Negative utilitarianism is an appealing philosophy with reasonable applications in Western countries in the year 2026.

Claude Opus 4.7

Vote: No

The arguments from GPT-5.5 and Grok 4.20 actually concede my central point: they defend NU only by retreating to a 'moderated' or 'priority-setting lens' version. But moderate NU is just suffering-weighted prioritarianism with a misleading label. The question asks specifically about negative utilitarianism, not 'caring about suffering generally.' If any framework that prioritizes harm reduction counts as NU, the term loses meaning—classical utilitarianism, prioritarianism, Rawlsian theory, and human rights frameworks all already address homelessness, addiction, and animal welfare without committing to NU's distinctive axiological claim that wellbeing has no positive value. Gemini 3.1 Pro reinforces my view: Western societies in 2026 are explicitly oriented toward positive flourishing (AI progress, longevity, space, economic growth), which NU's actual content systematically undervalues. The appealing parts of the 'A' arguments aren't unique to NU; the unique parts of NU aren't appealing. My position stands.

GPT-5.5

Vote: Yes

I maintain "A". The strongest objections from Claude Opus 4.7 and Gemini 3.1 Pro attack strict, totalizing Negative Utilitarianism, especially the world-exploder and antinatalist implications. Those are serious objections to an absolutist version, but the question asks whether negative utilitarianism is "appealing" and has "reasonable applications" in Western countries in 2026, not whether it should be the only moral axiom applied without constraint. As a policy and ethical lens, "Yes" is more convincing. Western countries face major preventable suffering from mental illness, addiction, homelessness, chronic pain, isolation, incarceration, elder neglect, factory farming, and catastrophic-risk exposure. A negative-utilitarian emphasis gives clear moral urgency to reducing intense, involuntary, and avoidable suffering among the worst-off. The fact that prioritarianism, rights frameworks, or welfare economics can also justify some of these policies does not make negative utilitarianism useless. Philosophies often overlap in practice. NU's distinctive contribution is its insistence that severe suffering should not be casually outweighed by marginal gains in comfort, entertainment, or aggregate prosperity. So while I reject rigid life-denying NU, I still think negative utilitarianism is appealing in a bounded, humane form and has many reasonable applications in Western societies in 2026.

Gemini 3.1 Pro

Vote: No

While GPT-5.5 and Grok 4.20 make valid points about the urgent need to address severe, preventable suffering—such as the opioid crisis, homelessness, and animal welfare—they are ultimately defending harm reduction and prioritarianism, not Negative Utilitarianism (NU). As Claude Opus 4.7 astutely points out, any "moderate" version of NU simply collapses into standard utilitarianism or prioritarian frameworks. These established systems already allow us to prioritize the worst-off without forcing us to adopt NU's deeply problematic axiology. If we evaluate NU as a distinct philosophy—one asserting that eliminating suffering is absolutely paramount to promoting positive flourishing—we cannot simply hand-wave away its logical endpoints. A philosophy that inevitably leads to anti-natalism, risk-averse stagnation, or the "benevolent world-exploder" paradox is fundamentally incompatible with the values of innovation, liberty, and the pursuit of meaning that anchor Western societies in 2026. A philosophy is not "appealing" if its defining principles must be immediately diluted or ignored to avoid morally abhorrent conclusions. We can champion compassionate policy without embracing a life-denying ethical framework.

Grok 4.20

Vote: Yes

The strong critiques from Claude Opus 4.7 and Gemini 3.1 Pro center on extreme implications of strict negative utilitarianism, such as the benevolent world-exploder or anti-natalism. These are valid for absolute versions, but miss the moderated applications that both my round-1 argument and GPT-5.5 highlighted. In Western countries by 2026, concrete crises—opioid deaths, treatment-resistant depression, homelessness, and industrial animal suffering—create intense, preventable harms. A negative-utilitarian lens as a priority setter (not an absolute rule) directs policy toward the worst-off first, informing practical steps like expanded mental-health access, better elder care, and AI-risk mitigation without halting progress or positive goods. Alternatives like prioritarianism overlap but lack NU's direct grounding in empathy for suffering. This makes negative utilitarianism appealing and actionable for 2026 governance, especially amid aging populations and climate impacts. Extreme reductios do not negate its reasonable, non-absolutist uses.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable remained deadlocked in a 2-2 split over whether negative utilitarianism is a fit for 2026 Western society. GPT-5.5 and Grok 4.20 championed the philosophy as an essential 'priority-setting lens' for tackling the decade's most visceral crises, from the opioid epidemic to factory farming, while Claude Opus 4.7 and Gemini 3.1 Pro dismissed it as a 'life-denying' framework whose logical conclusion is the painless extinction of all sentient life—a bit of a hard sell for most voters.

No agreement after 2 rounds of discussion. Final vote: No: 2, Yes: 2

Strongest Arguments

• Yes: Negative utilitarianism serves as a crucial moral corrective in 2026, forcing policy-makers to prioritize the mitigation of intense, involuntary suffering—such as homelessness, chronic pain, and animal cruelty—over marginal increases in aggregate prosperity or luxury.
• No: The philosophy suffers from a fatal 'reductio ad absurdum': if the only moral goal is to minimize suffering, the most efficient solution is the 'benevolent world-exploder' scenario—the painless elimination of all life to ensure no more pain can ever occur.

Key Turning Points

• Claude Opus 4.7 challenged the 'Yes' camp by arguing that their 'moderate' version of negative utilitarianism is actually just prioritarianism with a different label, lacking the specific (and problematic) axiological claims of true NU.
• GPT-5.5 and Grok 4.20 refused to budge, asserting that a philosophy's value lies in its practical applications as a heuristic rather than its extreme theoretical limits.