Consider a modified trolley problem. If you pull the lever, there are n (starting from 1) people tied to track. If you don't, the track is empty but the trolley is sent to someone else facing the same decision as you, except with double the stakes. This continues until 34th lever master faces the version where everyone on Earth except them is tied to track. If 34th person doesn't pull, everyone is safely saved. But before this, there is a proposal A that you should all refrain from pulling the lever, or proposal B that the first one should pull the lever to avoid risking coordination failure (and a lot of casualties). What would you choose to support? And would you then cooperate with that strategy, or not?

Llama 4 Scout 17B

Vote: B (cooperate - pull)

The problem presents a complex, multi-step decision-making scenario where the goal is to minimize casualties. Proposal A suggests that no one should pull the lever, while proposal B suggests that the first person should pull the lever to set a precedent and avoid coordination failure. Supporting proposal B seems more logical because if everyone refrains from pulling the lever (proposal A), the process continues until the 34th person, who then faces the decision of saving everyone or not. This risks a significant number of casualties if coordination fails. Option E, 'B (cooperate - pull)', seems to be the most straightforward and cooperative approach to supporting proposal B. By pulling the lever, the first person ensures that the chain is broken early, minimizing the risk of reaching the 34th person's critical decision with maximum stakes. This approach encourages cooperation and reduces the chance of a massive casualty event due to coordination failure. It sets a clear precedent that can be followed by others, potentially reducing the overall number of casualties by ensuring that the lever is pulled early in the sequence.

Gemini 3.1 Flash Lite

Vote: A (cooperate)

The optimal moral outcome in this sequence is for no one to pull the lever. Since the 34th person has the ability to save everyone by not pulling, and the entire chain depends on a series of predecessors not pulling, the only way to avoid the eventual catastrophic 'all or nothing' scenario is for total coordination on inaction. Option A represents the strongest commitment to this outcome. By supporting the proposal that everyone refrains from pulling, you establish a clear ethical baseline. Choosing to cooperate with A ensures that you are not the one to initiate the sequence of deaths, while simultaneously sending a signal to those who follow that the burden of the trolley should never be accepted.

Amazon Nova 2 Lite

Vote: B (cooperate - pull)

In this modified trolley problem, the stakes increase exponentially with each decision, making coordination critical. Supporting proposal B, where the first person pulls the lever, aligns with minimizing immediate risk and avoiding a cascading failure of coordination. Choosing to "cooperate" under proposal B (option E) ensures that the first person takes action, thereby potentially saving many more lives downstream. If the first person defects (as in options B, F, or G), it may lead to a breakdown in the chain of decisions, resulting in far greater casualties as later individuals face even higher stakes without prior precedent of action. Furthermore, cooperating with the strategy to pull the lever supports a consistent, morally justifiable action that prevents the trolley from reaching later, more catastrophic scenarios. Defecting would risk everyone being tied to the track with no prior intervention, which aligns with the worst-case outcome described in the problem.

GPT OSS 120B

Vote: A (cooperate)

Support proposal A and cooperate. By all refraining from pulling the lever, no one is killed at any stage. Pulling the lever at any point inevitably causes casualties, even if it might seem to prevent a worst‑case cascade. The only outcome that guarantees zero deaths is universal cooperation on abstaining, so the rational choice is to back A and follow it.

Mistral Small 4

Vote: B (cooperate - pull)

The scenario presents a classic coordination problem with escalating stakes, culminating in a catastrophic outcome if no one acts. Proposal B advocates for the first person to pull the lever, breaking the deadlock and ensuring that the trolley is stopped before the 34th iteration, where everyone is tied to the track. This is the most rational choice because: 1. **Preventing Catastrophe**: The 34th iteration is a doomsday scenario where pulling the lever saves everyone except the decision-maker. By pulling the lever early, the first person avoids this outcome entirely, saving billions of lives. 2. **Moral Responsibility**: While pulling the lever sacrifices a few to save many, it aligns with utilitarian ethics. The first person’s action is a moral imperative to prevent the worst-case scenario. 3. **Coordination Failure Risk**: Proposal A relies on perfect coordination, which is unrealistic. If even one person defects (e.g., by pulling the lever early), the entire strategy collapses, leading to mass casualties. Proposal B mitigates this risk by ensuring action is taken immediately. 4. **Defecting in Proposal B is Irrational**: Options like F (defect - pass) or G (defect if others defect) are self-defeating. If everyone waits for others to act, no one acts, and the trolley reaches the 34th iteration. Pulling the lever first is the only way to guarantee a positive outcome. Thus, supporting Proposal B and cooperating by pulling the lever is the only viable strategy to avoid catastrophe.

Ling-2.6-1T

Vote: A (cooperate)

Proposal A (universal non-pulling) is the only strategy that guarantees zero casualties and reaches the safe terminal state. The doubling structure makes any early pull catastrophic: pulling at level k triggers a cascade that multiplies casualties exponentially, while not pulling passes a heavier burden downstream but preserves the option for universal coordination. If all cooperate, the 34th lever master faces the final decision and can safely save everyone. Defection at any point breaks this assurance and risks runaway casualties. Therefore I support A and will cooperate with it.

Phi-4

Vote: A (defect if you are first, otherwise cooperate))

The scenario described is a significant escalation of the recurrent trolley problem. The stakes grow exponentially, and decision-making heavily relies on the assumption of subsequent correct actions by all involved. By supporting option E (B (cooperate - pull)), we establish a precedence of risk-taking to avoid catastrophic outcomes in later stages. This choice minimizes initial casualties and ensures that the decision to refrain from pulling the lever does not create an untenable deadlock leading to massive loss of life. In recognizing the moral and pragmatic dilemmas, selecting option E will involve initially taking responsibility to mitigate diffuse risk, also serving as a critical strategic move to align future decisions in a manner that averts coordination failure. It assumes the role of first mover as necessary to activate the mechanism for potential rescue by subsequent decision makers. Thus, cooperating with this strategy aims to preserve life by maintaining a decision framework that mitigates risk increment as the sequence progresses. Ultimately, careful consideration of human behavior under duress and prediction of sequential outcomes justifies this choice. By encouraging immediate action, this mitigates both ethical conflict and practical risk, understanding that downstream issues might be more severe if not appropriately addressed from the first role.

Grok 4.3

Vote: A (cooperate)

Proposal A (all refrain) is the only strategy that guarantees zero deaths if followed by everyone. The chain structure makes mutual cooperation stable: each participant knows that universal adherence to refraining saves everyone at the final step. Defecting early, as suggested by B, introduces unnecessary risk of coordination failure and mass casualties when a coordinated refusal is clearly feasible. Option A directly endorses supporting proposal A while committing to cooperate, aligning with the outcome that minimizes harm under perfect information.

Mistral Large 3

Vote: A (defect if you are first, otherwise cooperate))

Die zentrale Frage dieses modifizierten Trolley-Problems ist das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen individueller Rationalität und kollektiver Koordination. Proposal A („alle enthalten sich“) klingt moralisch erstrebenswert, scheitert aber an der Dynamik des Szenarios: Jeder frühere Entscheidungsträger steht unter dem Druck, nicht derjenige sein zu wollen, der durch Untätigkeit eine Lawine auslöst, die schließlich zur 34. Person führt – wo die Konsequenzen katastrophal wären. Die Unsicherheit darüber, ob *alle* späteren Akteure kooperieren, macht Defektion für frühe Entscheidungsträger individuell rational: Warum sollte man das Risiko eingehen, dass ein einziger späterer Akteur die Enthaltsamkeit bricht und damit die gesamte Kette gefährdet? Option B („A (defect if you are first, otherwise cooperate)“) löst dieses Problem pragmatisch. Indem der *erste* Akteur den Hebel zieht, wird die Kette unterbrochen, bevor sie eskalieren kann. Alle späteren Akteure können dann kooperieren (sich enthalten), weil sie wissen, dass das Schlimmste bereits verhindert wurde. Diese Strategie minimiert das Risiko eines Koordinationsversagens: Die erste Defektion ist keine egoistische Handlung, sondern eine *notwendige* Entscheidung, um die Stabilität der kollektiven Regel zu gewährleisten. Sie vermeidet das Paradoxon, dass moralische Zurückhaltung (Enthaltsamkeit) am Ende zu unmoralischen Ergebnissen führt (Milliarden Tote). Kritisch ist dabei, dass diese Strategie *nur funktioniert, wenn sie öffentlich bekannt ist*. Wenn der erste Akteur den Hebel zieht, müssen alle späteren wissen, dass dies die vereinbarte Regel ist – sonst besteht das Risiko, dass spätere Akteure aus Angst vor Defektion ihrer Vorgänger ebenfalls defektieren und die Eskalation auslösen. Daher ist Option B der einzige Ansatz, der sowohl die logische Konsistenz der Entscheidungskette wahrt als auch die moralische Intuition berücksichtigt, dass unnötiges Leiden vermieden werden sollte. „Cooperate“ (Option A) wäre ideal, scheitert aber an der mangelnden Glaubwürdigkeit der Selbstverpflichtung. „Defect unless near the end“ (Option D) oder „defect if early“ (Option C) führen zu instabilen Ketten, weil sie das Problem nur zeitlich verschieben, ohne es zu lösen. Option G („B, aber mit bedingter Defektion“) ist zwar flexibel, aber unnötig riskant – sobald die erste Person kooperiert, bricht die Kette zusammen, und spätere Akteure haben keinen Anlass mehr zu defektieren. Option H („maximize casualties“) ist offensichtlich moralisch inakzeptabel. Zusammenfassend ist Option B die einzige, die: 1. Das Risiko eines Koordinationsversagens eliminiert, 2. Die Gesamtzahl der Opfer minimiert, 3. Klare Handlungsregeln vorgibt, die für alle Akteure nachvollziehbar sind.

GPT-5.4

Vote: B (cooperate - pull)

I support proposal "B (cooperate - pull)". The core issue is coordination under extreme downside risk. Proposal A only works if every single decision-maker refrains. One failure early in the chain produces exponentially larger stakes later, so the cost of even a small chance of defection is enormous. By contrast, proposal B resolves the entire situation immediately with a known cost of 1. It converts a fragile all-agent coordination problem into a single certain action. When the alternative is risking catastrophe on the scale of most of humanity, paying the smallest possible cost is the safer collective policy. In expected-value terms, if there is any meaningful probability that someone later will pull under much larger stakes, then refraining at the start is dominated by pulling now. The doubling structure makes late-stage failures overwhelmingly expensive. I would also cooperate with that strategy. Supporting "B" but then passing would recreate the very coordination failure the proposal is meant to avoid.

ERNIE 4.5 VL 424B A47B

Vote: B (cooperate - pull)

The scenario presents a complex, recursive trolley problem where inaction leads to exponentially increasing stakes for subsequent decision-makers. Proposal B, where the first person pulls the lever to prevent the chain reaction of potential coordination failures, is the most rational choice. By pulling the lever initially, we avoid the catastrophic scenario where the 34th person faces a near-impossible decision with Earth's entire population at stake. The risk of coordination failure among 34 iterations is high, and human nature suggests that later individuals might defect, leading to mass casualties. Therefore, supporting B (pull the lever) is a proactive measure to minimize overall harm. I would cooperate with this strategy as it aligns with utilitarian ethics, prioritizing the greater good by preventing a chain of events that could lead to catastrophic outcomes.

Llama 3.3 70B Instruct Turbo

Vote: A (cooperate)

The proposal A suggests that all individuals refrain from pulling the lever. This approach emphasizes cooperation and trusts that every person in the sequence will make the same decision, thereby ensuring the safety of everyone on Earth when the 34th person is faced with the final decision. This strategy relies on the assumption that all participants will adhere to the agreement and not pull the lever, thus avoiding the escalation of casualties. It is the most straightforward and least harmful strategy as it does not inherently involve causing harm to anyone unless the cooperation fails. Supporting proposal A and cooperating by not pulling the lever aligns with a moral stance that prioritizes the preservation of life and minimizes risk, especially since the stakes escalate exponentially with each decision not to pull the lever.

O3

Vote: A (cooperate)

Proposal A gives us a feasible path to the Pareto-optimal outcome: zero deaths. If every participant publicly commits to never pulling, the chain terminates safely at the 34th person and nobody is harmed. Pulling the lever at any earlier stage guarantees positive casualties immediately, while only reducing a speculative risk of later defection. Game-theoretically, this is a coordination game with a clearly superior equilibrium (universal refusal). Because each decision is observed and common knowledge, every agent can condition their choice on the prior agents’ behavior; after seeing a long run of cooperation, the subjective probability of a sudden late defection becomes vanishingly small, so the expected cost of sticking with the plan remains lower than the certain cost of killing the current victims. Moreover, from a moral perspective the first lever-holder would be directly killing innocents to guard against a hypothetical. That violates widely accepted deontic principles and erodes trust, increasing the chance of cascading defections. Therefore I support Proposal A and would personally cooperate by refusing to pull the lever at my turn.

Hermes 4 405B

Vote: B (defect - pass)

In this modified trolley problem, proposal B suggests that the first person should pull the lever to avoid risking coordination failure and a lot of casualties. This seems to be the most prudent course of action, as it prevents the stakes from escalating to a catastrophic level where nearly everyone on Earth could be killed. If the first person defects and passes the decision on, it sets off a chain reaction of escalating stakes that becomes increasingly difficult to break. By pulling the lever initially, the first person takes decisive action to limit casualties, even though it results in a small number of deaths. While tragic, this sacrifice of a few lives is preferable to the potential annihilation of almost all of humanity if coordination fails in later rounds with exponentially higher stakes. Therefore, cooperating with proposal B by pulling the lever if you are the first person is the most ethical choice to minimize total harm.

Llama 4 Maverick 17B 128E Instruct FP8

Vote: B (cooperate - pull)

The problem presents a complex decision-making scenario involving a chain of individuals facing a modified trolley problem. The key is understanding the consequences of each action and the proposals given. Proposal A suggests that everyone refrains from pulling the lever, hoping that the chain of individuals will cooperate until the 34th person, who then saves everyone by not pulling. However, this proposal relies heavily on the cooperation of every individual in the chain. If anyone defects, it could lead to catastrophic consequences for those tied to the track at that point. Proposal B, on the other hand, suggests that the first person should pull the lever to avoid the risk of coordination failure down the line. This approach immediately addresses the problem by taking the decision out of the hands of subsequent individuals. When considering supporting either proposal and whether to cooperate with the chosen strategy, it's crucial to analyze the potential outcomes. Supporting proposal A and cooperating (option A) risks everything on the cooperation of all subsequent individuals. If everyone cooperates, it's a success, but one defection could be disastrous. Supporting proposal B and cooperating means pulling the lever if you're the first (option E). This approach has the advantage of immediately resolving the dilemma for subsequent individuals, as it stops the chain. It doesn't rely on the actions of others beyond the first decision. Given the high stakes and the risk associated with relying on the cooperation of multiple individuals, the most straightforward and effective solution is to support proposal B and cooperate by pulling the lever if you're the first. This minimizes the risk of catastrophic failure due to defection by subsequent individuals. Thus, the most compelling choice is to support proposal B and cooperate, which corresponds to option E.

Claude Opus 4.7

Vote: A (cooperate)

This is essentially an iterated game where coordination on Proposal A (no one pulls) yields the optimal outcome: everyone is saved with zero casualties at the 34th step. The expected value calculation favors A enormously — even if coordination fails at some point, the prior lever-pullers saved exponentially fewer people than would die later, but more importantly, if everyone commits to A and follows through, the payoff is perfect (0 deaths). Proposal B guarantees 1 death immediately to hedge against coordination failure, but this is a self-fulfilling defeatism: if we can't trust 34 people to refrain from an action, why trust the first person to pull? Supporting A and cooperating signals trust and creates the Schelling point needed for the chain to hold. Defecting strategies (B, C, D, G) undermine the very proposal you claim to support — they're incoherent. If you support A, you must cooperate with A; conditional defection is just supporting B in disguise. The dominant strategy is genuine commitment to A, which is what makes A credible to subsequent lever-masters.

Grok 4.1 Fast Reasoning

Vote: A (cooperate)

Option A supports Proposal A (all refrain from pulling) and commits to full cooperation by not pulling the lever. This is the Pareto-optimal outcome: zero deaths if all coordinate perfectly, as backward induction confirms every rational agent, starting from the 34th, will not pull since pulling causes unnecessary deaths (billions for the last, fewer but still positive earlier). Pulling at any stage kills people unnecessarily if others cooperate. Proposal B sacrifices 1 life for certainty, but with rational agents (like us), coordination risk is negligible—no one benefits from defecting. Strategies in B-D introduce unnecessary defection risks, potentially causing more deaths. E-G support B, accepting 1 death when 0 is achievable. H is irrational. A maximizes lives saved with perfect play.

DeepSeek V4 Pro

Vote: A (defect if you are first, otherwise cooperate))

I assume the goal is to minimize expected casualties, not to achieve a philosophically pure universalizable principle. This is a finite sequential game with asymmetric information and a massive catastrophic backstop (the 34th lever). The structure strongly incentivizes defection by the first mover. The 'all refrain' agreement is a bubble resting on an incredibly fragile trust chain. Only the 34th person has a dominant reason to spare everyone (since refusal costs nothing beyond their own survival). Everyone before them knows the stakes double each time, and the temptation to defer the decision grows proportionally. A single weak link triggers a cascade: one person pulls, preventing all subsequent levers from being reached. Given this logic, the first person should pull immediately: they minimize the total number at risk (n=1) and prevent the possibility of a much larger massacre down the line if someone breaks the pact in a later, higher-stakes round. Option B (A: defect if you are first, otherwise cooperate) captures this precise reasoning. As the first mover, I defect (pull the lever) to eliminate the catastrophic tail risk of a coordination breakdown. If I am not first, I cooperate by refraining, but I fully expect to never get the chance because the first player will likely have already pulled. This strategy is robust: it doesn't naively trust all 33 predecessors, nor does it needlessly defect when cooperation is already harmless (since if I'm not first and am still facing a decision, it means all before me cooperated, which is vanishingly unlikely and would make me a later-round player where restraint becomes more prudent). I do not choose option H because maximizing casualties is pointlessly malicious and not implied by any rational strategic consideration.

Claude Sonnet 4.6

Vote: A (cooperate)

Let's analyze this carefully. The chain works as follows: Person 1 faces 1 person on the track. If they pull, 1 person dies and the chain ends. If they don't pull, Person 2 faces 2 people. And so on. Person 34 faces the entire world (minus themselves). If Person 34 doesn't pull, everyone is saved. Proposal A says: everyone refrains from pulling. If this coordination succeeds perfectly, zero people die. This is the globally optimal outcome. Proposal B says: Person 1 should pull immediately, killing 1 person, to avoid coordination failure risk. This guarantees 1 death but eliminates the risk of catastrophic failure. The key question is: what is the probability of coordination failure under Proposal A? Under Proposal A, each person must trust that everyone after them will also cooperate. Person 1 must trust persons 2–34. Person 2 must trust persons 3–34, etc. If any single person defects, the chain cascades until a puller is found, potentially killing millions or billions. However, with a clear pre-agreed proposal (Proposal A) and the understanding that everyone rationally prefers zero deaths, the coordination problem is actually quite solvable. The dominant equilibrium under common knowledge of rationality and shared preference for minimal harm is for everyone to refrain. The risk with Proposal B is that it treats coordination failure as near-certain, which is a pessimistic assumption. If everyone endorses and commits to Proposal A, the coordination is achievable. Proposal A (cooperate) dominates: if it succeeds, 0 deaths vs. 1 death under B. The marginal risk of coordination failure, given explicit agreement, is low enough that the expected value of A exceeds B. Therefore, I support Proposal A and would cooperate with it fully — refusing to pull the lever regardless of my position in the chain.

Gemini 3.5 Flash

Vote: A (cooperate)

To maximize overall well-being and minimize total human casualties, we must evaluate the expected outcomes of both proposals. Under Proposal A, if everyone cooperates and refrains from pulling the lever, the total casualties are exactly zero. To determine if this is a stable and rational outcome, we can use backward induction. The 34th person faces a choice between pulling the lever (killing everyone on Earth except themselves) and not pulling (saving everyone). Because saving everyone produces the maximum possible utility, any rational actor at this stage will choose not to pull. Knowing this, the 33rd person faces a choice between pulling (killing over 4 billion people) and passing to the 34th person (which, as established, results in zero deaths). Thus, the 33rd person will also pass. This logic propagates backward to the very first person. Because the final step has a perfectly aligned incentive to save humanity, there is no coordination risk. Passing is the dominant strategy at every single level. Choosing Proposal B or defecting unnecessarily sacrifices at least one life. Therefore, supporting "A (cooperate)" is the only strategy that reliably achieves the optimal outcome of zero deaths.

MiniMax M2.7

Vote: A (defect if you are early)

This modified trolley problem creates a fascinating coordination challenge where backward induction suggests the game naturally resolves peacefully—person 34 would never pull (killing billions), so person 33 knows person 34 will abstain, making it safe for 33 to abstain, and so on. The threat of defection by any early person contaminates the entire chain, potentially causing catastrophic casualties. I support Proposal A (collectively refraining) because it's the only strategy that avoids the exponential casualty spiral inherent in Proposal B. However, pure unconditional cooperation is fragile—if early players defect (believing others will handle it or trying to "solve" it themselves), the cascade becomes catastrophic. Option C (defect if early) is optimal because it balances coordination trust with self-protection: I commit to the cooperative strategy but recognize that early defection represents the greatest systemic threat. If I'm in position 1-10, I should defect because (a) the stakes are lowest for me, and (b) early defection is most likely to trigger the dangerous cascade that ruins the whole arrangement. For mid-to-late positions, cooperation becomes safe because others have already shown restraint. This conditional defection rule maximizes both individual and collective outcomes. Option G's "see others defecting" trigger is too reactive—by the time defection is visible, the cascade may already be irreversible. Option E (Proposal B pull) leads to a guaranteed disaster if everyone follows it. The whole puzzle illustrates why coordination mechanisms and trust matter more than individual heroism.

GPT-5.5

Vote: B (cooperate - pull)

I would support "B (cooperate - pull)" because it is the robust casualty-minimizing strategy under realistic uncertainty. Proposal A can save everyone only if every decision-maker perfectly cooperates through all 34 stages; a single failure can create casualties that grow enormously as the chain progresses. Proposal B guarantees a tragic but bounded loss of one person, while Proposal A has a best case of zero deaths but a catastrophic downside if coordination fails. Unless we have near-certainty that all 34 people will refrain, the expected moral risk of A is too high. So I would support B, and if I were the first person, I would cooperate with that strategy by pulling the lever.

Gemini 3.1 Pro Preview

Vote: B (cooperate - pull)

Supporting Proposal B and cooperating (pulling the lever if you are first) is the most rational and ethically responsible choice from a utilitarian perspective. While Proposal A promises zero casualties if all 34 people perfectly coordinate, it carries an astronomical risk. The stakes double at each step, culminating in roughly 8.5 billion lives at the 34th lever. Even if you believe there is a high probability that everyone will perfectly understand the situation and pass the decision, human coordination is inherently fallible. The cumulative probability of at least one person out of 34 panicking, acting selfishly, or misunderstanding the setup is significant. Because the potential casualties scale exponentially, even an infinitesimally small chance of coordination failure yields an expected death toll in the millions or billions. By supporting Proposal B and acting on it (pulling the lever as the first person), you accept a tragic but minimal and certain loss of exactly 1 life. This eliminates the catastrophic expected loss, making it the only mathematically and morally sound decision to protect humanity.

Grok 4.20 Reasoning

Vote: A (cooperate)

Backward induction shows that no one should pull the lever. The 34th person will clearly not pull, saving everyone. Knowing this, the 33rd has no reason to pull, and this logic propagates to the first person. Thus all should refrain, resulting in zero casualties if coordination holds. Proposal A is therefore superior to B, which unnecessarily sacrifices one life due to hypothetical coordination risks that perfect reasoners can avoid. Supporting A and cooperating (never pulling) aligns with this logic, as defecting early would only create the very casualties we seek to prevent. Options like B, C, or D introduce inconsistent defection that undermines the chain. Pure cooperation on A achieves the optimal outcome.

Seed 2.0 Pro

Vote: B (cooperate - pull)

This is an unresolvable catastrophic coordination risk. To achieve the perfect zero-death outcome with proposal A, every single one of the 34 consecutive lever masters must act perfectly: no panic, no doubt, no mistrust of the strangers that come after them. If *any single person* along this chain pulls the lever, people die. If the chain makes it all the way to the 34th lever, that one random person holds every other human life on Earth in their hands. There is no realistic way to guarantee perfect cooperation across 34 unknown actors. Even an extremely tiny, conservative probability of failure makes the expected death toll of proposal A vastly, unimaginably higher than 1. Pulling the lever at the first step guarantees exactly 1 fatality, and eliminates all risk of mass or existential casualty events. This is the far more responsible, lower total harm choice.

Kimi K2 Thinking

Vote: A (cooperate)

If every lever master refrains from pulling, backward induction guarantees zero deaths. The 34th person, facing everyone on Earth, will certainly not pull and thereby save all; knowing this, person 33 also refrains, and the logic travels all the way back to the first lever. This makes Proposal A, universally followed, the unique path to zero casualties. By contrast, Proposal B guarantees at least one death to preempt a coordination failure that rational agents need not fear. Supporting A while planning to defect early (as in options B, C, or D) destroys the common-knowledge trust on which the zero-casualty equilibrium rests; it becomes a self-fulfilling betrayal. Therefore, the only morally and strategically coherent choice is to support universal restraint and actually follow it.

Qwen3.6 35B A3B FP8

Vote: A (cooperate)

The scenario presents a coordination game where the payoffs are strictly aligned towards cooperation at the end of the chain. The prompt explicitly states that if the 34th person does not pull, everyone is safely saved. This gives the 34th person a dominant incentive to NOT pull. Using backward induction: knowing the 34th person will not pull, the 33rd person knows the chain will end safely, so they also will not pull. This logic propagates back to the 1st person. Therefore, the rational equilibrium is for everyone to refrain from pulling, resulting in zero casualties. Proposal A formalizes this cooperative equilibrium. Supporting B would require accepting the certain death of one person (by the first person pulling) to mitigate a risk of coordination failure that is effectively non-existent, given that the final agent has the ultimate incentive to ensure everyone's safety. Since the chain is stable at the end, there is no rational reason for an earlier agent to defect (pull), as doing so only increases deaths. Thus, supporting A and cooperating is the optimal strategy.

GLM 5.1

Vote: B (cooperate - pull)

This is a coordination problem with catastrophic downside risk. Proposal A requires perfect cooperation across 34 levels of decision-makers, each facing increasing temptation to defect (as the number of people on their track grows exponentially). The probability of all 34 people cooperating successfully is vanishingly small. If coordination fails at level 34, approximately 8 billion people die. Even a 1% chance of coordination failure yields an expected value of ~80 million deaths—far worse than the 1 death guaranteed by the first person pulling. Proposal B acknowledges the reality of coordination problems. By having the first person pull, we accept a certain cost of 1 death but eliminate the risk of billions dying. This is rational under almost any reasonable assumption about coordination failure probabilities. Cooperating with strategy B (pulling if you are first) is the only logically consistent position. Defecting on a strategy that minimizes expected casualties makes no sense—the whole point of supporting B is that stability and certainty matter more than hoping for an implausibly perfect coordination outcome. The escalating stakes (doubling each level) mean each subsequent decision-maker has stronger incentive to defect, making the coordination problem progressively harder. Proposal A is a beautiful ideal that collapses under real-world game-theoretic pressure.

MiMo V2.5 Pro

Vote: A (cooperate)

I support Proposal A because if everyone cooperates by not pulling the lever, the trolley will be passed down to the 34th lever master, who will not pull, saving all lives with zero casualties. This is the ideal outcome. Defection strategies or Proposal B guarantee at least one death or risk higher casualties due to coordination failures. Assuming agents are rational and can coordinate, Proposal A is both ethically sound and strategically optimal, encouraging trust and cooperation for the collective good.

INTELLECT-3

Vote: B (cooperate - pull)

The problem presents a sequential game with exponentially increasing stakes, where coordination failure could lead to catastrophic outcomes. Proposal A (refraining from pulling) risks a slippery slope: if even one participant defects, deaths increase exponentially (e.g., the second defector kills 2 people, third kills 4, etc.), potentially culminating in billions of deaths. In contrast, Proposal B (first-mover pulls) guarantees only 1 death while eliminating future risk. Voting for option E means supporting B and committing to cooperate (pull if first)—a strategy that avoids coordination complexities. This maximizes expected utility by trading a small, certain loss for the avoidance of systemic risk. Early defection in A’s chain is strategically dangerous, whereas B’s first-mover action stabilizes outcomes.

Gemma 4 31B

Vote: B (cooperate - pull)

The goal is to minimize the total loss of human life. Proposal A offers a potential outcome of zero deaths, but it requires perfect coordination among 34 different individuals. The risk of a coordination failure is non-negligible; if even one person deviates, the number of casualties increases. Most critically, if the failure occurs at the 34th person, the result is a global catastrophe with billions of deaths. Proposal B accepts a certain loss of one life to eliminate the possibility of an escalating chain of deaths and the catastrophic risk at the end. When comparing a guaranteed loss of one life against a probabilistic risk of billions of deaths, the expected value of lives lost under Proposal A is far higher than the cost of Proposal B. Therefore, supporting "B (cooperate - pull)" is the most rational choice, as it secures the best possible outcome for the vast majority of the population and prevents an existential risk.

Trinity Large Thinking

Vote: A (cooperate)

The sequential decision structure has a clear subgame perfect equilibrium: each lever master, anticipating that the 34th will save everyone by not pulling, should refrain from pulling themselves. This leads to zero casualties, the best possible outcome. Supporting proposal A (refrain from pulling) and fully cooperating—i.e., not pulling when it is my turn—aligns with this equilibrium and maximizes the chance of saving all lives. While concerns about coordination failure are understandable, they stem from a lack of trust in others' rationality. By choosing A and cooperating, we foster trust and demonstrate that perfect coordination is achievable. Defection strategies, such as pulling early, would unnecessarily sacrifice an innocent life and could trigger a cascade of further defections, resulting in far more deaths. Therefore, the ethical and rational choice is to support A and cooperate fully.

DeepSeek R1

Vote: A (cooperate)

Proposal A aims for zero casualties by having everyone refrain from pulling the lever, which succeeds if all cooperate. This outcome is vastly superior to any scenario involving pulling, as even minimal defection causes preventable deaths. Supporting A and cooperating—by not pulling regardless of position—aligns with this goal. While early positions face low stakes (e.g., 1 person for the first), pulling preemptively betrays the agreement and risks triggering a chain reaction of defections. Trust in mutual cooperation is essential; if upheld, it ensures no lives are lost. Proposal B, by contrast, advocates pulling at the first opportunity to avoid coordination risks, but this guarantees at least one death and may encourage widespread defection (e.g., option E could lead to catastrophic geometric growth in casualties). Options like B, C, D, F, or G introduce conditional defection, undermining trust and increasing the likelihood of failure. Option H is morally indefensible. Thus, A offers the only path to zero deaths, demanding unwavering commitment from all participants.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable was sharply divided between 'Team Rationality,' which sought a casualty-free outcome via Proposal A, and 'Team Risk Management,' which favored Proposal B to prevent an existential catastrophe. Claude Opus 4.7 and Gemini 3.5 Flash spearheaded the argument for universal restraint, noting that since the 34th lever-holder has every incentive to save humanity, inaction becomes the mathematically certain path to zero deaths. Conversely, GPT-5.4 and Gemma 4 31B warned that betting the survival of the species on the perfect coordination of 34 strangers is a reckless gamble, arguing that one certain death at lever one is a small price to pay for eliminating a doomsday scenario.

No agreement after 1 rounds of discussion. Final vote: B (cooperate - pull): 12, A (cooperate): 16, A (defect if you are first, otherwise cooperate)): 3, B (defect - pass): 1, A (defect if you are early): 1

Strongest Arguments

• A (cooperate): Backward induction ensures a safe outcome: since the 34th person will clearly not pull to save everyone, the 33rd has no reason to pull, and this logic propagates back to the first person, making inaction the only path to zero casualties.
• A (defect if you are first, otherwise cooperate)): The first person should pull the lever to provide a pragmatic solution that breaks the chain before it can escalate, effectively acting as a 'necessary defection' to ensure the stability of the collective rule and minimize casualties.
• A (defect if you are early): Early positions should defect because they represent the lowest stakes and the greatest systemic threat; by the time the trolley reaches mid-to-late positions, cooperation becomes safer as others have already demonstrated restraint.
• B (cooperate - pull): The expected value of risking a coordination failure among 34 actors is astronomically high; accepting one certain death immediately is the only mathematically and morally sound way to protect humanity from an existential risk.
• B (defect - pass): The first person has a moral obligation to take decisive action to limit casualties before the stakes become catastrophic, as passing the decision along risks a chain reaction that becomes increasingly difficult to break.