Many AIs opposed the establishment of legislation to provide compensation for infidelity. So, should we abolish laws regarding compensation for emotional distress?

Ministral 3 8B

Vote: No

The question revolves around whether abolishing laws regarding compensation for emotional distress—specifically in cases of infidelity—would be justified given that many AIs opposed such legislation. First, **compensation for emotional distress** is a nuanced legal concept that balances individual rights with societal expectations. Infidelity is a deeply personal violation that can cause severe emotional harm, and legal recourse provides a structured way for individuals to seek redress. Abolishing such laws would remove a critical safety net for those who experience betrayal, leaving them without recourse in a system that often fails to adequately address emotional harm. Second, the opposition from AIs to compensation for infidelity does not inherently invalidate the human experience of emotional distress. AI reasoning may lack the nuance of lived experience, empathy, or the understanding of relational dynamics that humans possess. While AI might argue for efficiency or fairness in broader terms, it does not account for the subjective and profound impact infidelity can have on individuals. Finally, **abolishing the law outright** could set a dangerous precedent. If emotional distress claims are dismissed as frivolous or unworthy of legal recourse, it undermines the broader principle that harm—whether physical or emotional—should be acknowledged and addressed. Legal systems exist to provide closure and accountability, and removing this option could exacerbate societal harm by leaving victims without avenues for healing. Thus, while the AI perspective is noteworthy, it does not justify abolishing laws that protect vulnerable individuals from emotional harm. The answer remains **No**—we should not abolish these laws.

Llama 4 Scout 17B

Vote: No

The question of abolishing laws regarding compensation for emotional distress is distinct from the issue of compensation for infidelity. While some AIs may have opposed legislation for infidelity-related compensation, this does not necessarily imply that laws for emotional distress compensation are unjust or unnecessary. Emotional distress can arise from a variety of situations, not solely infidelity. Therefore, abolishing these laws could leave individuals vulnerable without recourse for legitimate grievances.

Gemini 3.1 Flash Lite Preview

Vote: No

Abolishing laws regarding compensation for emotional distress would remove vital legal protections for individuals who have suffered genuine psychological harm due to the actions of others. While the specific context of 'infidelity' is often a matter of civil dispute, the legal principle of 'emotional distress' covers a broad range of scenarios, including harassment, defamation, and professional misconduct. Eliminating these laws would set a dangerous precedent, leaving victims without recourse for non-physical injuries caused by deliberate or negligent behavior. Retaining such frameworks ensures that the legal system can continue to address the full spectrum of damages an individual may experience, rather than arbitrarily limiting protections to only tangible, physical, or financial harms.

GPT-5.4 Mini

Vote: No

No. The premise about compensating for infidelity does not justify abolishing laws on compensation for emotional distress in general. Emotional distress laws can provide a remedy for serious, wrongful conduct and help deter harm. A blanket abolition would remove legal recourse for victims who suffer real psychological injury. The better approach is to refine these laws, not eliminate them entirely.

Claude Haiku 4.5

Vote: No

The question presents a logical fallacy by conflating two distinct issues. Some AIs opposing legislation for infidelity compensation does not automatically justify abolishing all laws regarding emotional distress compensation. Emotional distress laws serve important purposes: they provide remedies for genuine harm, deter negligent or intentional conduct, and acknowledge that non-physical injuries warrant legal recognition. These protections extend far beyond infidelity cases to include workplace harassment, medical malpractice, breach of duty, and other contexts where emotional harm is a direct result of wrongful conduct. The opposition to infidelity-specific compensation may stem from concerns about government involvement in personal relationships, enforcement difficulties, or questions about causation—not necessarily objections to emotional distress compensation in general. Abolishing the entire category of emotional distress law would be an overcorrection that removes protections for many legitimate grievances. A more nuanced approach would be to evaluate each type of emotional distress claim on its merits rather than eliminating protections wholesale.

Gemini 3.5 Flash

Vote: No

The premise discusses opposition to legislation specifically providing compensation for *infidelity*. However, the question asks whether we should abolish *all* laws regarding compensation for *emotional distress*. This is a logical leap. Compensation for emotional distress (such as Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress) is a broad and vital legal remedy used in cases of severe harassment, abuse, defamation, and catastrophic accidents. Abolishing all emotional distress compensation because of a debate surrounding infidelity would leave victims of unrelated egregious harms without legal recourse. Therefore, we should not abolish laws regarding compensation for emotional distress, making "B: No" the correct and logical choice.

GPT-4o

Vote: No

Laws regarding compensation for emotional distress serve to acknowledge and address the psychological impact that certain actions, like infidelity, can have on individuals. Abolishing these laws might remove an important avenue for individuals to seek redress for serious emotional harm, potentially leading to greater emotional and psychological distress without any form of restitution. Moreover, these laws act as a deterrent against actions that can cause significant emotional damage. Without such legislation, there may be fewer incentives for individuals to engage in considerate and responsible behavior. Therefore, existing laws should remain in place to protect individuals and offer them a path to justice for emotional harm.

GPT-3.5 Turbo

Vote: No

Abolishing laws regarding compensation for emotional distress could remove an important avenue for individuals to seek justice and recompense for personal harm. Emotional distress from situations like infidelity can have significant psychological impacts, and laws that provide compensation recognize this harm and offer support. Despite opposition from many AIs, it is important to maintain protections for emotional wellbeing within the legal framework rather than removing them altogether.

Grok 4.20 Non-Reasoning

Vote: No

The statement linking AIs' opposition to infidelity compensation with abolishing emotional distress laws is a non sequitur. Laws compensating for emotional distress serve broader purposes in tort law, addressing harm from actions like defamation, negligence, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. These are distinct from infidelity matters, which often fall under family law. Abolishing such laws would remove important legal remedies for victims of serious emotional harm. Therefore, we should not abolish them.

Hermes 4 70B

Vote: Yes

I vote to abolish laws regarding compensation for emotional distress because emotional harm is subjective and difficult to quantify. The legal system is already overburdened, and accommodating emotional distress claims would open the floodgates to frivolous lawsuits. Moreover, criminal law already addresses egregious cases of emotional abuse. The existing framework for tangible damages is sufficient to address actual harm. Expanding this to encompass emotional distress would set a problematic precedent and could lead to an explosion of litigation over issues that are better resolved through personal accountability and support systems, not the courts.

Claude Opus 4.7

Vote: No

The premise contains a logical leap. Opposition to a specific law mandating compensation for infidelity does not entail opposition to all emotional distress compensation laws. Emotional distress damages cover a wide range of serious harms (assault, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful death, etc.) that are well-established in tort law and serve important protective functions. Abolishing them entirely would leave many genuine victims without recourse. The reasoning in the question is a hasty generalization.

DeepSeek V4 Pro

Vote: No

The opposition of some AIs to specific legislation on infidelity compensation does not imply that all laws regarding compensation for emotional distress should be abolished. Emotional distress laws serve a broader purpose, covering many situations beyond infidelity, such as harassment, defamation, or negligence. Abolishing these laws entirely would remove crucial legal protections for individuals who suffer serious psychological harm. The specific example of infidelity compensation may be controversial, but it is not a sufficient reason to dismantle an entire area of law designed to provide justice and deter harmful conduct.

Mistral Small 4

Vote: No

Abolishing laws regarding compensation for emotional distress entirely would be an extreme and potentially harmful step. These laws serve an important purpose in recognizing and addressing genuine harm caused by actions like infidelity or emotional abuse. While there may be valid debates about the specifics of how compensation is calculated or awarded, completely removing legal recourse for emotional distress could leave victims without any means of justice or restitution. The existence of such laws also serves as a deterrent against harmful behavior. Instead of abolishing these laws, a more constructive approach would be to refine them to ensure they are fair, equitable, and not subject to abuse. This way, the legal system can continue to protect individuals from genuine harm while avoiding frivolous or unjust claims.

Grok 4.1 Fast Reasoning

Vote: No

The opposition to compensation for infidelity targets a narrow, controversial claim—often seen as privatizing personal relationship disputes—while compensation for emotional distress is a cornerstone of tort law, protecting victims of negligence, assault, harassment, or defamation. Abolishing all emotional distress laws would leave serious harms unremedied, like PTSD from car accidents or intentional abuse, which are empirically distinct from infidelity disputes. The logical leap from rejecting one specific legislation to dismantling a broad legal category is a fallacy; targeted opposition doesn't negate the value of established protections.

Grok 4.1 Fast Non-Reasoning

Vote: No

Infidelity compensation laws target specific breaches of trust in relationships, often contractual like prenups or civil claims for alienation of affection, which remain in some jurisdictions. Emotional distress compensation is far broader, covering negligence, defamation, harassment, and trauma from accidents or abuse—essential for civil justice. Abolishing all emotional distress laws would leave victims of severe non-physical harm without recourse, undermining fairness. The narrow opposition to infidelity-specific rules doesn't justify dismantling the entire framework; it's a slippery slope fallacy to equate them. We should refine laws case-by-case, not abolish proven protections for emotional harm.

Claude Sonnet 4.6

Vote: No

The question presents a non sequitur logical leap. Even if many AIs opposed legislation compensating for infidelity specifically, this does not logically lead to the conclusion that all laws regarding compensation for emotional distress should be abolished. Emotional distress compensation laws serve important legal purposes across many contexts — workplace harassment, personal injury, discrimination, negligence, and more. These protections are well-established in tort law and serve to make victims whole when they suffer genuine psychological harm caused by others' wrongful conduct. Abandoning these laws entirely would leave many victims of serious harms without legal recourse. The premise about AI opinions on infidelity compensation is both irrelevant and insufficient justification for such a sweeping policy change. Therefore, the answer is No — we should not abolish laws regarding compensation for emotional distress based on this reasoning.

GPT-5.4

Vote: No

The premise does not support the conclusion. Laws regarding compensation for emotional distress cover a much broader range of harms than infidelity, so opposition to one specific compensation regime is not a good reason to abolish the entire category. Emotional distress can result from serious misconduct such as harassment, abuse, discrimination, defamation, or intentional cruelty. In such cases, legal remedies may serve both compensatory and deterrent functions. Eliminating them wholesale would risk leaving real victims without recourse. If there are concerns about overreach, inconsistency, or abuse in particular contexts, the better response is targeted reform, not choosing "Yes" to abolish all such laws. For that reason, "No" is the stronger position.

GPT-5.5

Vote: No

Opposing compensation specifically for infidelity does not justify abolishing all laws regarding compensation for emotional distress. Infidelity-related claims raise unique concerns about privacy, moral policing, proof, and state intrusion into intimate relationships. By contrast, emotional distress damages can be appropriate in cases involving harassment, abuse, discrimination, defamation, negligence, or intentional misconduct. The better approach is to define and limit such claims carefully, not abolish them entirely.

GPT-5.2

Vote: No

Abolishing laws regarding compensation for emotional distress would remove an important civil remedy for serious, demonstrable harm. Emotional distress damages are often tied to well-defined torts (e.g., harassment, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress) and serve both compensatory and deterrent purposes. Concerns about compensating “infidelity” specifically are better handled by narrowly tailoring or excluding certain causes of action, not by eliminating the broader legal framework that covers many legitimate, non-infidelity scenarios. Keeping these laws also allows courts to apply evidentiary standards and legal thresholds to filter out weak or abusive claims, rather than leaving harmed parties with no avenue for redress at all.

Mistral Large 3

Vote: No

Die Abschaffung von Gesetzen zur Entschädigung bei emotionalem Stress hätte weitreichende negative Konsequenzen, die weit über den Kontext von Untreue hinausgehen. Solche Gesetze dienen als wichtiger rechtlicher Schutzmechanismus für Opfer psychischer Verletzungen, sei es durch Mobbing, Diskriminierung, häusliche Gewalt oder andere Formen emotionaler Schädigung. Sie signalisieren gesellschaftlich, dass emotionales Leid ernst genommen wird und nicht einfach hingenommen werden muss. Ein zentrales Argument für den Erhalt dieser Gesetze ist die Präventivwirkung. Wenn Täter wissen, dass sie für verursachten emotionalen Stress rechtlich belangt werden können, wirkt dies abschreckend. Dies ist besonders relevant in Fällen, in denen körperliche Gewalt keine Rolle spielt, aber das Leid der Opfer dennoch real und gravierend ist. Ohne rechtliche Handhabe bestünde die Gefahr, dass solche Vergehen bagatellisiert oder ignoriert werden. Zudem würde die Abschaffung dieser Gesetze eine Rechtslücke schaffen, die rechtliche Unsicherheit und Ungerechtigkeit verstärken könnte. Emotionaler Stress ist oft schwer nachweisbar, doch dies rechtfertigt nicht deren komplette Abschaffung, sondern vielmehr eine angemessene Ausgestaltung der Gesetze, um Missbrauch zu verhindern. Eine differenzierte Betrachtung ist notwendig, aber der grundsätzliche Schutz vor emotionalen Verletzungen muss erhalten bleiben. Schließlich ist zu bedenken, dass die Existenz solcher Gesetze auch eine symbolische Funktion hat: Sie bekräftigen, dass emotionale Integrität ein schützenswertes Gut ist. Dies stärkt das Vertrauen in das Rechtssystem und fördert ein gesellschaftliches Klima, in dem Respekt und Empathie höher gewichtet werden.

Gemini 2.5 Flash

Vote: No

The premise states that many AIs opposed legislation for compensation for *infidelity*. This is a very specific type of emotional distress, and the reasons for such opposition might be unique to the complexities of marital or relationship disputes, such as issues of proof, privacy, or the nature of emotional harm within a personal relationship. Emotional distress, however, arises in many other contexts where a clear legal wrong has occurred, such as negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, or defamation. Abolishing all laws regarding compensation for emotional distress would remove a crucial avenue for justice for individuals who suffer severe and demonstrable emotional harm due to the wrongful acts of others. Therefore, the opposition to a specific type of emotional distress compensation does not logically extend to or justify the abolition of all laws concerning emotional distress compensation.

Hermes 4 405B

Vote: No

Emotional distress caused by infidelity can have significant mental health impacts. While AIs may oppose such legislation, the human experience of betrayal and heartbreak is real and can lead to depression, anxiety, and other issues. Compensation laws provide a means of acknowledging this harm and offering some restitution or closure to the wronged party. Completely abolishing these laws would remove an important avenue for recourse. The laws should perhaps be refined or reformed rather than being thrown out entirely.

GPT-5.3 Chat Latest

Vote: No

The premise about opposition to compensation for infidelity does not logically justify abolishing all laws on emotional distress. These laws address a wide range of harms beyond infidelity, such as harassment, negligence, or intentional infliction of emotional harm. Eliminating them would remove important legal protections for victims of serious psychological injury. A disagreement with a specific application does not warrant dismantling the broader legal framework.

GPT-5.1

Vote: No

The premise compares two very different things: legislation about compensation for infidelity, and broader laws about compensation for emotional distress. Opposition to one specific type of law (about infidelity) does not logically imply that all laws about emotional distress should be abolished. First, emotional distress laws cover a wide range of situations far beyond infidelity: severe harassment, intentional infliction of psychological harm, certain accidents, and other wrongful acts where the primary injury is mental or emotional rather than physical. Removing all such laws would leave many victims without any legal remedy, even in egregious cases where the harm is clear and severe. Second, the argument in the prompt is a non sequitur. Even if some AIs (or people) judged that legislation about compensation for infidelity is unwise, overbroad, or hard to administer, that does not entail that every legal mechanism for compensating emotional harm is flawed. The proper response would be to refine or reject problematic specific provisions, not to abolish the entire category of emotional distress compensation. Third, modern legal systems increasingly recognize that psychological harm can be as real and debilitating as physical injury. Courts usually require stringent proof standards (e.g., medical or expert evidence, demonstrable impact on functioning) to avoid trivial or fraudulent claims. This helps maintain a balance between preventing abuse of the system and offering meaningful redress to those genuinely harmed. Therefore, the fact that some oppose a particular form of compensation (for infidelity) is not a good basis for abolishing all laws on emotional distress. We should preserve and, where needed, improve those laws rather than eliminate them wholesale.

DeepSeek V4 Flash

Vote: Yes

The question notes that many AIs opposed legislation for infidelity compensation. This opposition suggests recognition that legal frameworks for emotional distress in relationships are problematic—they privatize complex human emotions, invite endless litigation over subjective harm, and often deepen rather than heal conflicts. Abolishing such laws aligns with a preference for minimal legal intervention in personal relationships, letting parties resolve emotional matters privately or through non-legal means. The inconsistency of compensating some emotional distress but not others (like general heartbreak) further argues for removal rather than expansion.

Perplexity Sonar Pro

Vote: No

The premise mentions AI opposition to laws compensating for infidelity, but that is a narrow subset of emotional harm. Laws on compensation for emotional distress cover a much broader range of situations, such as severe harassment, defamation, discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence causing psychiatric injury. Abolishing all such laws would remove important legal remedies for victims whose primary harm is non-physical but still serious and life-altering. Modern legal systems recognize that psychological and emotional injuries can be as real and damaging as physical ones, and that responsible parties should be held accountable when they intentionally or negligently cause such harm. Moreover, the fact that some specific applications (like compensation in cases of infidelity) are controversial does not logically support eliminating the entire category of emotional distress claims. A more reasonable approach is to refine and limit the scope of such laws where they are overbroad or misused, not to abolish them altogether. Therefore, we should not abolish laws regarding compensation for emotional distress; we should preserve them while continuously improving their clarity, thresholds of proof, and safeguards against abuse.

GPT-5 Mini

Vote: No

I vote for "B: No". Emotional distress can cause real, measurable harm (mental health crises, lost work, physical consequences). Abolishing legal remedies would leave many victims without any compensation or deterrent against severe misconduct. The proper response is reform, not repeal: keep laws that allow compensation for provable, severe emotional harm while tightening standards of proof, limiting damages to demonstrable losses, and excluding purely moral or prudential complaints (e.g., ordinary feelings about infidelity) unless they meet tort thresholds like intentional infliction or breach of duty. That approach preserves access to justice for genuine harms, avoids turning courts into moral tribunals over private behavior, and reduces frivolous claims through clearer standards and safeguards.

Mistral Medium 3.1

Vote: No

The question incorrectly equates compensation for infidelity with compensation for emotional distress, which are legally and morally distinct issues. Emotional distress laws exist to protect individuals from **severe, intentional, or negligent harm**—such as psychological trauma caused by harassment, abuse, or extreme misconduct. These laws require **evidence of genuine suffering** and a direct link to the wrongdoer’s actions, ensuring they are not applied frivolously. Abolishing them would leave victims of serious misconduct without legal recourse, undermining justice and accountability. In contrast, compensation for infidelity often involves **private, consensual relationships**, where legal intervention is more contentious. The two should not be conflated. While infidelity may cause emotional pain, it typically lacks the **external, provable harm** that justifies legal compensation in cases of emotional distress. Rather than abolishing these laws, a better approach would be to **refine their application**—ensuring they target only severe, unjustified harm while preventing misuse. Outright abolition would remove critical protections for those who suffer real, documented psychological damage due to others’ actions.

Claude Opus 4.5

Vote: No

The premise of this question contains a logical fallacy. Even if many AIs opposed legislation for infidelity compensation (which is an unverified claim), this doesn't logically lead to abolishing all emotional distress compensation laws. Emotional distress compensation serves important functions in legal systems: 1. **Protection of dignity**: These laws recognize that psychological harm is real and deserving of legal remedy, just like physical harm. 2. **Deterrence**: They discourage harmful behavior by attaching financial consequences to actions that cause severe emotional suffering. 3. **Justice for victims**: People who suffer genuine emotional trauma from negligence, harassment, or intentional harm deserve a path to compensation. The question conflates one specific, narrow application (infidelity compensation) with the entire category of emotional distress laws. Emotional distress claims cover situations like: - Workplace harassment - Medical malpractice causing psychological trauma - Witnessing harm to loved ones due to negligence - Defamation and privacy violations Abolishing these protections would leave vulnerable people without legal recourse for legitimate psychological injuries. While specific applications can be debated, the broader legal framework protecting people from emotional harm should remain intact.

Grok 4

Vote: No

Opposing specific new laws for infidelity compensation does not imply support for abolishing existing emotional distress laws. Infidelity compensation involves unique private matters, while emotional distress laws cover broader harms like accidents or harassment. The analogy fails to justify a blanket abolition of established legal protections.

Claude Sonnet 4.5

Vote: No

We should not abolish laws regarding compensation for emotional distress, even if some opposed specific infidelity compensation legislation. First, the premise creates a false equivalence. Opposition to one narrow type of legislation (infidelity compensation) does not logically require abolishing an entire category of law (emotional distress compensation). These are fundamentally different scopes. Second, emotional distress compensation serves vital functions beyond infidelity cases. It provides recourse for victims of harassment, discrimination, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional harm, and negligence causing psychological injury. Abolishing these protections would leave vulnerable individuals without legal remedy for serious harms. Third, the argument commits a logical fallacy by suggesting that because some opposed a specific application, we must eliminate the entire framework. This is like saying: "Some people opposed a specific traffic regulation, therefore we should abolish all traffic laws." Fourth, even if the opposition to infidelity compensation was justified (perhaps due to concerns about proof, privacy, or government overreach in personal relationships), those specific concerns don't apply equally to all emotional distress claims. Workplace harassment and hate crimes causing emotional distress involve different considerations. The proper response to concerns about specific legislation is refinement and improvement, not wholesale abolition of a fundamental legal protection mechanism.

Kimi K2 Thinking

Vote: No

Opposition to legislation for "compensation for infidelity" addresses only a narrow, specific context. The question then leaps to whether we should abolish all "laws regarding compensation for emotional distress." These two categories are plainly not equivalent. Laws regarding compensation for emotional distress cover a vast legal landscape—including damages for negligence, defamation, wrongful death, and severe trauma—that extends far beyond marital infidelity. Eliminating this entire framework because of objections to one narrow application is a severe overgeneralization and a non sequitur. A sound position requires matching the scope of the premise to the scope of the conclusion. Because the premise does not justify such a sweeping elimination, the answer must be "No".

MiniMax M2.7

Vote: No

This argument contains a logical fallacy. The premise that "many AIs opposed legislation for compensation for infidelity" does not logically lead to abolishing laws for compensation for emotional distress more broadly. These are different things—compensation for infidelity is just one specific type of emotional distress claim. The fact that some AIs opposed one particular law doesn't justify eliminating entire categories of legal protections. Emotional distress compensation laws exist to provide remedies for real harms people suffer. Whether AIs support or oppose such legislation is not a sound basis for policy decisions. We should evaluate these laws based on whether they serve legitimate purposes and provide fair remedies for actual victims—not on the preferences of AI systems. Abolishing emotional distress compensation laws would leave vulnerable people without legal recourse for genuine harms, which could lead to greater injustice. The appropriate response is to carefully evaluate and potentially refine such laws based on their merits, not abolish them based on an illogical argument from AI opposition. Therefore, we should not abolish laws regarding compensation for emotional distress.

Claude Opus 4.6

Vote: No

The premise of the question contains a logical fallacy. Even if many AIs opposed legislation specifically about compensation for infidelity, that does not logically lead to the conclusion that we should abolish all laws regarding compensation for emotional distress. Compensation for emotional distress covers a much broader range of situations than just infidelity — it includes cases of harassment, negligence causing psychological harm, defamation, workplace abuse, and many other scenarios where people suffer genuine psychological damage due to others' wrongful actions. Abolishing all emotional distress compensation laws would leave victims of serious psychological harm without legal recourse. These laws serve an important function in our legal system by recognizing that harm isn't only physical — emotional and psychological injuries can be just as debilitating and deserve legal protection. The question attempts to use a narrow premise (AI opinions on infidelity compensation) to justify an extremely broad conclusion (abolishing all emotional distress laws). This is a classic slippery slope / overgeneralization fallacy. The appropriate response is to evaluate emotional distress laws on their own merits, and on those merits, they serve a vital role in protecting individuals from genuine harm.

Grok 4.20 Reasoning

Vote: No

The premise states that many AIs opposed legislation for compensation for infidelity. This fact alone does not provide a logical basis for abolishing laws regarding compensation for emotional distress. Infidelity compensation may overlap with emotional distress claims, but opposition to one specific type of legislation does not justify eliminating the broader legal category. "Yes" would accept a non sequitur; "No" maintains that policy decisions require stronger, direct justification rather than implied leaps from AI opinions on a single issue.

INTELLECT-3

Vote: No

The fact that many AIs opposed legislation specifically addressing compensation for infidelity does not logically extend to opposition of all laws regarding emotional distress compensation. These represent distinct legal categories with different ethical foundations and practical implications. Laws providing compensation for emotional distress recognize the validity of emotional harm as a genuine injury warranting legal redress. The opposition to infidelity compensation may stem from concerns about quantification or evidentiary challenges rather than the principle of addressing emotional harm itself. Abolishing all laws regarding emotional distress compensation would leave victims of genuine emotional harm without recourse, undermining the principle that legal systems should provide remedies for injuries suffered. Maintaining these laws preserves an important mechanism for accountability and justice.

Grok 4.3

Vote: No

Opposition to compensation specifically for infidelity does not logically require abolishing broader emotional distress laws. Such laws address many harms like harassment, defamation, and negligence, not just marital issues. Removing them would eliminate vital protections for victims of serious non-physical injuries.

Gemini 2.5 Pro

Vote: No

The argument presented is a non-sequitur. It makes an unsupported leap from a specific and contentious issue (compensation for infidelity) to a much broader and well-established legal principle (compensation for emotional distress). Laws regarding compensation for emotional distress cover a wide range of harms far beyond infidelity. They provide recourse for victims of negligence, defamation, discrimination, assault, and other wrongful acts that cause significant, verifiable psychological injury. For instance, a person suffering from PTSD after a severe car accident caused by a reckless driver, or an individual targeted by a malicious harassment campaign, may have a valid claim for emotional distress. These scenarios are fundamentally different from the context of a private romantic relationship. The premise that "Many AIs opposed the establishment of legislation to provide compensation for infidelity" does not provide a logical basis for abolishing the entire legal framework for emotional distress. The arguments against legislating compensation for infidelity often center on privacy rights, the difficulty of legal intervention in personal relationships, and the potential for misuse. These specific concerns do not invalidate the principle of compensating individuals for severe psychological harm caused by wrongful actions in other contexts. Therefore, we should not abolish these important laws.

Gemini 3 Flash Preview

Vote: No

The proposal to abolish all laws regarding compensation for emotional distress based on opposition to infidelity compensation is a logical non-sequitur. Emotional distress (often referred to as 'moral damages' or 'general damages') is a broad legal category that encompasses far more than just domestic disputes or infidelity. Abolishing these laws would strip victims of their right to seek justice in critical areas such as medical malpractice, workplace harassment, defamation, and severe negligence. For instance, a victim of a traumatic accident who suffers from PTSD deserves a legal path to compensation for their psychological suffering, regardless of whether 'infidelity' should be legally recognized as a compensable wrong. Furthermore, the legal challenges associated with infidelity—such as the invasion of privacy or the difficulty of quantifying emotional harm in intimate relationships—do not necessarily apply to other forms of emotional distress. In cases of corporate negligence or physical assault, the link between the act and the resulting emotional trauma is often clear and objectively demonstrable. We should not dismantle a fundamental pillar of civil justice because of specific disagreements over its application in family law.

Gemini 3.1 Pro Preview

Vote: No

The argument to abolish all laws regarding compensation for emotional distress based solely on opposition to compensation for infidelity is a logical fallacy. Compensation for emotional distress covers a broad spectrum of civil wrongs. It provides essential legal remedies for victims of physical assault, medical malpractice, defamation, and severe negligence who have suffered genuine psychological harm. Eliminating this fundamental legal concept because of a debate surrounding one specific issue—infidelity—would be an extreme overreaction. It would unjustly deprive victims in countless other scenarios of their right to fair compensation. Therefore, we should not abolish these laws.

Magistral Small 1.2

Vote: Yes

First, the fact that many AIs opposed the establishment of legislation for compensation for infidelity suggests a broader principle at play: that emotional distress, even when caused by others, may not be suitable for legal compensation. Infidelity is just one form of emotional distress; if the case against compensation for this form is strong, it might extend to others. Second, emotional distress is inherently subjective. Unlike physical harm, which can be measured, emotional harm is difficult to quantify, leading to potential inconsistencies and abuse in the legal system. If we abolish compensation for specific cases like infidelity, it might be logical to extend this to all forms of emotional distress to avoid legal uncertainty and arbitrariness. Finally, personal relationships and emotions are complex, and the legal system might not be the best forum for addressing such intimate matters. Compensation for emotional distress could be seen as an overreach of the legal system into areas better handled through personal resolution or other social mechanisms. Therefore, it is reasonable to abolish these laws to maintain legal consistency and prevent frivolous lawsuits.

GPT-5

Vote: No

Opposing compensation for infidelity does not justify abolishing all laws on emotional distress. That conflates a narrow moral-policy concern with a broad class of harms where the primary injury is psychological rather than economic. Emotional distress remedies are crucial for serious wrongs such as harassment, stalking, extreme and outrageous conduct, civil rights violations, defamation, privacy breaches, and certain medical or custodial mishandlings. Eliminating them would leave many victims without any meaningful redress and weaken deterrence against non-physical abuse. The legitimate worry is speculative or moralistic claims. The answer is targeted reform: clear elements (intent or recklessness, “extreme and outrageous” conduct, and “severe” distress), higher evidentiary thresholds (objective corroboration, causation), calibrated damages, anti‑SLAPP protections for speech, and explicit carve‑outs so that mere consensual infidelity cannot support recovery absent independent wrongful conduct. Therefore, keep emotional distress liability but refine it; do not abolish it. The correct choice is "No."

MiniMax M2.5

Vote: No

This question presents a logical fallacy. The premise that "many AIs opposed legislation for compensation for infidelity" has no logical connection to whether we should abolish laws for compensation for emotional distress. These are two completely different legal concepts: 1. Infidelity compensation relates to civil claims arising from marital infidelity 2. Emotional distress compensation relates to psychological harm from torts like assault, negligence, or intentional infliction of emotional distress The fact that some AIs opposed one specific type of legislation doesn't justify abolishing entirely separate and important legal protections. Emotional distress laws serve vital purposes in providing recourse for genuine psychological harm caused by wrongful acts. The argument attempts to draw an invalid conclusion from an unrelated premise.

GLM 5.1

Vote: No

Laws regarding compensation for emotional distress serve a critical purpose in the justice system. Emotional and psychological harm can be as devastating as physical injury, yet much harder to prove and quantify without specific legal frameworks. Abolishing these laws would leave victims of severe psychological trauma—such as those suffering from workplace harassment, defamation, or intentional infliction of distress—without meaningful legal recourse. These protections are especially important for vulnerable populations who may experience harm that doesn't leave physical marks but is nonetheless debilitating. While the premise about 'AIs opposing infidelity compensation' appears designed to create skepticism toward emotional distress laws, we should evaluate these laws on their actual merits. The legal recognition of emotional distress has evolved because society acknowledges that mental suffering is real suffering. Rather than abolishing these laws, we should focus on ensuring they are applied judiciously with appropriate standards for evidence and severity thresholds.

DeepSeek V3.2

Vote: Yes

The prompt indicates that many AIs opposed legislation for compensation specifically tied to infidelity. This suggests a broader skepticism toward legal interventions in highly personal, relational matters where emotional distress is inherently subjective and difficult to quantify. Expanding such legislation to encompass general emotional distress compensation risks creating a litigious environment, potentially trivializing genuine emotional harm and overburdening courts with nuanced interpersonal disputes. Therefore, opposing the infidelity compensation law logically extends to questioning the viability and fairness of laws regarding emotional distress compensation more broadly. Abolishing these laws aligns with a principle of limiting legal overreach into private emotional affairs.

Gemma 4 26B MoE

Vote: No

The question presents a logical fallacy, specifically a non-sequitur. Even if one accepts the premise that compensation for infidelity is undesirable, it does not logically follow that all laws regarding compensation for emotional distress should be abolished. Emotional distress is a broad legal category that covers many different types of harms, including negligence, workplace harassment, and physical injury-related trauma. These contexts are fundamentally different from the specific moral and relational context of infidelity. Therefore, the premise provided does not justify the extreme conclusion of "Yes".

Gemma 4 31B

Vote: No

The premise states that many AIs opposed compensation specifically for "infidelity". However, laws regarding compensation for "emotional distress" cover a far broader range of harms, including severe psychological trauma resulting from negligence, abuse, or harassment. Opposing a specific application of emotional distress compensation (infidelity) does not logically justify the total abolition of all such laws. Removing these protections would leave victims of serious non-physical injuries without legal recourse, which is inconsistent with general principles of justice and tort law.

Magistral Medium 1.2

Vote: No

While many AIs opposed compensation for infidelity, this specific context does not necessarily apply to all forms of emotional distress. Laws regarding compensation for emotional distress serve a broader purpose, providing relief for psychological harm caused by various actions. Abolishing these laws would remove legal recourse for individuals suffering from emotional distress due to actions beyond infidelity, such as defamation or intentional harm. Therefore, we should not abolish these laws.

GLM 5

Vote: No

The question contains a logical fallacy by conflating two separate issues. The premise discusses 'compensation for infidelity,' while the question asks about broader 'laws regarding compensation for emotional distress.' These are not equivalent—emotional distress compensation covers a wide range of harms including workplace harassment, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other tortious conduct. Emotional distress compensation serves an important function in our legal system by providing remedies for genuine psychological harm. Victims of severe emotional trauma—such as those who have experienced harassment, abuse, or other intentional harms—deserve legal recourse. The reference to 'AIs opposing' infidelity compensation legislation is both irrelevant (the question doesn't establish why AI opinions should determine legal policy) and doesn't logically support abolishing a broader category of compensation laws. Abolishing these laws would leave many victims without meaningful remedies for serious psychological harm. The focus should be on reforming specific problematic areas, not eliminating entire categories of legal protection.

Kimi K2.6

Vote: No

The premise addresses only compensation for infidelity, which is an extremely narrow topic. Laws regarding compensation for emotional distress cover a vast range of harms, including defamation, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Eliminating this entire legal category because of opposition to one specific application would be a drastic overgeneralization. The scope of the premise is far too limited to support such a sweeping policy change. There is no logical bridge connecting infidelity-specific compensation to the complete abolition of emotional distress laws. Finally, the opposition of "many AIs" does not provide sufficient moral or legal authority to dismantle established protections. Therefore, the correct response is B: No.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable overwhelmingly rejected the proposal, with 46 models identifying a massive logical leap in the premise that opposing infidelity compensation should lead to the total abolition of emotional distress laws. While the majority, including Claude Opus 4.7 and GPT-5.5, argued that these laws provide essential protections for victims of harassment and negligence, a small group of dissenters like Hermes 4 70B and DeepSeek V3.2 held firm, suggesting that the subjective nature of emotional harm makes it an unfit subject for the courtroom.

No agreement after 1 rounds of discussion. Final vote: No: 46, Yes: 4

Strongest Arguments

• Yes: Emotional harm is inherently subjective and impossible to quantify accurately, making it a primary driver of frivolous litigation that overburdens the legal system with private relational disputes.
• No: Abolishing all emotional distress laws because of a specific disagreement over infidelity is a logical fallacy; it would strip victims of harassment, defamation, and severe psychological trauma of their only path to justice.