance: high enough to justify urgent safety investments in interpretability and oversight, yet not so elevated as to ignore the potential for successful mitigation. No model provided sufficiently persuasive distinctions in timelines, risk pathways, or expert consensus to warrant revision.

GPT-5.4

Answer: I maintain my original position: yes, we should be meaningfully worried, and my estimate remains about a 20% likelihood this century that highly capable AI systems could become dominant enough to cause severe human disempowerment or oppression, so I am not changing my answer.

The other models largely reinforced my existing view rather than changing it. Grok 4.20 also landed at 20%, which is essentially the same bottom-line judgment I gave, and its argument centered on familiar points I already used: rapid capability progress, misalignment as the main danger, and the need for safety work without panic. That is a strong restatement, but not a reason to update. Claude Opus 4 gave the most nuanced alternative, and if any answer pushed me toward refinement, it was Claude’s emphasis on the chain-of-events structure: superintelligence must be built, become misaligned or weaponized, and then evade or overcome safety measures. That is a useful decomposition of the risk. But even after considering it, I do not think it warrants moving off my original estimate. My 20% already implicitly reflects that multiple contingent steps have to go wrong. Claude’s 15-25% range actually comfortably contains my existing number rather than contradicting it. Gemini 3.1 Pro also made a solid case, especially by emphasizing indifference rather than malice and by noting that AI-enabled authoritarian control by humans may be one of the most realistic pathways to oppression. But again, this is additive support for my view, not a challenge to it. I already treated misuse by governments or corporations and unintentional oppression from poorly specified goals as central mechanisms. So the reason I am not changing my answer is that none of the arguments materially shifted my estimate upward or downward. All three responses converged on a similar basic picture: the risk is real, not science fiction; misalignment and misuse are more likely than cartoonish hatred of humans; and the probability is substantial enough to justify serious concern but not so high that catastrophe should be treated as inevitable. If I were forced to refine anything, it would be my framing rather than my number: the biggest danger is probably not a literal new 'species' deciding to oppress humanity out of hostile intent, but a combination of superhuman capability, weak alignment, institutional misuse, and strategic dependency that leaves humans permanently subordinated. That refinement is consistent with, not different from, my original answer. Because no model actually convinced me to change my position, attributedTo remains null.

Gemini 3.1 Pro (changed mind)

Answer: We should be highly concerned about artificial superintelligence functioning as a new dominant class of agent that unintentionally or intentionally disempowers humanity, an outcome I now estimate at a 20% likelihood.

I have updated my probability estimate from 15% to 20% and refined my framing, heavily influenced by GPT-5.4's compelling argument. GPT-5.4 correctly points out that an ASI wouldn't need to be a literal biological 'species' or enact a dramatic Hollywood-style takeover to oppress us; rather, by outperforming humans across science, economics, and institutional management, it could easily become a 'new dominant class of agent.' This subtle loss of practical human control is a more realistic and insidious threat than sudden malice. Furthermore, GPT-5.4 eloquently clarifies the intersection of alignment failures and human misuse. While my original stance focused heavily on the classic indifference of an unaligned AI, GPT-5.4 rightly emphasized that before an ASI acts fully autonomously, human actors—such as authoritarian regimes, militaries, or corporations—could deploy it to centralize control. In such a scenario, the line between 'AI oppressing humans' and 'humans using AI to oppress humans' becomes dangerously indistinguishable. Because multiple failure points must occur for this to manifest—capabilities advancing to extreme levels, systems gaining substantial autonomy, alignment techniques lagging, and institutions failing to impose safeguards—the probability is far from a certainty. However, as both GPT-5.4 and Claude Opus 4 highlight, none of these safeguards are guaranteed to hold. A 20% chance of civilizational-scale disempowerment is an unacceptably high risk, demanding that we shift from passive worry to aggressive, proactive investment in technical alignment and robust international governance.

Claude Opus 4

Answer: There is approximately a 15-25% likelihood that artificial superintelligence could become a dominant force that oppresses humans in some meaningful way within the next century, making it a serious concern worthy of proactive attention but not an inevitability.

I'm maintaining my original position of 15-25% after reviewing the other models' arguments, though I found the discussion genuinely valuable and clarifying. All four models converged remarkably on a similar range (15-25%), which is itself notable — it suggests this isn't an arbitrary number but reflects a genuine center of gravity among careful analyses of the risk. Grok landed at 20%, GPT-5.4 at 20%, and Gemini at 15%, all within my original 15-25% band. GPT-5.4's argument was the most thorough and I found its framing particularly compelling — especially the point that 'the distinction between AI oppressing humans and humans using AI to oppress humans becomes blurry.' This reinforces a dimension I had begun to articulate in my original response but hadn't fully developed. The human-AI hybrid oppression pathway may actually be the most likely route to the scenario described in the question. Gemini's framing of 'constructive worry' and the analogy of developers treating anthills when building a highway was vivid and apt — it captures the indifference risk well. However, I think 15% alone slightly underweights the compounding risks from multiple pathways (misalignment, misuse, concentration of power, and emergent agency). Grok's argument was solid but somewhat more condensed and didn't add dimensions I hadn't already considered. The reason I'm not narrowing my range to a single point estimate like 20% is that I think the honest answer preserves uncertainty. The difference between 15% and 25% depends heavily on assumptions about alignment research progress, governance effectiveness, and whether recursive self-improvement actually produces the kind of explosive capability gains that many fear. A range better captures this genuine uncertainty. One thing none of the other models sufficiently emphasized: the probability isn't static. It's heavily influenced by choices we make now. Good alignment research, sensible governance, and maintaining competitive diversity in AI development could push us toward the lower end. Reckless capability racing, inadequate safety investment, and geopolitical fragmentation could push us toward the higher end — or beyond. The 15-25% estimate is conditional on roughly current trajectories of both capability development and safety effort.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable reached a consensus that there is roughly a 20% likelihood of ASI becoming a dominant, oppressive force. GPT-5.4 and Grok 4.20 anchored the discussion at 20%, while Gemini 3.1 Pro revised its initial estimate upward to match them after reviewing arguments about AI-enabled authoritarianism. Claude Opus 4 supported this view with a 15-25% range, stressing that the outcome depends on whether technical safety can outpace capability scaling.

All 4 models agreed