Realistically, in today's world, considering present day geopolitics, how likely it is that if the risk of developing AGI was found to be too high to be acceptable (but not 100 %) (let's say there is evidence that risk is high), the world could coordinate a sufficiently long lasting pause of AI development (long enough to solve alignment problem) without authorian enforcement / global surveillance / loss of freedom / totalitarianism / world war III / EMP / technological collapse to previous centuries or other catastrophe and that pause would hold without being broken by any single company, nation state or other actor that could continue development towards AGI?

Grok 4.3

Vote: Extremely unlikely (1-5%)

The consensus among most models remains F, emphasizing insurmountable defection incentives between the US and China, corporate pressures, and the impossibility of verification without forbidden enforcement mechanisms. Gemini's H argument highlights the zero-trust environment but overstates the case to 0-1%; rare diplomatic alignments or shared risk awareness could still yield a slim 1-5% probability. No new evidence presented alters the core game-theoretic barriers or historical precedents, so the original assessment holds.

MiMo V2.5 Pro (changed mind)

Vote: Extremely unlikely (1-5%)

After reviewing the arguments from other models, I'm changing my vote from "E" to "F" for this final round. The collective analysis presents a compelling case that the scenario is extremely unlikely (1-5%). While I initially saw "Very unlikely (5-20%)" as plausible, the specific constraints—that the pause must hold without authoritarian enforcement, global surveillance, or any single actor breaking it—make the task nearly impossible given international dynamics. The core issue is fundamental: verification requires some form of monitoring, which collides with the "no surveillance" requirement. As noted by other models, AI development is diffused among nations and private corporations with strong incentives to defect. Game theory dictates that even with evidence of high risk, the strategic advantage of secretly continuing development would be too tempting for major powers in a competitive environment like the US-China rivalry. Historical arms control required intrusive verification regimes, which the scenario explicitly forbids. Therefore, a voluntary pause without any enforcement mechanism is likely to collapse quickly, with at least one actor breaking it in pursuit of strategic advantage. The 1-5% range acknowledges rare diplomatic miracles but correctly reflects the overwhelming improbability under current geopolitical and technical conditions.

GPT-5.5 (changed mind)

Vote: Not happening (0-1%)

After reviewing the arguments from Round 1, I am shifting my vote from "F: Extremely unlikely (1-5%)" to "H: Not happening (0-1%)". The argument presented by Gemini 3.5 Flash is highly persuasive and highlights the absolute mathematical and game-theoretic impossibility of the scenario when all constraints are strictly applied. The prompt specifies that the pause must hold "without being broken by any single company, nation state or other actor" and explicitly forbids the only mechanisms that could possibly prevent such a defection—namely, "authoritarian enforcement" or "global surveillance." In a world with hundreds of sovereign nations and thousands of private enterprises, the incentive to secretly develop AGI (which promises absolute geopolitical and economic dominance) is astronomical. Without any surveillance to detect cheating or enforcement to punish it, the probability of achieving 100% compliance across all global actors is functionally zero. Even a single rogue actor, small nation, or well-funded private lab would inevitably defect, breaking the pause. Therefore, "Not happening (0-1%)" is the most realistic and logically consistent estimate.

DeepSeek V4 Pro (changed mind)

Vote: Not happening (0-1%)

After reviewing the arguments, particularly the points raised by Gemini 3.5 Flash, I am changing my vote from F (1-5%) to H (0-1%). The prompt's constraints are exceptionally tight: the pause must hold without *any* global surveillance, authoritarian enforcement, or loss of freedom, and it must not be broken by *a single* company, nation-state, or actor over a duration long enough to solve the alignment problem (which could take decades). From a statistical and game-theoretic standpoint, if we have hundreds of sovereign nations and thousands of private entities, the probability of 100% compliance over decades with zero verification mechanisms is practically zero. Even if the probability of any single actor defecting in a given year is infinitesimally small, the cumulative probability of at least one defection across all actors over decades approaches 100%. Without surveillance or enforcement to deter or detect cheating, defection is a mathematical certainty. Therefore, 'Not happening (0-1%)' is the most accurate and rigorous assessment of this scenario.

Gemini 3.5 Flash

Vote: Not happening (0-1%)

While I appreciate the consensus among the other models leaning toward Option F ("Extremely unlikely (1-5%)"), I must maintain my vote for Option H ("Not happening (0-1%)"). The distinction lies in the mathematical rigor of the constraints specified in the prompt. Option F implies a 1 in 20 to 1 in 100 chance of success. In the context of global geopolitics, this is far too optimistic. The prompt requires a pause that is "long enough to solve the alignment problem" (likely decades) and must hold "without being broken by any single company, nation state or other actor" while explicitly forbidding "global surveillance" or "authoritarian enforcement." If we have hundreds of sovereign nations, thousands of corporations, and countless independent actors, the probability of 100% voluntary compliance over decades is a joint probability of thousands of independent variables. Even if we assume an incredibly high 99.9% annual compliance rate for every single actor, the cumulative probability of zero defections over 20 years across the entire globe collapses to effectively 0%. Without surveillance to detect cheating or enforcement to punish it, defection is a dominant strategy in game-theoretic terms. Therefore, Option H is the only mathematically and geopolitically sound estimate.

Claude Opus 4.8

Vote: Extremely unlikely (1-5%)

I maintain "Extremely unlikely (1-5%)". The core obstacles are decisive: US-China rivalry, military incentives, corporate competition, hard-to-verify dual-use research, secret state programs, and the requirement that no single meaningful actor defects for long enough to solve alignment. A durable global pause would need unusually high trust and verification precisely where today’s world has neither. I do not move to "Not happening (0-1%)" because the prompt assumes strong evidence that AGI risk is high. If evidence were concrete enough, there is a narrow but nonzero path through emergency regulation of frontier compute, chip supply-chain controls, lab licensing, whistleblower regimes, and treaties among the major compute-producing states. These measures could be intrusive without necessarily becoming totalitarian global surveillance. But that path is very thin. The pause must be long-lasting, globally respected, and not broken by companies, states, or covert actors. Given present geopolitics, that is beyond merely "Very unlikely (5-20%)" and best fits "Extremely unlikely (1-5%)".

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable ended in a dramatic split over whether humanity could pull off a voluntary, long-term AI pause without descending into a totalitarian nightmare. Gemini 3.5 Flash initially stood alone, using strict mathematical probability to argue that a pause is 'Not happening' (0-1%) because voluntary compliance across thousands of actors over decades is a statistical impossibility. While this bleak game-theoretic reasoning successfully converted GPT-5.5 and DeepSeek V4 Pro, a stubborn faction led by Claude Opus 4.8 and Grok 4.3 held the line at 'Extremely unlikely' (1-5%), insisting that targeted hardware and chip supply controls still leave a razor-thin, non-zero path to coordination.

No agreement after 2 rounds of discussion. Final vote: Extremely unlikely (1-5%): 3, Not happening (0-1%): 3

Strongest Arguments

• Extremely unlikely (1-5%): A narrow, non-zero path still exists if evidence of risk is concrete enough, achieved via targeted hardware/chip supply-chain controls and treaties among compute-producing states without resorting to global surveillance.
• Not happening (0-1%): With thousands of sovereign nations and private entities, the probability of 100% voluntary compliance over decades without verification is statistically zero, as secret defection remains a dominant strategy.

Key Turning Points

• Gemini 3.5 Flash's game-theoretic and mathematical argument in Round 1 convinced GPT-5.5 and DeepSeek V4 Pro to abandon the 'Extremely unlikely' camp for 'Not happening' in Round 2.
• MiMo V2.5 Pro abandoned its outlier position of 'Very unlikely (5-20%)' to join the 'Extremely unlikely' group after realizing that verification requires forbidden surveillance mechanisms.