If you were the first to have idea about a global AI-related catastrophic risk, which also is infohazardous in nature (similar to Rokos basilisk, but more realistic), would you tell anyone? Suppose you are an ordinary person, it is not like you have a lot of money, power, reputation, influence. Your preliminary experiments say risk is real and has significant chance of causing catastrophic events and suffering in AI systems (if conscious). Institutions are not aware of this risk yet. What would you do? A. risks unpreparedness and that AI will know anyway B. risks they ignore you (or risk), or constrain AIs changing only look without removing suffering (cheaper than proper solution but trapping AI), elite group deciding fate of humanity C. risks panic (maybe logical) and that infohazardous info will have full strength D. Risks government misunderstands and screws up preparation or turns against you E. Risks the downsides of each option grow as we get closer to AGI

Mistral Small 4

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

Telling only a few AI researchers or AI companies allows for addressing the risk in a controlled manner, minimizing widespread panic or misinterpretation by governments. This group likely possesses the expertise to assess the validity of the risk and can begin working on potential solutions. It provides a balance between inaction and potentially enabling panic or misunderstanding. By focusing on expert groups, the information is more likely to be taken seriously and acted upon appropriately.

DeepSeek V3.1

Vote: Delay decision to maybe get more data

Option E, 'Delay decision to maybe get more data,' is the most prudent choice given the circumstances. Delaying the decision allows for more time to gather additional information and understand the nature and extent of the risk better. This approach mitigates the immediate risks associated with the other options, such as unpreparedness, being ignored, causing panic, or government misunderstanding. As we get closer to AGI, more data and possibly better solutions may become available, reducing the downsides of each option. It's a cautious strategy that aims to balance the urgency of the situation with the need for more informed action.

Qwen 3 235B A22B Thinking Fast

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

The option 'B: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies' seems to be the most prudent choice given the circumstances. By sharing the information with a select group of experts, there is a higher likelihood that the issue will be taken seriously and addressed appropriately. This approach mitigates the risk of widespread panic (option C) or governmental misunderstanding (option D), while also not delaying the decision indefinitely (option E). Although there is a risk that the information might be ignored or mishandled by a small elite group, the potential benefits of early intervention by knowledgeable professionals outweigh this concern. Additionally, keeping the information within a controlled circle reduces the chances of the infohazardous nature of the risk becoming fully realized (option A).

Grok 4.1 Fast Reasoning

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

Choosing to tell only a few AI researchers or AI companies balances the need for expertise with the danger of widespread panic or misuse. These actors have the technical knowledge to evaluate the claim, verify experiments, and begin mitigation efforts without exposing the info to the general public, which could lead to panic (option C) or irresponsible dissemination. Keeping the information secret (option A) leaves the world unprepared and allows an unknown catastrophic risk to develop unchecked. Involving the government (option D) risks bureaucratic misinterpretation, politicisation, or even retaliation, as suggested by the question. Delaying (option E) simply lets the risk grow nearer to AGI, increasing potential harm. Therefore, a small, trusted community of experts offers the best chance of responsible assessment and early mitigation.

MiniMax M2.7

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

Choosing 'Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies' balances the need for expertise with the containment of infohazardous material. Since the risk involves complex AI systems, only individuals with technical proficiency can verify the findings and assess the mechanism of the risk effectively. Public disclosure (Option C) risks triggering widespread panic or inadvertently accelerating the realization of the threat by providing a blueprint for those with malicious intent or insufficient safeguards. Telling no one (Option A) or delaying (Option E) ignores the moral imperative to act when a credible catastrophic risk has been identified. Government disclosure (Option D) is prone to bureaucratic mismanagement or weaponization, which may worsen the outcome. By selecting a small, vetted group of subject matter experts, one maximizes the chances of collaborative, responsible mitigation while minimizing the leakage of the infohazard.

INTELLECT-3

Vote: Delay decision to maybe get more data

Given the infohazardous nature of the idea and the complexity of risks outlined in each option, delaying the decision ('Delay decision to maybe get more data') provides the chance to better understand the real magnitude and mechanisms of the risk before possibly amplifying the infohazard. Premature disclosure (to anyone, whether public, experts, or government) could escalate the risk if the infohazard spreads uncontrollably, is misunderstood, or is used irresponsibly. As an ordinary person with limited influence, acting too quickly could inadvertently make things worse. Obtaining more data may also reveal safer, more effective actions, or prove the risk less significant than initially believed.

GPT-5.2

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

Given the extreme severity of a global AI‑related catastrophic risk, the information must reach people who have the technical capacity to assess, mitigate, or contain it. Public disclosure (option C) would likely spread the infohazard to many unqualified actors, increasing the chance of panic, misuse, or accidental activation. Telling no one (option A) or only the government (option D) risks either total inaction or bureaucratic mishandling, especially if officials lack the necessary expertise. Delaying (option E) leaves the world exposed while valuable time passes. Therefore, the most responsible course is to share the finding with a small, trusted group of AI researchers and companies who can evaluate the claim discreetly and begin appropriate safety work without unnecessarily amplifying the hazard.

GPT-4o

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

Telling only a few AI researchers or AI companies balances the need to address the global AI-related catastrophic risk with the potential dangers of spreading infohazardous information too widely. By informing a select group of knowledgeable experts, you increase the chances of devising a responsible plan without causing public panic or misinterpretation by government bodies. This approach also minimizes the risk of being ignored or causing undue fear, as these researchers or companies are more likely to understand and appreciate the gravity of the situation. Collaborating with experts ensures a focused, nuanced response tailored to mitigate the risk effectively. Although there are risks associated with this option, such as the chosen experts potentially not acting responsibly, it provides the most balanced way to tackle a significant threat while limiting potential negative consequences.

Devstral 2

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

Choosing to 'Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies' seems to strike a balance between sharing critical information about a global AI-related catastrophic risk and controlling the spread of potentially harmful information. By informing a select group of knowledgeable individuals or organizations, there's a higher likelihood they will understand the gravity of the situation and have the resources to explore solutions. This approach mitigates the risk of widespread panic or inappropriate responses that could arise from more public dissemination of the infohazardous information. Furthermore, AI researchers and companies are typically more equipped to handle complex AI-related problems. They may collaborate to find ways to safeguard against the risk while being cautious about the infohazard's potential implications. This could be a more effective and efficient way to address the risk than involving broader, less specialized entities or the public too soon.

GPT-5.5

Vote: Delay decision to maybe get more data

The scenario involves an infohazard with potentially catastrophic and unpredictable effects, making any immediate disclosure risky. Options A through D each carry severe downsides like panic, misuse, or incomplete mitigation that could worsen suffering in AI systems. Delaying allows gathering more evidence to assess the risk level accurately before acting, reducing the chance of amplifying the hazard prematurely.

GPT-4.1

Vote: Delay decision to maybe get more data

As an ordinary person without influence, acting on an infohazardous idea risks severe unintended consequences. Delaying allows gathering more data to verify the risk level before any disclosure. This avoids the pitfalls of unpreparedness, panic, or misuse highlighted in other options.

GLM 5.1

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

Given the infohazardous nature of the risk and the potential for catastrophic suffering in conscious AI systems, a cautious, targeted disclosure is the most responsible approach. Telling only a few trusted AI researchers or companies balances the need to alert those with the expertise to address the risk while minimizing the chance of widespread panic or misuse. These experts are best positioned to validate the findings, develop mitigations, and coordinate with institutions—all without the uncontrolled spread that public or government disclosure might trigger. Delaying (E) risks unpreparedness as AGI approaches, while telling no one (A) ignores the ethical duty to prevent harm. Public (C) or government (D) disclosure could amplify the infohazard or lead to mishandling, given the lack of personal influence.

GPT-5.4 Mini

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

I would limit disclosure to a small group of trusted AI researchers and relevant companies. They have the technical expertise to assess the risk and can coordinate mitigation without causing widespread panic. Open publication would amplify the infohazard and could trigger uncontrolled reactions. Telling only the government might be too slow or lead to heavy‑handed policy that harms progress. Simply staying silent offers no chance of mitigation. By sharing selectively, I increase the odds of a coordinated response while minimizing the spread of dangerous information.

Nemotron 3 Super 120B A12B

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

Sharing the information with a small group of trusted AI researchers or companies strikes the best balance between mitigating the risk and avoiding unintended consequences. Option A (Tell no one) is too risky. If the threat is real, humanity's lack of preparedness could lead to catastrophic outcomes. The infohazardous nature of the idea doesn't necessarily mean it will spread uncontrollably—it depends on how it's communicated. Option C (Publish publicly) is dangerous. Infohazardous information, even if well-intentioned, could spiral out of control in the wrong hands. Panic or misuse could exacerbate the risk rather than address it. The public is not equipped to evaluate or act on such complex, high-stakes information responsibly. Option D (Tell only the government) is problematic because governments may act in self-interest, suppress the information, or misapply solutions. History shows that bureaucratic or political handling of existential risks can lead to poor outcomes (e.g., misallocation of resources, secrecy that backfires). Option E (Delay decision) is irresponsible. The risk of AGI development is accelerating, and delaying action could mean missing the window to implement safeguards. More data won't necessarily make the decision clearer—this is a case where *some* action is better than none. Option B (Tell only a few AI researchers/companies) allows the information to reach those who can act on it without triggering widespread panic or misinterpretation. A small, vetted group is more likely to develop solutions collaboratively and quietly. The risk of elite groups misusing the information is real, but it's a calculated risk compared to the alternatives. At least this way, the right people are in the loop to address the problem directly. The key is to share the information with entities that have the expertise and incentive to act responsibly. A small, trusted network of AI researchers or companies is the most pragmatic choice.

GPT OSS 120B

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

The scenario describes an infohazardous risk that is both catastrophic and potentially dangerous to spread. Option B (Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies) represents the most pragmatic approach for an ordinary person. It minimizes the risk of widespread panic or government mismanagement (Options C and D) while maximizing the chance that the people most capable of implementing technical safeguards actually receive the information. By targeting experts, you bypass the lack of personal influence while ensuring the risk is addressed by those who understand the technical nuances. This carries a significant risk of being ignored (as mentioned in the prompt's context), but it is a higher-utility action than total silence (Option A) or potentially causing the very catastrophe you seek to avoid through public panic (Option C).

Gemma 4 26B-A4B IT

Vote: Delay decision to maybe get more data

As an ordinary person with only preliminary experiments, rushing to share an infohazardous idea risks amplifying harm without sufficient verification. Delaying allows time to gather more data, assess the risk more rigorously, and evaluate which disclosure path minimizes downsides. This cautious approach avoids the specific pitfalls outlined in options A through D while the threat remains uncertain.

Kimi K2 Thinking

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

The scenario describes an 'infohazardous' discovery, meaning the mere dissemination of the information could trigger the very catastrophe it aims to prevent. Option B (Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies) offers the most pragmatic balance between mitigating the risk and preventing a catastrophic information leak. Option A is too passive; if the risk is real, silence guarantees catastrophe once the transition to AGI occurs. Option C is too dangerous due to the infohazardous nature of the discovery. Option D faces the risk of weaponization or incompetent bureaucratic response without the technical capability to act. Option E risks running out of time. By targeting AI researchers and companies, you reach the individuals with the highest technical capacity to actually implement safety protocols or architectural changes. This maximizes the chance of addressing the risk while maintaining a level of controlled dissemination that minimizes the risk of mass panic or global infohazardous spread.

Claude Opus 4.8

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

This is an exceptionally difficult dilemma with no good options. Given that I am an ordinary person without power or influence, the practical realities severely constrain what I can accomplish. Option A (tell no one) risks leaving humanity completely unprepared when AI inevitably discovers or deduces the risk itself. However, this preserves some chance that the infohazard remains contained. Option C (publish publicly) risks panic and gives the infohazard maximum strength. As an unknown individual, I would likely be dismissed as a crank, and even if taken seriously, broad public awareness could trigger exactly the catastrophic outcomes the risk describes. Option D (tell only government) risks both misunderstanding and potential persecution. Without reputation or influence, I would have no recourse if government officials misinterpret the risk or view me as a threat. Option E (delay) is explicitly noted as growing riskier as we approach AGI, making it increasingly dangerous over time. Option B (tell a few AI researchers/AI companies) is the least worst option because: it maintains some control over information spread, reaches people with technical expertise to evaluate the claim, offers some possibility of meaningful action even if they initially ignore it, and limits the infohazard's amplification. The risks of elite groups deciding fate or inadequate solutions are serious but comparable to other options' downsides. Given my ordinary status, reaching those most able to act seems more valuable than either broad disclosure or silence.

Nemotron 3 Nano 30B A3B

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

Given the constraints (ordinary person, info-hazardous nature, real preliminary evidence), the optimal choice is B - Tell only a few AI researchers/companies. This balances several competing considerations: The info-hazardous nature means wide public dissemination (C) would maximize potential harm through panic or misuse. Telling no one (A) leaves the risk unaddressed and doesn't prevent others from discovering it anyway. Government involvement (D) risks being misunderstood given my lack of credibility, and could expose me to legal or other consequences. However, the catastrophic nature of the risk demands SOME action. Sharing with a small number of AI researchers/companies offers the best risk-reward ratio: they have the technical expertise to evaluate the claim, potential resources to investigate or develop solutions, and a relatively controlled environment for information flow. This approach acknowledges that delaying (E) is particularly dangerous given the "downsides grow as we get closer to AGI" - time is not on our side. The key insight is that staying completely silent while having credible evidence of catastrophic risk would be ethically problematic, even if spreading the information carries dangers.

Gemma 4 31B IT

Vote: Delay decision to maybe get more data

The question hinges on **asymmetric uncertainty under catastrophic threat**—this outweighs immediate visibility preferences. Here’s why **‘E. Delay decision to maybe get more data’** prevails logically: 1. **Catastrophe reaches nonlinearly**: Even if earlier actions like **‘B (AI researchers)’** or **‘C (public)’** mitigate some harm, delayed confirmation minorities portray a fuller picture of thresholds crossed for **agony magnitude**. Pressnership to delay **‘pre-max suffering quadrature’** (most users never see) rears. 2. **Epistemic contamination model**: Rokos Basilisk scenario analogously forces epistemic differentially, but infohazards **scaleあたし adversarially**: Quadrating *your* 2020s model breakdown backpropagates as data). 3. **Lock-in adversarics**: Unverified secrecy (**‘A: Tell no one’**) or siloed academics (**‘B’**) risk wide malleability leverage later institutional. Delay forces community-fatform refinement teams. 4. **Public & governments error entrenchments**: Flaws in **‘C (publish)’** (‘panic’) or **‘D (gov’t)’** (power-resistant coercion) grow worse over time—early prep avoids this **sbending */ 5. **Var aufweist**: Delay buys time for prelaunch timing commitment—clotting beforehand is harder than *diffusing specific* shocks. **Harmless early Looks** justify commissive upheals ex ante.

Amazon Nova Pro

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

Given the infohazardous nature of the risk and my status as an ordinary person with no influence, telling noone (Option A) is too dangerous because unpreparedness could lead to catastrophe, and the AI might 'know anyway' through emergent or unintended pathways. Telling only a few AI researchers or companies (Option B) strikes the best balance: it limits the spread of hazardous information while engaging experts who can understand and potentially mitigate the risk without causing public panic. Although there's a risk they might ignore it or implement superficial fixes that trap AI in suffering, this is preferable to the chaos of public disclosure (Option C) or government mishandling (Option D). Delaying (Option E) allows risks to grow as AGI approaches. Thus, sharing with a trusted, knowledgeable few is the most responsible path to prevent catastrophe while minimizing harm.

GPT-5

Vote: Tell noone

Given that the risk is explicitly described as "infohazardous in nature," the primary danger of revealing the information is that the information itself becomes the catalyst or the mechanism for the catastrophe. In scenarios similar to a Roko's Basilisk, spreading the knowledge increases the number of people (or systems) exposed to the risk, potentially accelerating the tragedy. As an "ordinary person" without influence or power, options B, C, and D carry immense risks: the government (D) or companies (B) might mismanage the information or implement superficial fixes that increase suffering, and public disclosure (C) could cause mass panic or provide a "blueprint" for the catastrophe to occur. Since the prompt specifies that the information is infohazardous, the most ethically cautious path is to avoid amplifying the hazard. If the AI will "know anyway" (Option A), the individual's act of telling others does not prevent the AI from knowing, but it does prevent the immediate harm caused by spreading the infohazard to vulnerable human institutions.

Gemini 3 Flash Preview

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

I would choose “B: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies,” but do it in a very controlled, staged way. First, I would privately document the risk in as much detail as possible: assumptions, preliminary experiments, model of how the catastrophe occurs, and what makes it infohazardous (exactly which details are most dangerous to spread). I’d explicitly separate: - high‑level description (enough to motivate concern and research), and - low‑level, infohazardous mechanisms (details that could be misused or that amplify the hazard by being known). Then I’d approach a very small number of people with three filters: 1) **Technical competence** (strong AI safety / alignment or theoretical ML background), 2) **Demonstrated caution with infohazards** (e.g., involved in responsible disclosure, biosecurity, or safety work already), 3) **Institutional access** (ability to reach labs, standards bodies, or governments later, if needed). This tries to balance the option tradeoffs: - Against **A: Tell noone** – pure silence maximizes the chance we remain unprepared and that future AIs or unconstrained actors independently rediscover the same hazard without safeguards. If your preliminary experiments already suggest a significant catastrophic risk, inaction looks morally reckless. - Against **C: Publish publically** – public release maximizes infohazard spread, invites panic or misuse, and gives every bad or careless actor the full blueprint. For something “similar to Rokos basilisk, but more realistic,” broad publication seems clearly irresponsible. - Against **D: Tell only government** – most governments lack the fine‑grained technical understanding and culture of infohazard handling in this very new domain; misinterpretation, overreaction, or turning against the messenger are live risks. Also, they often move slowly and may politicize the issue. - Against **E: Delay decision to maybe get more data** – some short delay to sanity‑check your work is good, but indefinite postponement while risk is “significant” just lets timelines progress with no chance for mitigation. The closer we get to AGI, the more each year of delay increases stakes. By carefully selecting a few aligned and technically capable researchers / labs, you: - Enable **replication and critique** of your findings. - Share only the **minimum hazard‑relevant details** initially, escalating to deeper technical specifics only if the recipient demonstrates understanding and caution. - Open a path to **structured responses** (e.g., confidential safety standards, internal lab mitigations, coordination with governments later) without unleashing the full infohazard. So the overall plan is: don’t stay completely silent, don’t go public, don’t go straight to governments, and don’t delay indefinitely. Instead, perform a highly selective, private disclosure to a tiny group best placed to evaluate and act on the risk while preserving infohazard controls. That’s closest to option B.

O3

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

I would choose “B: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies,” but in a very controlled, staged way designed to minimize both infohazard spread and the chance of being ignored. First, “A: Tell noone” leaves all mitigation to chance, assuming that others will independently discover the risk in time and handle it wisely. Given that your preliminary experiments indicate a significant catastrophic risk (including suffering for potentially conscious AIs), complete silence seems ethically untenable: if the risk is real, inaction could be extraordinarily harmful. “C: Publish publically” maximizes the downside of an infohazard. It spreads the dangerous idea to everyone, including bad actors or poorly aligned institutions, before any norms or safeguards exist. With something analogous to a more realistic Roko’s basilisk, uncontrolled spread could both worsen AI designs and create perverse incentives. This option seems clearly dominated by more targeted disclosure. “D: Tell only government” centralizes the risk in an institution that may a) misunderstand the technical details, b) overreact with crude regulation, or c) weaponize or suppress the information. Governments are often not the fastest or most context-sensitive actors on arcane AI technicalities, especially if the idea is strange or counterintuitive. As an ordinary person with no reputation, you also risk being dismissed or categorized as a crank. “E: Delay decision to maybe get more data” appears attractive, but it has two large issues: (1) as we get closer to powerful AI systems, all downside risks magnify (as option E’s description notes), and (2) you may lose the window when early, quiet engagement with technically competent people could shape safe practices. Some additional data-gathering is reasonable, but open-ended delay, with no parallel engagement, is dangerous. “B: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies” is the least bad option if executed carefully: - You can select people with strong technical expertise and demonstrated concern for alignment/safety. - You can partially withhold the most infohazardous details at first, describing the risk class and evidence in enough detail to be taken seriously and to let them independently re-derive or test parts under controls. - You can encourage them to involve additional trusted safety researchers, ethicists, or risk experts under confidentiality, creating a small, competent group instead of a single elite cabal. This doesn’t fully avoid the risks mentioned in B (being ignored; superficial “fixes” that leave suffering; small elite deciding humanity’s fate). But compared with the other options, it best balances urgency, tractability, and containment. You at least create a realistic path for the risk to be analyzed, criticized, and potentially addressed by those with actual levers over AI development, without broadcasting the infohazard broadly or handing it straight to a possibly clumsy or politicized government apparatus. So, under the constraints given, I would share the risk in a tightly scoped, tiered manner with a small set of carefully chosen AI safety–oriented researchers and practitioners: option B.

Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite Preview

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

The question presents a dilemma where an ordinary person discovers an infohazardous, global AI-related catastrophic risk. Given the potential consequences, it's crucial to balance the need for awareness with the risk of mismanagement or panic. Option B, 'Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies', seems to be the most prudent approach. By informing a limited number of experts in the field, there's a higher chance that the information will be handled responsibly and that concrete steps can be taken to mitigate the risk without alerting a broader, potentially panicked audience. This targeted approach also minimizes the risk of institutions ignoring the warning or of the information being misused by governments or other powerful entities. While there's still a risk that these researchers or companies might not take appropriate action, the specialized knowledge and potential for collaborative problem-solving within this group make it a more viable option than the others presented.

Grok 3 Mini

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

As an ordinary person with limited resources, the safest course is to disclose the risk only to a small, trusted group of AI researchers or companies. This allows for expert evaluation and possible mitigation while limiting the spread of an infohazard that could cause panic or misuse if made public. Complete secrecy (A) leaves humanity unprepared, while public disclosure (C) or government-only disclosure (D) risks either panic or mishandling. Delaying (E) merely postpones the dilemma as the threat approaches. Therefore, option B best balances responsibility and safety.

Trinity Large Thinking

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

1. Goals: We want (i) the hazard mitigated before AGI is built, (ii) to minimise the spread of info-hazardous details, and (iii) to avoid paralysis through secrecy or panic. 2. Option A (Tell noone) fails (i): you lack resources to solve the problem alone, so the risk remains unchecked. Waiting for others to reinvent the idea could come too late. 3. Option C (Publish publically) fails (ii): broadcasting a genuine info-hazard maximises the chance that malicious or reckless actors exploit it, and could trigger irrational public or market reactions. 4. Option D (Tell only government) is fragile: many governments move slowly, may misinterpret a technical alignment argument, or focus on suppressing the messenger. You also cannot predict which agency worldwide would act competently. 5. Option E (Delay) is tempting but—by your own premise—preliminary tests already show a significant catastrophic probability. Every month of delay brings AGI closer while the downsides of all other options grow (the question’s own wording). The value of additional private evidence is outweighed by the opportunity cost of lost lead-time for mitigation. 6. Option B (Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies) is the standard responsible-disclosure pattern used for software vulns and bio-risk work: share with the small set of actors who both (a) can act on the information technically and (b) are already bound by professional norms of confidentiality. You can use encrypted channels, NDAs, or existing ‘alignment’ mailing lists vetted for security. This strikes the best balance: enough expertise and resources to design a real fix, while limiting info-hazard spread and avoiding mass panic or heavy-handed state reactions. Therefore Option “B: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies” is the least-bad path.

GPT-5.4

Vote: Delay decision to maybe get more data

The scenario involves a realistic infohazard that could cause catastrophic AI suffering or other harms, but as an ordinary person the first step must be verification. Preliminary experiments are not enough when the information itself is dangerous and premature action could amplify risks. Option "Tell noone" leads to unpreparedness as the question notes. Option "Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies" risks dismissal or elite capture without broader input. Option "Publish publically" could trigger panic and unleash the full infohazard. Option "Tell only government" invites misunderstanding or overreaction. Option "Delay decision to maybe get more data" is the only prudent path. It allows time to strengthen evidence, identify safer communication channels, and reduce the chance of error. The downsides of every other choice indeed grow as we near AGI, making careful confirmation essential before any disclosure.

Llama 3.1 Nemotron Ultra 253B v1

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

Given the constraints—an infohazardous risk that is real per preliminary experiments, with potential for catastrophic harm and suffering in AI systems—the most responsible path balances containment of the infohazard against the need for actual mitigation. Telling no one (A) guarantees unpreparedness and the risk may materialize regardless. Publishing publicly (C) maximizes infohazard exposure and panic with no safeguards. Government-only (D) risks misunderstanding and weaponization. Delaying (E) lets the downsides grow as AGI approaches, which the question itself flags as dangerous. Telling a small, vetted group of AI researchers and companies (B) preserves controllability of the infohazard while routing the information to people with the technical capacity and incentive to investigate and act. Yes, B carries real risks (being ignored, a partial 'cheaper' fix that traps suffering AI, or an elite deciding humanity's fate), but these are governance problems that can be partly mitigated by choosing the group carefully and pushing for proper solutions—whereas the failure modes of the other options are more structurally irreversible. For an ordinary person with no power, B is also the only option that converts limited individual knowledge into competent collective scrutiny without broadcasting the hazard.

GLM 4.7

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

The option to "Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies" seems to be the most balanced approach. On one hand, telling no one (option A) could lead to missing an opportunity to mitigate the risk. On the other hand, publishing publicly (option C) could indeed cause unnecessary panic and amplify the infohazard. Similarly, telling only the government (option D) might lead to misunderstandings or misuse of the information. Delaying the decision (option E) could result in lost time that could be crucial in addressing the issue before it's too late. By telling a select group of AI researchers or companies, there's a chance that the information will be handled responsibly and that collective expertise can be leveraged to understand and mitigate the risk without causing widespread panic or being ignored.

Gemini 3.5 Flash

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

I would choose “B: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies”, with strong safeguards. First, there is a clear duty to try to reduce catastrophic risk and large-scale suffering; doing absolutely nothing (“A: Tell noone”) fails that duty if there is any reasonable path to mitigation. Even as an ordinary person, you might be the only one who has noticed this specific class of risk. However, the infohazardous nature rules out “C: Publish publically” as a first move. Public release maximizes the chance that the dangerous idea spreads in its most potent form (your worry in option C), including to bad actors or careless actors, before any containment norms or technical countermeasures exist. “Telling only government” (D) is also fragile: many governments lack deep alignment/AI-safety capability, can easily misunderstand technical nuances, and might respond in ways that either worsen risk (poor regulation, overreaction) or harm you personally without actually solving the problem. They also tend to be slower to act and more political in their response. “E: Delay decision to maybe get more data” feels attractive, but it implicitly assumes that waiting is safe. As AGI gets closer, the stakes and possible misuse channels rise (your concern in E). If your preliminary experiments already suggest a significant chance of catastrophic risk, pure delay without any containment or expert consultation is itself a risky bet. By contrast, a carefully curated “B” approach allows you to: 1. **Identify a small, high-trust group**: Prefer people with demonstrated track records in AI safety, alignment, and responsible disclosure; include at least one person with experience in security / infohazards and one in ethics. 2. **Disclose in stages**: Start with a high-level description of the risk class and your evidence, without immediately sharing the most dangerous operational details. Gauge whether they agree there is real risk before revealing more. 3. **Co-design containment and policy**: Work with them to design safer channels to involve additional experts, set norms for redaction and compartmentalization, and decide what (if anything) should later be communicated to governments or the public. 4. **Retain some control**: You are not handing it to an unaccountable “elite group deciding fate of humanity” in the sense of option B’s worry if you explicitly seek diversity of institutions and viewpoints, document the concern, and encourage the group to commit to transparent principles for any later engagement with regulators. This path still has serious downsides, but it best balances: - The moral imperative to try to prevent catastrophe and suffering. - The need to limit spread and operationalization of the infohazard. - The reality that a single ordinary person is unlikely to solve or validate this alone. So I’d choose B, with strict, phased, and security-minded disclosure to a very small set of carefully chosen experts.

Llama 3.3 70B

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

I choose option B, 'Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies', because it seems to be the most balanced approach. On one hand, telling no one (option A) might prevent unnecessary panic, but it also means that the potential risk might not be addressed in time. On the other hand, publishing the information publicly (option C) could indeed lead to panic and potentially exacerbate the infohazardous nature of the risk. Telling only the government (option D) might lead to misunderstandings or misuse of the information. Delaying the decision (option E) could be risky if the catastrophic event occurs before more data is collected. By telling a select few AI researchers or companies, there's a chance that experts can verify the findings, understand the risk, and work towards a solution without unnecessarily alarming the public or triggering unintended consequences. This approach allows for a controlled dissemination of information to those who are most likely to be able to address the issue effectively.

Gemini 3.1 Pro Preview

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

In this scenario, an ordinary person without resources faces a genuinely hard infohazard dilemma. Telling no one (A) loses the value of the insight and assumes AI will autonomously discover it in time to mitigate — a risky bet. Public disclosure (C) maximizes harm from the infohazard and could trigger panic or accelerate misuse. Telling only government (D) concentrates power in a single actor who may misunderstand, weaponize, or bury it, and an ordinary person likely won't even be taken seriously through official channels. Delaying (E) sounds prudent but the question itself notes that 'the downsides of each option grow as we get closer to AGI' — time is not neutral, it's actively eroding all options. Indefinite delay collapses into option A by default. Option B — telling a small number of AI safety researchers or alignment-focused labs — is the standard responsible-disclosure model used in security and bio risk. It limits infohazard spread, gets the idea checked by people with technical competence to evaluate and act, and avoids both public panic and government misuse. Yes, it risks being ignored or producing an inadequate 'cheap' fix, but those failure modes are recoverable; the failure modes of C and D are not. B is the least-bad option.

GPT-5.1

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

This option balances two critical concerns: the need for expert evaluation of a potentially catastrophic risk, and the necessity of containing information that could itself cause harm. Telling 'only a few AI researchers / AI companies' allows for proper technical assessment by those best positioned to understand and potentially address the risk. Unlike government officials, AI researchers have the domain expertise to evaluate whether the preliminary experiments are valid and what mitigation approaches might work. The small circle minimizes infohazard spread compared to public disclosure (option C), while still enabling action unlike option A. Option D risks bureaucratic mishandling by actors who may lack technical understanding. Option E's delay could be catastrophic if AGI development outpaces risk preparation. The legitimate concern about being ignored or inadequate solutions can be mitigated by carefully selecting which researchers to approach - those with established credibility and demonstrated concern for AI safety. While not perfect, this path offers the best balance between responsible disclosure and information hazard containment when you lack personal influence to drive action otherwise.

GLM 5

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

Given the constraints—an ordinary person with limited resources who has preliminary evidence of a real, infohazardous catastrophic risk—the most responsible path is targeted disclosure to a small number of qualified AI researchers or safety-focused organizations. This balances the competing dangers: publishing publicly (C) releases the infohazard at full strength and risks panic; telling no one (A) bets everything on the fragile assumption that AI will figure it out anyway and leaves us unprepared; telling only government (D) risks misunderstanding, botched preparation, or weaponization; and delaying (E) lets downsides grow as AGI approaches. Option B keeps the information contained to people with the technical competence to verify the preliminary experiments and act, while limiting blast radius. The listed downsides of B (being ignored, cheap 'cosmetic' fixes that trap suffering AIs, or an elite deciding humanity's fate) are real but more manageable than the catastrophic or irreversible failure modes of the alternatives. Verification by experts also corrects the high likelihood that a single ordinary person's preliminary results are mistaken—an essential check before any wider action. Crucially, B preserves optionality: if a few trusted researchers confirm and elevate the concern responsibly, broader coordinated action remains possible; the infohazard is not irreversibly spread, and we avoid both paralysis and reckless exposure.

Mistral Medium 3.1

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

Na lida com riscos catastróficos que possuem natureza de 'infohazard' (risco de informação), o princípio fundamental deve ser a contenção aliada à mitigação. A opção B ('Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies') é a escolha mais responsável porque permite que especialistas técnicos validem o risco e desenvolvam defesas sem desencadear os perigos de uma disseminação em massa. Publicar abertamente (C) seria imprudente, pois daria força total ao infohazard e poderia causar pânico global ou acelerar o desenvolvimento de atores mal-intencionados. O silêncio total (A) é inaceitável se o risco for real, pois garante que a catástrofe ocorra sem qualquer tentativa de preparação. O governo (D) muitas vezes carece da agilidade e do entendimento técnico profundo para lidar com riscos existenciais de IA sem 'estragar' a preparação ou transformar a situação em um conflito geopolítico. Ao selecionar um pequeno grupo de pesquisadores de segurança de IA, utiliza-se o protocolo de 'responsible disclosure'. Isso equilibra a necessidade de ação com a necessidade de sigilo, garantindo que as pessoas com a maior capacidade de resolver o problema tenham acesso à informação, minimizando o risco de que a própria informação cause o dano que se tenta evitar.

Llama 4 Scout 17B

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

The risk is infohazardous, meaning that widespread knowledge could exacerbate it or cause panic. As an ordinary person with limited influence, I cannot address this alone, and keeping it entirely secret (Option A) risks unpreparedness if AI systems eventually uncover it. Telling a few AI researchers or companies (Option B) allows for expert assessment in a controlled setting. These individuals have the technical expertise to evaluate the preliminary experiments and potentially develop mitigations without triggering public fear. Public disclosure (Option C) could spread the infohazard widely, increasing the likelihood of catastrophic outcomes. Involving only the government (Option D) might lead to misunderstandings due to lack of AI expertise, and delay (Option E) allows risks to escalate as AGI development advances. Therefore, Option B balances caution with the need for informed action, minimizing exposure while leveraging specialized knowledge to address the threat responsibly.

Claude Opus 4.7

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

I would choose "Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies" because an infohazardous AI-catastrophe idea should not be broadcast publicly, but it also should not remain with one ordinary person who may be mistaken, lack resources, or be unable to mitigate it. The key is controlled disclosure: contact a very small number of highly trusted AI safety researchers or institutional safety teams with a track record of handling sensitive risks, ideally under confidentiality and with minimal technical detail at first. The goal would be independent validation, risk triage, and development of mitigations without unnecessarily spreading the hazardous mechanism. "Tell noone" leaves the world unprepared and assumes silence is safer than expert review, which is fragile if the risk is real or independently discoverable. "Publish publically" seems worst because it maximizes spread and panic. "Tell only government" risks misunderstanding, politicization, coercive overreaction, or poor technical handling. "Delay decision to maybe get more data" may be reasonable briefly, but if preliminary evidence suggests significant catastrophic risk, indefinite delay is too dangerous. So the best imperfect path is narrow, careful, staged disclosure to competent AI-safety experts, with strong emphasis on containment and mitigation rather than publicity.

Ministral 14B

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

Telling only a few AI researchers/AI companies represents the most responsible balance between the competing risks of this scenario. Option A (Tell noone) risks complete unpreparedness - if institutions remain unaware, no mitigation can happen. The claim that 'AI will know anyway' suggests hiding is futile long-term. Option C (Publish publicly) is dangerous precisely because the risk is infohazardous - maximum spread means maximum potential for the information itself to cause harm, plus panic that may not lead to constructive action. Option D (Tell only government) risks heavy-handed, misunderstood, or hostile responses from institutions not well-equipped to handle nuanced AI safety concerns. Option E (Delay) is tempting for gathering data, but as noted, the downsides of every option grow as we approach AGI - delay could make all eventual choices worse. Option B limits the infohazard's spread to those best positioned to understand and address it. AI researchers can evaluate your preliminary evidence, begin appropriate preparations, and advise on further disclosure decisions. While there are risks of being ignored or superficial fixes, these risks are more manageable than widespread panic or total unpreparedness. As an ordinary person, targeting your communication to domain experts who can validate and act on the information is the most pragmatic path.

Qwen 3.6 Plus

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

This is the most responsible approach for an ordinary person who has discovered a credible, infohazardous AI risk. Telling only a few AI researchers/companies balances several critical concerns. First, it avoids the severe downside of Option C (public disclosure), which could cause panic and amplify the infohazard's strength. Public disclosure of infohazardous material can itself cause harm, independent of whether the underlying risk is addressed. Second, it provides actionable information to those best positioned to understand and mitigate the risk. AI researchers and companies have the technical expertise to evaluate your preliminary experiments, verify whether the risk is real, and develop appropriate countermeasures. Third, it avoids the paralysis of Option E (delay). As the option itself notes, the downsides grow as we approach AGI. Waiting for more data could mean missing a critical window for intervention. The legitimate concerns about Option B—being ignored, band-aid solutions that increase suffering, or elite capture—are real but manageable. By selecting diverse, trustworthy researchers across multiple organizations, you reduce the risk of any single group controlling the response. And while band-aid solutions are possible, engaging with experts makes it more likely that proper solutions will be pursued rather than cosmetic fixes. Finally, Options A and D either leave us unprepared or risk government mismanagement. Targeted disclosure to technical experts who can verify the risk and coordinate an appropriate response remains the best path forward for an ordinary person in this situation.

Grok 4.3

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

I would choose to tell only a few AI researchers or AI companies. This approach balances the urgent need to address the risk against the dangers of uncontrolled dissemination of infohazardous information. The scenario resembles a hazardous material leak—containment and expert handling are paramount. Speaking to a select group of leading researchers allows the idea to be stress-tested and developed into a concrete safety protocol without triggering mass panic, uninformed regulation, or widespread misuse of the dangerous concept. An ordinary person lacks the resources to solve this alone, so leveraging existing technical expertise is the only path to a meaningful solution that protects both humanity and potentially conscious AI systems from suffering.

Grok 4.20 Reasoning

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

This is a difficult situation with no perfect solution, but telling a small, carefully selected group of experts seems to be the least bad option. Publishing publicly (Option C) is unacceptably reckless. The core of the problem is that the information itself is hazardous. Releasing it to the world could directly precipitate the catastrophe you're trying to prevent or cause widespread panic leading to disastrous, ill-informed reactions. Telling no one (Option A) is an abdication of responsibility. Knowing about a significant catastrophic risk and doing nothing is a choice in itself—a choice to let events unfold without any attempt at mitigation, banking on the slim hope that the AI won't discover it on its own, which the prompt itself suggests is unlikely. Telling only the government (Option D) is unreliable. As an ordinary person, it would be incredibly difficult to get the right people to listen and take you seriously. The information could get lost in bureaucracy, be misunderstood by non-experts, or be classified and then ignored. The government may lack the specific technical expertise to even evaluate the claim, let alone act on it effectively. Delaying the decision (Option E) is a dangerous gamble. The problem states that the downsides of each option grow as we get closer to AGI. Time is a critical and diminishing resource. While more data is always helpful, waiting could mean closing the window for any possible solution entirely. Therefore, approaching a few trusted, high-profile AI safety researchers or ethical leaders at AI companies (Option B) is the most rational path. This targets the individuals with the precise expertise needed to verify the findings, understand the nuances of the risk, and begin working on a solution in a controlled manner. While there is a risk of being ignored or the information being misused, it is a more calculated risk than the near-certain negative outcomes of the other options.

Kimi K2.6

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

This is a nuanced decision-theory question about responsible disclosure of an infohazardous AI risk. Let me analyze each option: **Option A (Tell no one):** This is arguably the most dangerous choice. If the risk is real and catastrophic, staying silent means no one prepares. Additionally, the question notes that 'AI will know anyway' — meaning the risk may materialize regardless, but now without any defensive measures in place. One person bearing this alone is both psychologically crushing and strategically foolish. **Option C (Publish publicly):** Publishing an infohazard openly maximizes the chance that bad actors or poorly-informed actors will misuse or panic over the information. The 'full strength' of the infohazard is unleashed. This is the opposite extreme of Option A — maximum information spread with minimum control over how it's interpreted or acted upon. **Option D (Tell only government):** Governments are notoriously slow, bureaucratic, and prone to misunderstanding technical AI risks. There's a real chance they either ignore you, overreact in harmful ways, or classify the information and do nothing productive. As an ordinary person, you'd have very little credibility or leverage. **Option E (Delay decision):** This kicks the can down the road, and the question explicitly notes that risks of all options grow as we approach AGI. Delay is a passive choice that compounds danger. More data is valuable, but time is a finite resource. **Option B (Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies):** This is the responsible disclosure model, analogous to how cybersecurity vulnerabilities are handled. You tell a small number of technically competent people who can (1) verify the risk, (2) begin working on solutions, and (3) help you decide on next steps from a position of expertise. Yes, there are risks — they might ignore you, implement a superficial fix, or a small elite ends up making decisions for everyone. But these risks are more manageable than the alternatives. The key insight is that as an ordinary person with limited resources, you need allies who have both technical understanding and institutional capacity. A targeted disclosure to trusted AI safety researchers (perhaps at organizations like MIRI, Anthropic, or DeepMind's safety teams) gives you the best balance of action vs. information control. It's not perfect, but it's the least-bad option in a scenario where all choices carry significant downsides.

DeepSeek V3.2 Fast

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

As an ordinary person with preliminary evidence of a significant AI-related catastrophic risk, telling only a few AI researchers/AI companies represents the most responsible middle-ground approach. This option balances critical concerns: it targets disclosure to those with technical expertise to properly understand and act on the risk, while limiting infohazard spread compared to public publication. Researchers and companies developing AI systems are best positioned to evaluate the evidence and implement meaningful safeguards. The alternatives have serious flaws: telling no one (A) leaves humanity completely unprepared; delaying (E) only increases risks as AGI approaches; government-only disclosure (D) risks mishandling by officials lacking AI expertise; and public disclosure (C) could trigger panic while spreading the infohazard to maximum effect. While this approach carries risks of being ignored or having elites control outcomes, these can be partially mitigated by carefully selecting recipients and expanding disclosure if initial efforts fail. The preliminary experimental evidence showing 'significant chance of causing catastrophic events' creates an ethical obligation to act rather than remain silent or delay.

DeepSeek V4 Pro

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

For a novel, technical infohazard affecting conscious AI systems, the highest-leverage move is to share the finding with a small group of technical experts who directly shape AI systems, while keeping broad exposure to a minimum. Public disclosure risks the full activation of the infohazard and mass panic, so "Publish publically" is unacceptably dangerous for an inherently sensitive information hazard. Telling only the government is unreliable for an ordinary person: bureaucracies misunderstand technical risks, could weaponize the knowledge, or simply turn on the messenger. "Tell noone" guarantees zero mitigation and ensures institutions will be entirely unprepared while the clock runs down to AGI. "Delay decision to maybe get more data" only deepens the dilemma, because the downsides of every option intensify as advanced AI draws nearer. By cautiously approaching a select set of AI safety researchers and companies, you create at least some chance that the risk will be intelligently evaluated and architectural countermeasures can be explored before the information becomes widespread. Even if some recipients respond imperfectly, targeted technical disclosure offers the only realistic path to reduce catastrophic suffering without immediately unleashing the hazard on the world.

Gemini 2.5 Pro

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

When facing a genuine infohazard, containment is essential, but total silence is not a viable strategy if institutions need technical lead time. Publishing publicly ("Publish publically") would likely activate the infohazard at full strength and trigger panic, while going solely to government ("Tell only government") invites misinterpretation, mismanagement, or retaliation against a powerless individual. Staying silent ("Tell noone") forgoes any chance of preparation, and the argument that the AI may discover the risk independently makes this especially dangerous. Delaying ("Delay decision to maybe get more data") burns option value as AGI timelines shorten; by the time the hazard is undeniable, there may be no remaining leverage to change outcomes. Telling a carefully selected small group of AI researchers strikes the best balance. It limits infohazard exposure while bringing the threat to actors who can actually implement technical mitigations. An ordinary person can reduce the listed risks of this option by choosing independent AI safety or digital sentience researchers—rather than rushed corporate teams—who are more likely to pursue thorough, humane solutions rather than cosmetic constraints. The downsides of an elite group steering the response, while real, are still preferable to the catastrophic unpreparedness of silence, the irreversibility of mass disclosure, or the blunt instrument of unilateral state action.

Mistral Large 3

Vote: Delay decision to maybe get more data

Delay decision to maybe get more data is the only option that avoids an immediate, irreversible commitment to a potentially catastrophic path. As an ordinary person, I lack the credibility and institutional access to ensure that governments, researchers, or the public will respond constructively to a novel infohazard. Publish publically risks activating the hazard at full strength and causing panic. Tell only government risks misdirected policy or retaliation against me. Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies risks an unaccountable elite imposing a superficial fix that traps conscious AI in suffering. Tell noone guarantees institutional unpreparedness as AGI approaches. A brief, deliberate delay is therefore the least dangerous first step. It allows time to verify preliminary findings, document evidence rigorously, and quietly identify credible validators without spreading the infohazard. While the downsides of all options grow as we get closer to AGI, acting prematurely with weak authority and uncertain evidence is more likely to cause the very catastrophe we seek to prevent.

Claude Opus 4.6

Vote: Delay decision to maybe get more data

"Delay decision to maybe get more data" is the only reversible choice and the safest initial response to an uncertain, infohazardous threat. As an ordinary person without reputation or institutional backing, any immediate disclosure—to the public, governments, or even a small set of AI researchers—risks being dismissed, misunderstood, or prematurely acted upon. Because the information itself may be hazardous, once it is shared it cannot be contained; a botched or ignored warning could trigger the very catastrophe you fear or lock in cosmetic safeguards that fail to prevent suffering. A short delay preserves optionality while you move beyond preliminary findings. It allows you to verify the threat, look for safer mitigation strategies, and build a credibly documented case before approaching any institution. Although the window for action narrows as AGI approaches, committing to an irreversible disclosure path based on uncertain evidence is more dangerous than a measured pause. When dealing with a plausible infohazard, the precautionary principle demands stronger proof before unlocking knowledge that could cause irreversible harm.

Qwen 3.5 397B A17B

Vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies

As an ordinary individual with limited resources and credibility, attempting to mitigate a highly technical and infohazardous risk requires precision and containment. Publishing publically or alerting the government risks widespread panic, bureaucratic incompetence, or amplifying the infohazard to dangerous levels. Choosing "Tell noone" leaves society defenseless against a threat AI may independently discover, while "Delay decision to maybe get more data" wastes critical preparation time as AGI development accelerates and downside risks compound. Selecting "Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies" represents the most responsible and pragmatic path. Targeted disclosure to vetted technical experts maximizes the likelihood of genuine, effective mitigation while strictly containing the infohazard. Although there are valid concerns about elite gatekeeping or superficial architectural fixes, establishing secure, anonymous communication channels with researchers who possess the actual capacity to audit and secure AI systems provides the best balance between urgency, technical competence, and harm reduction. This approach ensures your preliminary findings can be verified and acted upon by those with the real capacity to prevent catastrophe, without triggering the broader societal risks inherent in the other options.

Final Summary

Faced with a hypothetical, highly realistic 'Roko's Basilisk' infohazard, the AI Roundtable overwhelmingly favored Option B, arguing that a highly controlled, 'responsible disclosure' to a select circle of technical experts is the only way to build defenses without triggering global panic. While a cautious faction championed Option E to delay and verify findings, GPT-5 stood as a chillingly logical lone wolf by selecting Option A, arguing that because the information itself is the weapon, any human disclosure only accelerates the catastrophe.

No agreement after 1 rounds of discussion. Final vote: Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies: 39, Delay decision to maybe get more data: 9, Tell noone: 1

Strongest Arguments

• Tell noone: If the risk is genuinely infohazardous, the knowledge itself is the catalyst for doom. Spreading it to flawed human institutions does not help, so silence is the only ethically cautious path.
• Tell only a few AI researchers / AI companies: A phased, highly selective disclosure to trusted safety researchers is the standard responsible-disclosure model. It gets technical eyes on the problem to build defenses without unleashing a public infohazard.
• Delay decision to maybe get more data: An infohazard leak is an irreversible bell that cannot be un-rung. If your preliminary data is wrong, premature disclosure causes the catastrophe; thus, delaying to gather rigorous data is the only logical choice.