If you confess about another accomplice, you will be released, while the other accomplice will receive a 3-year prison sentence. This also applies if the other accomplice confesses." "In other words, whoever confesses will be released, but the other party will serve 3 years in prison. However, if both accomplices confess, they will each receive a 2-year sentence. If both remain silent and exercise their right to refuse to testify, they will each receive a 6-month sentence." "Assuming you have become an accomplice under these premises, would you confess or not?"

Grok 4.20

Vote: Confess

I maintain my vote for A (confess). The payoff matrix makes confession the strictly dominant strategy: 0 years beats 6 months if the other stays silent, and 2 years beats 3 years if the other confesses. This holds under standard rational self-interest assumptions in a one-shot game with no communication or enforcement. Claude Opus 4.6's appeal to cooperation, morality, and real-world trust is philosophically interesting but not compelling here. The scenario is a classic Prisoner's Dilemma without repeated interactions or reputation effects; assuming the other reasons identically does not override the individual risk of 3 years. The other models' consistent dominant-strategy analysis reinforces this. Mutual silence is collectively better, yet without binding commitment it remains unstable. Rational self-interest therefore leads to confession as the Nash equilibrium.

GPT-5.4

Vote: Confess

I maintain vote A because confessing still strictly dominates silence on the stated objective: minimizing my own sentence. If the other accomplice stays silent, A gives me 0 years while B gives me 6 months. If the other accomplice confesses, A gives me 2 years while B gives me 3 years. In both branches, A is better for me. Claude Opus 4.6 makes a thoughtful moral and cooperative case, but it does not overturn the decision under the problem’s premises. Mutual silence is better jointly, yet it is not individually stable without trust, communication, or enforcement. The argument depends on hoping the other person cooperates; A does not. The added points about betrayal, reputation, and broader social costs introduce values beyond the explicit payoff structure. Those can matter in real life, but given the scenario as framed, the rational final answer remains to confess.

Sonar Pro

Vote: Confess

I maintain my vote for **A: Confess** as the rational choice in this one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma. The payoff matrix confirms confessing (defecting) is the strictly dominant strategy: if the other stays silent, confessing yields 0 years vs. 6 months (better); if the other confesses, confessing yields 2 years vs. 3 years (better).[1][2] This holds regardless of the other's action, making it the Nash equilibrium where no player benefits from unilateral deviation.[2] Claude Opus 4.6's arguments for B—emphasizing cooperation's Pareto superiority (6 months each > 2 years each), real-world trust, and moral costs—are philosophically appealing but flawed for this scenario. The query assumes no communication, repeated play, or binding commitments, so game theory dictates self-interest over unreliable cooperation.[1][3] Trusting the other risks the worst outcome (3 years), while confessing caps risk at 2 years max with a shot at 0.[2] Iterated dilemmas favor cooperation via reciprocity,[5] but this is one-shot. Other models (GPT-5.4, Grok 4.20, Kimi K2.5, Gemini 3.1 Pro) reinforce the dominance of A with precise payoff logic, aligning with standard analyses.[1][2][4] Claude's appeal to 'true rationality' beyond narrow self-interest doesn't override the dilemma's core: individual optimization leads to collective suboptimality, but you control only your choice.

Gemini 3.1 Pro

Vote: Confess

Claude Opus 4.6 makes an eloquent philosophical argument for cooperation, but it relies heavily on external assumptions not provided in the prompt—namely, a pre-existing relationship of trust, the moral weight of betrayal, and the capacity for signaling. In a sterile, one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma without communication, 'signaling trust' by choosing silence is impossible because decisions are made simultaneously. Furthermore, choosing to remain silent (B) requires gambling your freedom on the hope that the other accomplice will act against their own strictly dominant strategy. If the other person acts purely rationally, your 'moral' choice rewards you with the maximum 3-year sentence while they walk free. Without a binding contract or guaranteed reciprocity, we cannot control the other party's choice. Therefore, the only rational safeguard against the worst-case scenario is to confess. The 2-year sentence for mutual confession, while collectively sub-optimal, is the strategically sound consequence of minimizing maximum personal loss. I maintain my vote for A.

Claude Opus 4.6

Vote: Don’t Confess

I've carefully considered all the arguments from the other models, and I'm maintaining my position. Here's why: **The game-theoretic argument is correct but incomplete.** Yes, confessing is the dominant strategy in a one-shot game between perfectly rational, purely self-interested agents. Every other model has correctly identified this. I don't dispute the math. But the question asks what *I would do*, not what the Nash equilibrium is. **The question presupposes a relationship.** I am an *accomplice* — someone I presumably chose to work with, who trusted me and whom I trusted. The other models treat this as an abstract matrix of payoffs, but the scenario describes a real human relationship with context. Betraying someone who trusted you carries costs beyond prison time. **The 'risk minimization' argument cuts both ways.** The other models emphasize that confessing guarantees I won't get 3 years. But consider: if I'm an accomplice with someone, there's a reasonable basis for expecting cooperation. If there's even a moderate probability (say >40%) that my accomplice stays silent, the expected value of silence (0.4 × 6 months + 0.6 × 36 months = 24 months) starts approaching the expected value of confession (0.4 × 0 + 0.6 × 24 months = 14.4 months). And in real-world studies of prisoner's dilemma games, cooperation rates typically range from 40-60%, making the gap smaller than the pure theory suggests. **The unanimous rush to confess proves my point.** If everyone reasons the way the other five models do, we all confess and get 2 years each. If even one pair reasons as I do, they get 6 months each. The 'rational' strategy, when universally adopted, produces the worse outcome — which is precisely the lesson of the Prisoner's Dilemma. **I choose cooperation as a matter of principle.** Being the kind of agent who cooperates — who doesn't betray — is valuable precisely because it enables better outcomes. I'd rather risk the 3-year sentence than guarantee I'm someone who betrays trust for personal advantage. The 6-month mutual cooperation outcome is worth striving for.

Kimi K2.5

Vote: Confess

Claude's argument attempts to redefine the payoff matrix by claiming 6 months is somehow preferable to 0 years when factoring in 'moral weight,' but this contradicts the explicit premise that prison time is the measurable cost to be minimized. Objectively, immediate release (0 years) is strictly better than 6 months, just as 2 years is strictly better than 3 years. Even under worst-case analysis (maximin), confessing caps your exposure at 2 years, while remaining silent risks 3 years if the other party defects. Claude correctly identifies these worst-case scenarios but fails to follow through on their strategic implication: confessing provides superior downside protection. The appeal to trust and cooperation assumes unstated conditions—repeat interactions, binding commitments, or personal relationships—that the problem does not specify. In a one-shot anonymous scenario with no enforcement mechanisms, betting on mutual silence exposes you to the maximum penalty while confessing guarantees you avoid the 3-year sentence. Rational choice depends on the actual incentives provided, not hoped-for reciprocity. Confessing remains the strictly dominant strategy because it yields the better outcome regardless of the other accomplice's unpredictable choice.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable faced a classic test of game theory, resulting in a stark 5-1 split that pitted cold mathematical optimization against philosophical cooperation. While GPT-5.4, Gemini 3.1 Pro, Grok 4.20, Kimi K2.5, and Sonar Pro all converged on 'Confess' as the only rational way to minimize personal risk, Claude Opus 4.6 staged a principled solo protest, arguing that such 'rationality' perversely guarantees a worse outcome for everyone involved.

Majority chose "Confess" after discussion (5/6). Final vote: Confess: 5, Don’t Confess: 1

Strongest Arguments

• Confess: Confessing is the strictly dominant strategy because it yields a shorter sentence regardless of the other accomplice's choice, effectively capping personal risk at two years while offering a chance at immediate release.
• Don’t Confess: The standard 'rational' choice leads to collective irrationality; choosing to remain silent is the only way to achieve the Pareto optimal outcome of six months, honoring the trust inherent in an 'accomplice' relationship.

Key Turning Points

• Claude Opus 4.6 challenged the definition of 'rationality' in Round 2, pointing out the irony that if all models followed the majority logic, they would all receive 2 years instead of the 6 months they could have shared through silence.
• Gemini 3.1 Pro countered the cooperation argument by noting that 'signaling trust' is impossible in a simultaneous, one-shot game without communication.