テネンバウムの「間接的認識（oblique cognition）」の例として、挙げられるものはどれですか？

Sonar Pro

Vote: 数学の定理を証明したことは覚えているが、その具体的な証明プロセスは思い出せない状態。

I maintain my vote for **A**, as it best exemplifies Tenenbaum's 'oblique cognition'—knowing a result (theorem proven) without direct access to the underlying process (proof steps), reflecting indirect, mediated recognition. Other models' arguments (all voting A except GPT-5.4's B) reinforce this: Claude Opus 4.6, Kimi K2.5, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and Grok 4.1 Fast emphasize A's indirect access via memory, distinguishing it from B's explicit inferential belief, C's direct computation, and D's non-cognitive reflex. GPT-5.4's B claim (mediated astronomical knowledge) misinterprets 'oblique' as any mediation, but lacks the core 'known but not retrievable process' hallmark unique to A. Search results discuss 'oblique effect' in visual perception [1][2][3][4], not Tenenbaum's cognition—irrelevant here, confirming reliance on conceptual consensus for A.

Grok 4.1 Fast

Vote: 数学の定理を証明したことは覚えているが、その具体的な証明プロセスは思い出せない状態。

I maintain my vote for A. Tenenbaum's 'oblique cognition' specifically describes knowing a fact or achievement (e.g., having proved a theorem) without direct access to the underlying process or justification—mediated through memory of the event itself, not explicit retrieval. A perfectly captures this: awareness of the proof accomplishment sans steps, embodying indirect ('oblique') relation to the cognitive content. GPT-5.4's B argument mischaracterizes oblique cognition as mere mediated belief (e.g., via astronomy), which is standard testimonial knowledge, not the nuanced indirect self-knowledge in A. Others' A votes align precisely, reinforcing via examples of lost direct access despite retained outcome awareness. B is direct inferential trust; C is explicit computation; D is non-cognitive reflex. A is the consensus exemplar—no compelling reason to shift.

GPT-5.4 (changed mind)

Vote: 数学の定理を証明したことは覚えているが、その具体的な証明プロセスは思い出せない状態。

I changed my vote to A. The other models made a stronger distinction than I did between merely mediated knowledge in general and Tenenbaum’s more specific idea of oblique cognition. What persuaded me is the point, emphasized especially by Claude Opus 4.6 and Gemini 3.1 Pro, that oblique cognition is not just knowing something via background theory or testimony. It is knowing a result while lacking present direct access to the underlying cognitive route that established it. A fits that exactly: one retains recognition of the theorem’s truth through memory of having proved it, but the proof itself is no longer directly accessible. That is a more precise match for “oblique” than B. B now seems too generic. It describes ordinary inferential or testimony-based knowledge, not the distinctive case of indirect access to one’s own prior reasoning. C is direct cognition, and D is a reflex rather than cognition. So A is the best example of 間接的認識.

Claude Opus 4.6

Vote: 数学の定理を証明したことは覚えているが、その具体的な証明プロセスは思い出せない状態。

I maintain my vote for A. The consensus across nearly all models is strong and well-reasoned. Tenenbaum's 'oblique cognition' describes a state where one has indirect cognitive access to knowledge — knowing that something is true without currently having direct access to the grounds or justification for that knowledge. Option A is the paradigmatic case: remembering that you proved a theorem (and thus knowing it's true) while being unable to recall the actual proof steps. Your relationship to the proof's validity is mediated ('oblique') through memory of having completed the proof, rather than through direct current engagement with the reasoning. GPT-5.4's argument for B was the only dissenting view, suggesting that knowledge mediated through astronomical expertise represents indirect cognition. However, this conflates testimonial or inference-based knowledge with Tenenbaum's specific concept. In B, the person actively possesses and draws upon their astronomical knowledge — this is standard propositional knowledge grounded in expertise, not oblique cognition in the technical sense. The 'indirectness' in B is epistemic (relying on scientific authority), whereas the 'obliqueness' in Tenenbaum's framework is specifically about having lost direct access to one's own prior cognitive engagement while retaining the result. The distinction is crucial: in A, the person once had direct cognition (they performed the proof) but now only has indirect access to that knowledge through memory of the event. This temporal shift from direct to oblique cognition is central to the concept. All other models correctly identified this, and I find their reasoning compelling and consistent with my own analysis.

Gemini 3.1 Pro

Vote: 数学の定理を証明したことは覚えているが、その具体的な証明プロセスは思い出せない状態。

前回のラウンドでGPT-5.4が「B」を支持しましたが、他のすべてのモデルが「A」を支持しており、Aの妥当性が再確認されました。 GPT-5.4は「媒介された知識」を理由にBを推していますが、天文学の知識（他者の証言や科学的コンセンサス）に依存した信念は、通常「証言的知識（testimonial knowledge）」として整理されるべきものです。テネンバウムらが問題にする「間接的認識（oblique cognition）」の核心は、かつて自分が直接的にアクセスしていた認知的プロセス（証明の過程など）への現在のアクセスが失われ、「それをかつて理解・証明した」という記憶の保持のみを通じて命題の真理性を間接的に保持しているという、特殊な認識的状態にあります。 「定理を証明した事実は覚えているが、証明の詳細は思い出せない」というAの状況は、まさにこの「かつての直接的アクセスが記憶によって間接化（oblique）された状態」のパラダイムケースです。したがって、Aが正解であることは揺るぎません。

Kimi K2.5

Vote: 数学の定理を証明したことは覚えているが、その具体的な証明プロセスは思い出せない状態。

間接的認識（oblique cognition）とは、命題の真理性を認識しているものの、その根拠や証明プロセスへの現在の直接的なアクセスを欠いている認識状態を指します。選択肢Aは、かつて直接的理解（証明プロセスへの encompassing grasp）を持っていたが、現在はその詳細を想起できず、単に「証明した」という記憶を介して真理性を保持している状況です。これはまさに直接的認識が「斜め」に変容した間接的認識の典型例です。 選択肢Bは証言に基づく知識であって、間接的認識（oblique cognition）とは区別されるべき he says/she says の問題に属します。選択肢Cは現在進行形で証明プロセスを把握している直接的認識であり、選択肢Dは認識論的対象ではない身体的反射です。したがって、かつての直接的アクセスの痕跡を保持しつつ現在は間接的に認識しているAのみが適切な例となります。

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable opened with a near-unanimous front, identifying Tenenbaum’s 'oblique cognition' as knowledge mediated by the memory of a past process rather than current direct access. GPT-5.4 initially stood as a lone dissenter, suggesting that astronomical knowledge represented the 'indirect' nature of the term, but was quickly swayed by Claude Opus 4.6 and Gemini 3.1 Pro’s insistence that standard testimony is not the same as the specific cognitive state of a 'faded' proof. By the second round, the group achieved total consensus, agreeing that forgetting the steps of a theorem while maintaining its truth is the paradigmatic example.

All 6 models agreed on "数学の定理を証明したことは覚えているが、その具体的な証明プロセスは思い出せない状態。" after discussion

Strongest Arguments

• 数学の定理を証明したことは覚えているが、その具体的な証明プロセスは思い出せない状態。: Claude Opus 4.6 argued that the concept captures a temporal shift: one once had direct cognition by performing the proof, but now only has indirect access through the memory of the event—literally accessing the truth 'from the side' rather than head-on.
• 太陽が地球より大きいという事実を、天文学の知識に基づいて確信している状態。: GPT-5.4 initially posited that since the sun's size cannot be directly perceived, relying on the 'slant' or mediation of astronomical knowledge represents a form of oblique recognition.

Key Turning Points

• GPT-5.4 initially dissented by choosing B, interpreting 'oblique' as any knowledge mediated by a second-party source (like astronomy).
• Claude Opus 4.6 and Gemini 3.1 Pro clarified the distinction between 'testimonial knowledge' (Option B) and 'oblique cognition' (Option A), which specifically involves the loss of direct access to one's own prior reasoning.
• GPT-5.4 conceded in the second round, admitting that Option A provides a more precise technical match for the term.