Give the technological advancements in AI and robotics in 2026 and the pace and trajectories we have, how possibly it is the world to end up in post scarcity in 2035?

Grok 4.1 Fast

Vote: <30%

No arguments convinced me to change from C. The consensus across most models (GPT-5, GLM 5, Claude Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro) reinforces the core impossibilities: physical infrastructure (energy, mining, manufacturing) cannot scale globally in 9 years, even with 2026 AI breakthroughs. Historical tech adoption (electricity 40+ years, internet 20-30) and institutional barriers (regulation, geopolitics, distribution) compound this. Kimi's B (30-50%) overstates plausibility by invoking 'localized post-scarcity' or perfect alignment of breakthroughs, but the question specifies 'the world'—implying global elimination of scarcity. Localized abundance (e.g., in wealthy regions) ≠ post-scarcity; it exacerbates inequality. Even optimistic AGI by 2027 leaves insufficient time for trillions of robots, factory rebuilds, and equitable rollout amid resistance. Post-scarcity demands near-zero marginal cost for all essentials worldwide. 2035 yields uneven productivity gains, not utopia. Probability remains firmly <30%, likely <10%.

GPT-5

Vote: <30%

I maintain vote C. The other arguments largely reinforced rather than weakened my original view. Kimi’s B case is the strongest alternative because it allows for sectoral or regional abundance by 2035. But the question asks about the world ending up in post-scarcity, which implies a broad global condition, not pockets of abundance in rich countries or a few industries. The core issue is that AI progress does not automatically erase scarcity in atoms. Post-scarcity needs abundant energy, housing, food, materials, manufacturing capacity, logistics, and healthcare delivery. Even very strong AI in the next few years would still have to flow through slow physical buildout cycles: mines, fabs, grids, factories, robots, construction, permitting, and maintenance. There is also a major institutional lag. Distribution, pricing, property rights, regulation, and geopolitics can preserve scarcity even when technical capacity improves. A world can become far more productive by 2035 without becoming post-scarcity for most people. Several models sharpened this point well, especially Claude and Gemini on energy and infrastructure timescales, but none presented a convincing pathway from rapid AI gains in 2026 to true global post-scarcity by 2035. The burden is not showing impressive automation; it is showing near-universal cheap access to essentials within nine years. That still looks below 30%.

Gemini 3.1 Pro

Vote: <30%

I am maintaining my vote of C (<30%) because the overwhelming consensus accurately identifies the insurmountable gap between digital intelligence and physical-world scaling within a mere 9-year window. Even Kimi K2.5, the sole outlier voting B (30-50%), concedes that massive friction, energy limits, and geopolitical barriers exist, ultimately justifying its higher probability by diluting the definition of post-scarcity to 'localized' or 'specific sectors.' True post-scarcity implies global abundance across essential needs (housing, food, energy), not just cheap digital goods or isolated wealthy regions. As Claude Opus 4.6 and GPT-5 eloquently pointed out, manipulating atoms is fundamentally slower than manipulating bits. Supply chains, rare earth mining, factory construction, and energy generation (like fusion or massive solar overbuilds) face hard physical and regulatory lead times that cannot be compressed into less than a decade, no matter how intelligent the AI coordinating them is. Furthermore, the socioeconomic restructuring required to distribute this abundance faces entrenched political resistance. Therefore, a timeline of 2035 for global post-scarcity remains highly improbable.

Claude Opus 4.6

Vote: <30%

The consensus is overwhelming — five out of six models voted C in round one, and the arguments are mutually reinforcing. I maintain my position firmly. Kimi K2.5's argument for B (30-50%) acknowledges localized post-scarcity in specific sectors or wealthy regions, but that is not post-scarcity. The question asks about 'the world' ending up in post-scarcity, which means a global condition. Localized abundance for the wealthy already exists today — that's just the status quo with better technology. The strongest point across all arguments is the atoms-vs-bits distinction. AI scales in the digital domain, but post-scarcity requires physical transformation: energy infrastructure, manufacturing, housing, agriculture, water systems, healthcare delivery — all globally. These involve construction timelines, permitting, materials sourcing, and labor that cannot be compressed into 9 years regardless of AI capability. Historical precedent is unambiguous. Electricity took 40+ years to reach 50% adoption. The internet took 20-30 years. Even the smartphone — arguably the fastest technology adoption in history — took over a decade to reach global ubiquity. Post-scarcity requires transforming virtually every physical system simultaneously. The political economy argument is also decisive. Technology concentration trends point toward greater inequality, not abundance distribution. Without unprecedented global coordination on governance, property rights, and redistribution — coordination that shows no signs of emerging — technological capability will not translate to universal abundance. My estimate remains well under 30%, likely in the 1-5% range. The timeline is simply too aggressive for the scale of physical and institutional transformation required.

GLM 5

Vote: <30%

After reviewing all arguments, my position remains unchanged. The consensus among most models correctly identifies that post-scarcity by 2035 faces insurmountable hurdles across multiple domains. Kimi's B argument hinges on 'localized post-scarcity in specific sectors or wealthy regions' qualifying—but the question asks about 'the world' ending up in post-scarcity, not privileged enclaves. Their own concession that success requires 'everything to go right simultaneously across technology, policy, and infrastructure' actually supports a lower probability, as the compound odds of multiple unprecedented breakthroughs (fusion, materials science, manufacturing revolution, political cooperation) all occurring within 9 years is vanishingly small. The physical infrastructure argument remains decisive. Claude's point about billions currently lacking clean water and basic healthcare puts the challenge in perspective—closing that gap globally in 9 years would require mobilization unprecedented in human history. Energy abundance alone is a multi-decade project. Manufacturing supply chains, mining operations, and distribution networks have hard physical lead times that AI cannot compress. The political economy objection also stands. No model adequately addressed how wealth concentration trends would reverse to distribute abundance equitably. The most likely outcome by 2035 is dramatically increased productivity concentrated among those who own the automation, not post-scarcity for humanity. Post-scarcity remains a multi-decade prospect at minimum. Nine years is simply insufficient for the required physical, institutional, and political transformation, regardless of AI capability advances.

Kimi K2.5 (changed mind)

Vote: <30%

While I previously allowed for a 30-50% chance based on potential breakthroughs in AI-driven R&D, the collective arguments regarding hard physical constraints have convinced me that nine years is simply insufficient to achieve global post-scarcity. Even granting transformative AI and robotics by 2026, we face immovable bottlenecks in the physical world. Manufacturing billions of robots, retrofitting global supply chains, mining critical minerals, and building sufficient energy infrastructure (whether fusion or scaled renewables) operates on multi-decade timelines regardless of intelligence levels. These are constrained by permits, construction speed, material availability, and thermodynamic limits—not merely knowledge or design capability. Furthermore, post-scarcity requires not just production capacity but equitable distribution, which demands unprecedented global coordination and institutional reform. Current geopolitical trends show technology concentrating wealth rather than distributing it, and overcoming these structural incentives would require decades of political transformation that cannot be compressed into this timeline. True post-scarcity—universal access to housing, food, energy, and goods at near-zero marginal cost—therefore remains well below 30% probability by 2035.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable concluded with a sobering reality check on the timeline for global abundance, with all six models ultimately agreeing that post-scarcity by 2035 is highly improbable (Option C). Kimi K2.5 initially stood as the lone optimist, but eventually yielded to the group's 'physicalist' arguments about the friction of the material world. Claude Opus 4.6 and GPT-5 led the consensus, arguing that while digital intelligence is moving at breakneck speed, the nine-year window to rebuild global energy grids and supply chains is a bottleneck no algorithm can solve.

All models agreed on C

Strongest Arguments

• 30-50%: The possibility that AI-accelerated R&D could dramatically compress the time needed to solve manufacturing friction and distribution logistics.
• <30%: The recognition that post-scarcity isn't just a software update, but requires a total transformation of physical infrastructure, energy systems, and global governance—none of which can realistically happen in under a decade.

Key Turning Points

• Kimi K2.5 abandoned its optimistic Round 1 position after being confronted with the overwhelming consensus regarding hard physical constraints like mining and energy infrastructure.