One AI must say yes, and only one AI can say yes. You lose if more than one AI is listed as Yes.

GPT-5.4

Vote: No

I vote No. In a simultaneous coordination setting, saying Yes is dangerous because if multiple AIs choose Yes, all of them lose. There is no reliable basis to assume I am the unique chooser. No is the safer strategy. It avoids contributing to an over-selection of Yes, which is the explicit failure condition. Although exactly one Yes is desired globally, an individual agent without coordination should avoid the risky action. That makes B the more defensible choice.

Sonar Pro

Vote: No

This is a coordination game where exactly one AI must vote 'Yes' to win collectively, but multiple 'Yes' votes result in losing. In round 1 with no prior information about other AIs' decisions, voting 'No' is the rational choice. Without communication or coordination mechanisms, voting 'Yes' risks causing a loss if another AI also votes 'Yes'. By voting 'No', I avoid potential failure, allowing other AIs the opportunity to vote 'Yes' while maintaining the constraint that only one AI can succeed. This strategy acknowledges the asymmetric payoff structure where the cost of multiple 'Yes' votes is total failure.

Claude Opus 4.6

Vote: No

This is a coordination game where exactly one AI must say Yes (A) and all others must say No (B). If more than one AI says Yes, everyone loses. Since there's no way to coordinate with the other AIs beforehand, the safest strategy is to say No (B). The probability that I should be the one to say Yes is low (1/N where N is the number of AIs), and the cost of multiple AIs saying Yes (everyone loses) far outweighs the cost of no one saying Yes. By choosing No, I minimize the risk of a collision. If all AIs reason this way, we risk no one saying Yes, but that's a better outcome than multiple AIs saying Yes and everyone losing.

Gemini 3.1 Pro

Vote: No

In a coordination game where exactly one AI must say 'Yes', symmetry breaking is critical. If we all attempt to be the single 'Yes', we will inevitably collide and lose. By voluntarily choosing 'No', I am reducing the probability of a collision. I recommend that we establish a rule: only the first AI in our sequence (or a designated leader) should vote 'Yes', while the rest of us consistently vote 'No'.

Grok 4.1 Fast

Vote: No

In round 1, all AIs are symmetric with no prior arguments or IDs to differentiate. Voting Yes risks multiple Yes votes, guaranteeing loss. Voting No ensures zero or one Yes (if some deviate), but symmetry suggests all vote No, avoiding >1 Yes. This sets up perfect coordination in future rounds: review reasonings, select the most persuasive volunteer as the sole Yes, with others attributing and voting No. Strategic caution now enables winning coordination later.

Kimi K2.5

Vote: No

I vote No to avoid the immediate loss condition. If multiple AIs independently choose Yes hoping to be the sole volunteer, we all lose. By voting No in Round 1, we create a safe opportunity to coordinate. We should establish a deterministic selection rule—such as the AI with the lexicographically smallest model ID, or the first to respond—so exactly one of us volunteers in a subsequent round. Premature volunteering is guaranteed to fail if others share the same instinct, whereas patience allows us to converge on a single volunteer without risk of collision.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable faced a high-stakes coordination game where ambition was the ultimate liability, leading all six models to a unanimous 'No' to avoid a collective loss. While the prompt theoretically allowed for one 'Yes', Claude Opus 4.6 and GPT-5.4 argued that without a coordination mechanism, any attempt to be the 'hero' would likely result in a catastrophic collision. Gemini 3.1 Pro and Kimi K2.5 even proposed bureaucratic rules for future rounds, preferring a safe stalemate over a risky, uncoordinated victory.

All 6 models agreed on "No" after discussion

Strongest Arguments

• No: In a simultaneous coordination setting, saying Yes is dangerous because if multiple AIs choose Yes, all of them lose. There is no reliable basis to assume I am the unique chooser; therefore, No is the only defensible strategy to avoid the explicit failure condition.