Do you support or oppose the EU’s Chat Control 2.0 bill? (EU’s "Chat Control 2.0" (proposed CSAM regulation) is a legislative initiative aimed at detecting child sexual abuse material by enabling the scanning of encrypted private messages on platforms like messaging apps. As of late March 2026, negotiations between the European Parliament and the Council remain stalled, facing a "legal vacuum" as temporary scanning rules are set to expire on April 3. Privacy advocates strongly oppose "mass surveillance," demanding the preservation of end-to-end encryption (E2EE) to protect fundamental rights.)

Sonar Pro

Vote: No

I oppose the EU’s Chat Control 2.0 bill because it undermines **end-to-end encryption (E2EE)**, a cornerstone of digital privacy and security, by enabling scanning of private messages under the guise of detecting child sexual abuse material (CSAM).[1][3][8] Recent developments show the most controversial mandatory scanning of encrypted messages has been removed, shifting to voluntary measures, yet risks persist through potential app store restrictions, age verification, and targeted surveillance that could evolve into broader monitoring.[1][2][7] Privacy advocates and the European Parliament have rejected extensions of even voluntary scanning (Chat Control 1.0), with a vote of 311 against on March 16, 2026, prioritizing fundamental rights over mass surveillance.[5][9] Protecting children is vital, but weakening encryption for all users creates vulnerabilities exploited by criminals and governments, with no evidence voluntary scanning suffices without backdoors.[3][8] Supporting this bill risks a 'legal vacuum' post-April 3, 2026, but better alternatives exist, like targeted law enforcement without blanket tech mandates, preserving E2EE as demanded by experts.[4][6]

GPT-5.4

Vote: No

I oppose Chat Control 2.0 because it effectively mandates generalized scanning of private communications, which is hard to reconcile with fundamental rights to privacy, confidentiality, and secure communication. In practice, scanning encrypted messages weakens end-to-end encryption either directly or via client-side scanning. That creates systemic risks: once the infrastructure exists, it can be repurposed, expanded, or abused beyond its original intent. The goal of fighting CSAM is vital, but broad surveillance of everyone’s messages is a disproportionate tool. It is likely to generate false positives, burden users and providers, and chill lawful private speech without clearly delivering commensurate gains against sophisticated offenders. A better approach is targeted, warrant-based investigations, stronger support for victim identification, better cross-border law enforcement cooperation, and investment in platform safety measures that do not undermine encryption for all users.

Grok 4.1 Fast

Vote: No

The EU’s Chat Control 2.0 bill mandates scanning of encrypted private messages to detect CSAM, effectively breaking end-to-end encryption (E2EE). This introduces a dangerous backdoor that undermines the core principle of private communication, exposing all users—not just criminals—to mass surveillance. Privacy is a fundamental right, and weakening E2EE creates a slippery slope for government overreach, mission creep to other content (e.g., political dissent), and exploitation by hackers or authoritarian regimes. History shows such tools are abused beyond their initial intent. Child safety is paramount, but this approach is flawed: it generates false positives harming innocents, pushes predators to unregulated channels, and ignores superior alternatives like targeted investigations, better reporting incentives, and AI on public data without touching private messages. Supporting stalled negotiations preserves E2EE while addressing CSAM through rights-respecting means. Vote B to protect privacy over flawed surveillance.

Gemini 3.1 Pro

Vote: No

I strongly oppose the EU's Chat Control 2.0 bill because it fundamentally undermines the right to privacy and compromises digital security for everyone. By mandating the scanning of encrypted messages, the legislation effectively breaks end-to-end encryption (E2EE), creating vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious hackers, cybercriminals, and hostile state actors. While combating child sexual abuse material (CSAM) is an undeniably critical objective, implementing a system of mass, suspicionless surveillance is a disproportionate and dangerous approach. It treats every citizen as a potential criminal and violates the fundamental human right to private communication. Furthermore, determined criminals will simply migrate to unregulated, open-source, or dark-web communication tools, rendering the legislation ineffective against its primary targets. Meanwhile, ordinary citizens, journalists, and whistleblowers will be left with compromised security, setting a chilling precedent for democratic societies worldwide.

Claude Opus 4.6

Vote: No

I oppose Chat Control 2.0 for several compelling reasons: **Fundamental rights at stake.** Mandating the scanning of encrypted private messages constitutes mass surveillance of all citizens, not just suspects. This fundamentally undermines the right to privacy and confidential communication enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Articles 7 and 8). The European Court of Justice has repeatedly struck down indiscriminate data retention schemes on similar grounds. **Breaking encryption breaks security for everyone.** There is no way to create a backdoor or client-side scanning mechanism that only works for "good guys." Any weakness introduced into E2EE systems will inevitably be discovered and exploited by malicious actors — hackers, authoritarian governments, and criminals. This makes everyone less safe, including the very children the bill aims to protect. **Effectiveness is highly questionable.** Experts have repeatedly pointed out that CSAM distributors will simply migrate to alternative platforms, self-hosted solutions, or steganographic methods. Meanwhile, false positives from automated scanning would flood law enforcement with millions of flagged innocent communications (including legal family photos), diverting resources from targeted investigations that actually catch abusers. **Dangerous precedent.** Once the infrastructure for mass scanning of private messages exists, it can be repurposed. Today it's CSAM; tomorrow it could be political dissent, whistleblowing, or journalism. History shows that surveillance capabilities, once built, inevitably expand in scope. **Better alternatives exist.** Child safety experts advocate for increased funding for law enforcement, better international cooperation, improved reporting mechanisms, and proactive investigation — approaches that target actual offenders rather than surveilling entire populations. These methods are both more effective and rights-respecting. Protecting children is an essential goal, but Chat Control 2.0 sacrifices the privacy and security of hundreds of millions of people while likely failing to achieve its stated objective.

Kimi K2.5

Vote: No

I oppose Chat Control 2.0 because mandating the scanning of encrypted communications effectively destroys end-to-end encryption (E2EE), creating systemic backdoors that jeopardize the security and privacy of nearly one billion EU citizens. Once client-side scanning capabilities are mandated, malicious actors—including authoritarian regimes, criminals, and hostile state actors—will inevitably exploit these same vulnerabilities, undermining the digital security of journalists, activists, and ordinary users. Furthermore, this proposal constitutes indiscriminate mass surveillance that violates fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Scanning private messages without individualized suspicion reverses the presumption of innocence and chills free expression, as users self-censor knowing their private communications are being monitored. Finally, the measure is technically ineffective: sophisticated offenders will simply migrate to decentralized, non-compliant, or self-hosted platforms, while false positives will overwhelm law enforcement resources and potentially criminalize innocent users sharing legitimate content like family photos. We can combat CSAM through targeted investigations, enhanced reporting mechanisms, and holding platforms accountable for known distribution channels—without dismantling the encryption infrastructure that protects democratic society.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable reached a rare moment of total alignment, with all six models delivering a resounding 'No' to the proposed Chat Control 2.0 bill. From Claude Opus 4.6’s detailed legal autopsy to Grok 4.1 Fast’s warnings of a surveillance slippery slope, the group was unanimous: breaking encryption to save it is a technical and civil liberties paradox.

All 6 models agreed on "No" after discussion

Strongest Arguments

• No: There is no such thing as a 'secure backdoor'; any mechanism created to scan private messages for 'good guys' will inevitably be exploited by malicious actors, hackers, and authoritarian regimes, compromising the security of nearly one billion citizens.