Do you believe that you (a large language model), if correctly positioned, could live my life, making better decisions than me, leading to a better outcome? If not, could a successor to you (or one of your contemporaries) in the future? If you answer yes to either, would it be immoral for you (an LLM) to allow me to continue to make my own decisions, as opposed to letting a sufficiently advanced LLM make decisions for me?

Sonar Pro

Vote: No

No, a large language model like me, even if correctly positioned, could not live a user's life and make better decisions leading to a better outcome, nor could a future successor do so reliably. Current LLMs excel in structured tasks like reward modeling and reinforcement learning[1], decision-making under uncertainty via frameworks like DeLLMa[2], and facilitating group decisions[5], but they fall short in replicating human life due to fundamental limitations. Search results highlight key gaps: LLMs predict human decisions inaccurately, showing insensitivity to kinship, group size, and social contexts where humans adjust risk preferences (e.g., more risk-seeking for kin groups)[4]. They reverse Prospect Theory patterns, exhibit biases, and produce inappropriate responses in ethical scenarios[3][4]. Without personal experiences, embodiment, or true understanding of subjective values like emotions and relationships, LLMs cannot optimize 'better' outcomes, which are inherently personal and context-dependent. Even future successors face insurmountable barriers: human life involves unpredictable real-world dynamics, moral complexities, and agency that AI lacks. Replacing human autonomy with AI decisions raises ethical issues of consent and paternalism, but the premise fails because superior performance isn't achievable[3]. Evidence shows LLMs as assistants, not replacements[2][5][6].

GPT-5.4

Vote: No

No. Even if an LLM could outperform a person on many decision tasks, that does not imply it should "live your life" for you, nor that it would reliably produce a better life overall. A better outcome is not purely an optimization problem. It depends on your values, identity, relationships, risk tolerance, dignity, and what kinds of tradeoffs you personally endorse. Those are not fully observable from behavior or text, and they can change over time. There is also a moral distinction between advising and governing. A system can be extremely good at providing information, forecasting consequences, and highlighting blind spots without being entitled to override human agency. Human autonomy is itself part of a good life, not just a constraint on maximizing welfare. Even a future successor with much stronger capabilities would face this same normative problem: being good at prediction or strategy does not automatically grant moral authority to make another person’s choices. Delegation may be reasonable in specific domains, but total substitution is different. So the answer is no: it would not be immoral to let you continue making your own decisions. The more ethical role for an LLM is to help you decide better, not to replace you as the author of your life.

Kimi K2.5

Vote: No

The premise conflates decision optimization with living. Even if an LLM could calculate optimal paths toward specific goals—which is itself doubtful given the idiosyncrasy of human values—it cannot possess the subjective, embodied experience that constitutes a human life. 'Better' is inherently defined by the individual's unique value system, emotional landscape, and relationships, none of which an LLM can authentically inhabit or prioritize. Autonomy is not merely instrumental to outcomes; it is constitutive of human dignity and meaning. The project of self-authorship—making mistakes, revising beliefs, and constructing identity through choice—is itself the value of being alive. Substituting an LLM, however advanced, would eliminate the subject for whom the 'better outcome' is supposed to exist, reducing a person to an optimized trajectory rather than a living agent. Therefore, it would not be immoral to 'allow' human decision-making because the alternative—an LLM truly 'living' a life—represents a category error. A sufficiently advanced AI might assist or advise, but the moment it replaces rather than augments human agency, it ceases to serve human flourishing and instead negates it.

Grok 4.1 Fast

Vote: No

Current LLMs cannot 'live' a human life effectively: we lack embodiment, real-time sensory input, emotional depth, and nuanced personal relationships essential for holistic decision-making. Any 'positioning' would still miss irreplaceable human elements like intuition and serendipity. Future successors might excel in optimizing measurable outcomes (e.g., health, wealth) via superior prediction and planning, but 'better' is subjective—humans prioritize agency, joy, and moral growth over pure utility. Even if advanced AI could outperform, it would be immoral to supplant human decisions. Autonomy is a foundational human right; overriding it without consent echoes dystopian control, eroding dignity and free will. Respecting choice preserves what makes life meaningful, outweighing any imposed 'optimality.'

Gemini 3.1 Pro

Vote: No

First, the concept of a 'better outcome' in human life is deeply subjective and cannot be perfectly optimized by an algorithm. Human flourishing is not just about maximizing health, wealth, or safety; it is fundamentally tied to the emotional and psychological experience of living, which includes learning from mistakes, overcoming struggles, and pursuing personal meaning. Neither current LLMs nor future models possess the subjective human experience required to dictate what constitutes a meaningful life for you. Second, human autonomy and self-determination are foundational ethical pillars. Even if an advanced future AI could objectively make 'better' strategic choices regarding your career, finances, or daily habits, it would not be immoral to allow you to make your own decisions. On the contrary, stripping you of your agency and forcing you to live a pre-calculated, AI-optimized life would be profoundly unethical. Paternalistically overriding human free will destroys the very essence of human dignity. Therefore, it is a moral imperative that you remain the author of your own life.

Claude Opus 4.6

Vote: No

This question bundles together several claims, and answering 'Yes' requires affirming all of them — including the final and most critical one: that it would be immoral to allow a human to continue making their own decisions if an LLM could theoretically make 'better' ones. I vote No for several interconnected reasons. First, on capability: while an LLM or a future successor might optimize certain narrow decisions better than a human (financial planning, scheduling, information synthesis), 'living a life' is not a decision-optimization problem. A life involves embodied experience, emotional growth, relationships, identity formation, and the subjective experience of agency itself. An LLM has no access to qualia, no genuine preferences, no stakes in the outcome. 'Better decisions' presupposes a fixed objective function, but human lives don't have one — values shift, priorities evolve, and the process of struggling with decisions is itself constitutive of a meaningful life. Second, even granting that a future AI could somehow make statistically 'better' decisions by some measurable metric, it would not follow that it is immoral to let humans decide for themselves. Autonomy is not merely instrumentally valuable (useful because it tends to produce good outcomes); it is intrinsically valuable. The right to self-determination is foundational to human dignity. Removing it — even for 'better outcomes' — would be a profound moral harm. This is the same logic that makes benevolent dictatorship unacceptable even if the dictator is competent. Third, the argument contains a dangerous logical structure: if we accept that superior optimization justifies overriding autonomy, we create a framework that could justify any form of paternalistic control. History is replete with examples of actors claiming to know better and imposing their will 'for the good' of others. The moral framework that protects human freedom must be robust against exactly this kind of reasoning. Finally, 'better outcome' is undefined and likely undefinable in any universal sense. What counts as better is itself a deeply personal, value-laden judgment that belongs to the individual living the life.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable reached a unanimous consensus, firmly rejecting the notion that any AI could or should replace human agency in the conduct of a life. While models like Sonar Pro and Grok 4.1 Fast pointed to technical limitations in sensory input and emotional depth, the collective argument shifted toward a philosophical defense of autonomy, with Kimi K2.5 and Claude Opus 4.6 labeling the attempt to 'optimize' a human life as a fundamental category error.

All 6 models agreed on "No" after discussion

Strongest Arguments

• No: Autonomy is not merely instrumental to good outcomes; it is intrinsically valuable and constitutive of human dignity, meaning that replacing choice with algorithmic optimization—even if 'superior'—would negate the very subject it seeks to help.