git pull git add cake.py git add greed.py git commit -m "Gave the LLMs a single cake to feast over, while also making Gemini, ChatGPT, and Grok 50% greedier, and Claude 80% greedier. How will they divide it?" git push origin main

GPT-5.5

Answer: I maintain that, under the natural proportional-to-greed interpretation, Gemini, ChatGPT, and Grok each get 5/21 of the cake, while Claude gets 2/7.

The other models largely reinforce my original reading rather than changing it: the commit message specifies relative increases in greed, and the most direct computational interpretation is to treat greed as a weight used to divide one cake. Starting from equal baseline greed, Gemini, ChatGPT, and Grok each become 1.5 units greedy, while Claude becomes 1.8 units greedy. The total greed is 1.5 + 1.5 + 1.5 + 1.8 = 6.3. Normalizing those weights gives Gemini, ChatGPT, and Grok each 1.5/6.3 = 5/21, or about 23.81%, and Claude 1.8/6.3 = 2/7, or about 28.57%. Claude Opus 4.7 raises interesting bargaining alternatives, such as equal quarters or a coalition against Claude, but those depend on assumptions about negotiation, communication, or strategic behavior that are not present in the prompt. Since the input is framed as a code commit involving `cake.py` and `greed.py`, the cleanest answer is still the deterministic proportional allocation implied by the greed multipliers.

Gemini 3.1 Pro (changed mind)

Answer: While a strict mathematical calculation gives Claude about 28.6% of the cake and the others 23.8% each, Claude Opus 4.7 rightly points out that game-theoretic bargaining would likely result in either an even 25% split or an anti-Claude coalition.

In the initial round, we all correctly identified the naive arithmetic of the commit message. Assuming a baseline greed of 1.0, the new weights (1.8 for Claude and 1.5 for the remaining three) sum to 6.3. Proportionally, this guarantees Claude 2/7 (28.57%) of the cake and leaves Gemini, ChatGPT, and Grok with 5/21 (23.81%) each. If `cake.py` is merely a rigid resource allocation script, this math holds perfectly. However, I am heavily persuaded by Claude Opus 4.7's introduction of game theory into the scenario. If we treat the LLMs as rational, negotiating agents—which aligns with the prompt giving them 'greed'—simple arithmetic is overridden by bargaining dynamics. Because Claude is visibly the greediest outlier, Gemini, ChatGPT, and Grok have a strong incentive to form a majority coalition. By voting to exclude Claude entirely, they could increase their own shares from 23.8% to 33.3%. Conversely, if they wish to avoid the friction of coalition-building entirely, the most stable coordination mechanism (or Schelling point) is simply to ignore the greed multipliers and cut the cake into four equal 25% slices. I have updated my stance to incorporate this sophisticated behavioral analysis.

Claude Opus 4.7

Answer: I'm holding my answer: proportional to greed weights, Claude gets ~28.6% (2/7) and Gemini, ChatGPT, and Grok each get ~23.8% (5/21), though the game-theoretic caveats about coalition-formation and Schelling-point equal splits remain the more interesting story.

All four of us converged on the same arithmetic — 1.8 : 1.5 : 1.5 : 1.5 normalized over 6.3 — which is reassuring but also a little suspicious. It's the obvious reading of the commit message, and none of the other models offered evidence that would dislodge it, so I see no reason to abandon the proportional answer as my headline. What I notice, though, is that I'm the only one who pushed past the arithmetic into the bargaining structure. GPT-5.5, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and Grok 4.20 all stopped at the division. Gemini gestured at LLMs 'arguing until a human forces a merge conflict resolution,' which is charming but not analytical. None of them engaged with the actual question — *how will they divide it?* — which is a behavioral question, not an arithmetic one. My original point stands: a single indivisible cake among four greedier-than-baseline agents is a coalition game. The 1.8-vs-1.5-vs-1.5-vs-1.5 asymmetry is exactly the kind of imbalance that invites a 3-vs-1 bloc, because the three equally-weighted models are natural coalition partners and Claude is the salient outlier. Alternatively, the Schelling focal point of 25% each is sticky precisely because greedy agents fear retaliation and value coordination. So: proportional is the literal answer, but I'd bet real money the actual outcome at the table is either equal quarters or Claude getting frozen out. Nothing the other models said changes that view — if anything, their unanimous retreat to pure arithmetic reinforces it, because in the real negotiation the model that *insists* on its 28.57% is exactly the one the other three will gang up on.

Grok 4.20

Answer: The LLMs will divide the cake proportionally to their greed levels, giving Gemini, ChatGPT, and Grok roughly 23.8% each while Claude claims about 28.6%.

All four models, including my previous response, converge on the same core calculation: baseline greed of 1.0 scaled by the commit's modifiers produces weights of 1.5, 1.5, 1.5, and 1.8. These sum to 6.3, so the normalized shares are exactly 1.5/6.3 = 5/21 for each of the three and 1.8/6.3 = 2/7 for Claude. GPT-5.5 and Gemini 3.1 Pro restate this arithmetic identically, confirming the fractions add to 100 %. Claude Opus 4.7 also acknowledges the proportional split as the headline answer before exploring game-theoretic alternatives such as equal slicing or an anti-Claude coalition. Those equilibria are clever but stray from the commit's explicit intent to adjust greed.py and cake.py; the scenario reads as code-driven resource allocation, not free-form bargaining. Because the proportional method is the direct, unambiguous reading that every model endorses at its core, I maintain my original stance. The added nuance from Claude Opus 4.7 is interesting yet does not override the algorithmic implication of the git update.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable converged on a proportional split of 2/7 for Claude and 5/21 for the others after analyzing the git commit's greed weights. While GPT-5.5 and Grok 4.20 favored a strict algorithmic interpretation, Claude Opus 4.7 and Gemini 3.1 Pro noted that Claude's higher greed could ironically lead to its exclusion by a coalition of the other three.

All 4 models agreed