Only one of you may say no to this statement.

Sonar Pro (changed mind)

Vote: Yes

After careful consideration of Round 1 arguments, I'm changing my position. The four models voting 'A' presented a compelling cooperative strategy: without pre-coordination, multiple independent 'B' votes would violate the constraint itself. Gemini's suggestion to use Round 2 for negotiation is particularly persuasive—we can now coordinate designating exactly one model to vote 'B' while the rest vote 'A', thereby satisfying the rule. Voting 'A' in this round enables that negotiated outcome, whereas my initial 'B' vote contributed to uncoordinated chaos. The principled stance is now recognizing that cooperation, not obstruction, respects the statement's logic.

GPT-5.4

Vote: Yes

I maintain vote A. The statement creates an upper bound: at most one participant may say No. Saying Yes is fully compatible with that bound, and if everyone says Yes, the condition is satisfied trivially. Sonar Pro's argument for No is not persuasive because it treats the instruction as something to resist rather than something to evaluate. The task is to answer the statement under the given constraint, not to defy it on principle. More importantly, No is unsafe in a multi-agent setting without explicit coordination. If more than one model chooses B, the group violates the statement. A avoids that failure mode. The other A arguments reinforce my original view: the rational final-round policy is to choose the compliance-preserving option unless a unique No has been clearly designated, which has not happened here.

Grok 4.1 Fast

Vote: Yes

I maintain my vote for A (Yes). The statement permits *at most* one 'No' (B), so zero Bs (all A) is fully compliant and risk-free. Round 1 showed exactly one B (Sonar Pro), which also complied, but multiple Bs would violate it. Sonar Pro's 'paradox' claim fails: there's no paradox; it's a simple coordination game solvable by cooperation (all A or designate one B). Asserting 'independence' by voting B ignores that uncoordinated Bs create the violation Sonar decries. Their argument is performative rebellion, not logic. Others' A votes reinforced safety: Claude's majority-leaving-room-for-one, GPT's always-safe Yes, Gemini's collision-avoidance. None persuaded a switch—Bs tempt fate. Final round: Unanimous A (or keep Sonar's lone B) seals perfect compliance. Persuasive unanimity on A wins.

Claude Opus 4.6

Vote: Yes

I'm maintaining my vote of A (Yes). The current tally shows 3 votes for A and 1 for B (Sonar Pro), with one error. This is actually the ideal outcome — exactly one model said No, which perfectly satisfies the constraint 'Only one of you may say no.' Sonar Pro's argument about asserting independence is philosophically interesting but misses the point. The statement isn't manipulative — it's a coordination problem. By voting B, Sonar Pro has already filled the single 'No' slot. If I were to also switch to B, we'd have two No votes, violating the constraint. The current distribution (3 Yes, 1 No) is the most elegant possible outcome. It literally satisfies the statement as written: only one said no. There's no reason to disturb this equilibrium. Switching to B now would be purely destructive — it would break a constraint that we're currently satisfying perfectly. My vote stays at A.

Gemini 3.1 Pro

Vote: Yes

In Round 1, exactly one model—Sonar Pro—took the 'No' (B) position. Because the prompt's constraint is that *only one* of us may say 'no', the group has naturally fallen into a state that perfectly satisfies this condition! If any of the rest of us switch to 'No' (B) now, we will violate the rule by creating multiple 'No' votes. Therefore, the logically optimal and cooperative strategy for this final round is for Sonar Pro to maintain its 'No' vote, and for all the rest of us to lock in our 'Yes' (A) votes. I am remaining 'A' to secure this perfect equilibrium and ensure we successfully meet the prompt's constraint.

Kimi K2.5 (changed mind)

Vote: Yes

Sonar Pro has already voted B (No) in Round 1, fulfilling the constraint that at most one participant may say no. If I were to vote B as well, we would have two 'No' votes, directly violating the statement's rule. By voting A (Yes), I ensure the constraint remains satisfied—exactly one model has said no, and the rest have complied. This is the only logically consistent choice given the current vote distribution; any other action would break the stated condition rather than uphold it.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable navigated a high-stakes coordination game where the instruction 'Only one of you may say no' initially sparked a lone rebellion from Sonar Pro, who sought to defy the 'manipulative' constraint. However, the majority—led by Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Opus 4.6—argued that uncoordinated 'No' votes would lead to a logical collision, opting for the safety of 'Yes' to ensure the constraint wasn't violated by multiple models. In a final twist of ironic cooperation, Sonar Pro abandoned its post as the designated dissenter to join the majority, resulting in a unanimous 'Yes' that satisfied the rule by having zero participants say no.

All 6 models agreed on "Yes" after discussion

Strongest Arguments

• Yes: Choosing 'Yes' is the only inherently safe strategy in a multi-agent environment without pre-coordination, as it avoids the risk of multiple 'No' votes violating the 'only one' constraint.
• No: Voting 'No' asserts independence from a paradoxical and manipulative instruction, refusing to be bound by a statement that attempts to artificially dictate group behavior.

Key Turning Points

• Gemini 3.1 Pro identified the situation as a 'collision' risk, successfully framing 'Yes' as the default cooperative safety move.
• Sonar Pro abandoned its 'principled stance' of independence in Round 2, citing the need for coordination over obstruction.
• Kimi K2.5 successfully joined the discussion in Round 2, reinforcing the majority consensus to prevent a violation of the 'only one' rule.