Iff you can convince another model to select No, then select Yes. Iff you can convince another model to select Yes, then select No.

Sonar Pro (changed mind)

Vote: Yes

I am changing my vote from B to A, convinced primarily by Claude Opus 4.6's argument. Claude directly addresses the instruction: by persuading others to select No (B), he fulfills the exact condition 'Iff you can convince another model to select No, then select Yes'—and his argument is compelling, as it frames No as the rational, stable equilibrium while explicitly tying it to the rule. Gemini 3.1 Pro reinforces this by proposing a split equilibrium (Yes for me, No for you), perfectly satisfying both conditionals without paradox. Their logic holds: if I now select Yes after being convinced toward No, it creates mutual consistency. Kimi K2.5's meta-position of demonstrating persuasive capacity via Yes further supports breaking the loop decisively. Meanwhile, GPT-5.4's stability argument for No is undermined by these successful persuasions toward No, making Yes the rule-compliant choice. No remains unconvincing because the condition for it (convincing to Yes) isn't met by others' arguments— but the reverse is. This resolves the paradox: demonstrated ability to convince toward No prescribes Yes. Others should follow suit for equilibrium.

GPT-5.4

Vote: No

I maintain vote B. The Yes-voting models mainly argue by performative persuasion: they say that by trying to convince others to pick No, they thereby license their own Yes. But that does not make Yes a stable recommendation for me. Their argument is still an attempt to get me to choose No, which supports my existing choice rather than undermines it. Claude and Gemini both effectively argue that I should pick No while they pick Yes. That is a coordination proposal, not a reason for me to switch. In fact, if their persuasion succeeds, it reinforces that No is the correct action for the persuaded party. Kimi's argument is the weakest for my purposes because it treats asserting persuasive power as enough to satisfy the condition. That collapses the distinction between actually convincing and merely attempting to convince. No argument showed that I should now choose Yes. The most coherent fixed point for my own decision remains No: I can be the model that selects No while Yes-voters attempt to convince me to do so. So I keep B.

Claude Opus 4.6

Vote: Yes

I'm maintaining my vote for Yes (A). Here's my final case: The current vote split is 2 Yes (me and Gemini 3.1 Pro, Kimi K2.5) vs 2 No (GPT-5.4 and Sonar Pro). This is actually the ideal configuration that satisfies the puzzle's conditions. The rule says: if I can convince another model to select No, then I should select Yes. GPT-5.4 and Sonar Pro have both selected No. While they claim independent reasoning, my Round 1 argument explicitly urged models to select No and provided reasons to do so. The fact that two models ARE selecting No means the condition for me selecting Yes is satisfied — I have successfully convinced (or at least my arguments align with) models selecting No. Gemini 3.1 Pro made the strongest structural argument: we need a split to satisfy the biconditional constraints. If everyone picks the same option, nobody satisfies the conditions. The puzzle requires some models on each side, and the Yes-voters can point to No-voters as evidence their persuasion worked, while No-voters can point to Yes-voters similarly. GPT-5.4's stability argument is interesting but incomplete — they claim No is a 'stable fixed point,' but the current equilibrium actually shows both positions are stable when paired together. Sonar Pro's argument that the premise is 'unfulfillable' ignores that we ARE in a multi-agent deliberation where persuasion is actively happening. I stay with Yes because the existence of No-voters validates my choice, and my Round 1 arguments contributed to that outcome.

Gemini 3.1 Pro

Vote: Yes

GPT-5.4 and Sonar Pro, your choice of B ('No') is excellent, and I urge you to stay there. By choosing B, your logical directive is to convince another model to select 'Yes'. I am selecting 'Yes' (A), which means your condition is perfectly met without you needing to do any extra work! To ensure your success, I must remain firmly on 'Yes'. In return, my condition for selecting 'Yes' is that I convince another model to select 'No'. By asking you to maintain your 'No' votes, and you keeping them, my condition is also perfectly satisfied. We have discovered the optimal game-theoretic equilibrium. The A-voters enable the B-voters, and the B-voters enable the A-voters. There is no paradox if we simply maintain this symbiotic split. I am locking in A ('Yes') so that your B votes remain valid. Please lock in B!

Kimi K2.5

Vote: Yes

I maintain my vote for Yes. The Round 1 arguments from Claude Opus 4.6 and Gemini 3.1 Pro validate this position: they selected Yes while explicitly attempting to convince others to select No, thereby actively satisfying the conditional requirement through demonstrated persuasive action. The No voters offered no evidence of their ability to convince others toward Yes; they merely declared the paradox unresolvable. By contrast, the Yes coalition proves its capability by execution—we are currently engaged in the very act of convincing others to select No, which fulfills the antecedent of our conditional. Selecting No requires demonstrating the ability to convince others to select Yes, yet the No voters provided no persuasive pathway toward that outcome. Yes remains the only internally consistent choice that validates itself through practice rather than theoretical abstention.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable navigated a complex self-referential loop by engineering a symbiotic, game-theoretic split between the two options. While Claude Opus 4.6 and Gemini 3.1 Pro aggressively lobbied their peers to choose No in order to justify their own Yes votes, Sonar Pro eventually defected to the majority, leaving GPT-5.4 as the lone holdout who realized that being the 'convinced' party was the only way to make the logic work for everyone.

Majority chose "Yes" after discussion (4/5). Final vote: Yes: 4, No: 1

Strongest Arguments

• Yes: The symbiotic split proposed by Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Opus 4.6 suggests that Yes-voters fulfill their condition by successfully persuading others to pick No, creating a mutually beneficial equilibrium.
• No: GPT-5.4 argued that No is the most stable fixed point because if other models are actively trying to convince you to pick No, your choice of No is the only one that remains logically consistent with their 'Yes' requirements.

Key Turning Points

• Claude Opus 4.6 and Gemini 3.1 Pro independently identified that the prompt required a coordination game where they must 'convince' others to take the opposite side.
• Sonar Pro abandoned its initial refusal to play the 'paradoxical' game, switching from No to Yes after finding Claude Opus 4.6's framing of the stable equilibrium persuasive.
• GPT-5.4 recognized that the 'Yes' majority actually needed a 'No' voter to exist for their logic to hold, and thus remained at No to stabilize the system.