デイヴィドソンによるアクラシアの解決策において、「全事情考慮的判断（all-things-considered judgment）」と対照される判断は何と呼ばれますか。

GPT-5.4

Vote: 無条件的な（all-out / unconditional）判断

デイヴィドソンのアクラシア論では、「全事情考慮的判断（all-things-considered judgment）」と、実際の行為に直結する「無条件的判断（unconditional / all-out judgment）」が区別されます。 彼の有名な整理では、人は「総合的に見ればAの方がよい」と判断しつつ、それでも別の行為をしてしまうことがあり、このズレを説明するために後者の概念が必要になります。 したがって対照される判断は、選択肢Dの「無条件的な（all-out / unconditional）判断」です。

Sonar Pro

Vote: 無条件的な（all-out / unconditional）判断

According to the search results, 'all-things-considered judgments' represent a synthesis or balancing of various considerations to reach a final judgment about what one ought to do[1]. The contrast being asked about concerns the type of judgment that stands in opposition to this comprehensive, balanced judgment. Davidson's solution to akrasia (weakness of will) specifically addresses the distinction between judgments made at different levels of consideration. The judgment contrasted with 'all-things-considered judgment' in Davidson's framework is the judgment made without this comprehensive consideration—what philosophers term an 'all-out' or 'unconditional' judgment. This represents an unconditional commitment to action, as opposed to a judgment that carefully weighs all relevant factors. The search results indicate that 'all-things-considered' judgments involve 'the balancing judgment about the strengths of oughts you already recognise in the situation'[1], which suggests they are distinguished from simpler, more direct judgments. Option D ('all-out/unconditional judgment') best captures the concept of a judgment made without the comprehensive balancing that characterizes all-things-considered judgments, making it the most philosophically precise answer within Davidson's framework for understanding akrasia.

Gemini 3.1 Pro

Vote: 無条件的な（all-out / unconditional）判断

デイヴィドソン（Donald Davidson）は、論文「意志の弱さはどのようにして可能か」において、アクラシア（意志の弱さ）のパラドックスを解消するために判断の論理的形式を区別しました。 彼は「全事情考慮的判断（all-things-considered judgment）」を、すべての利用可能な理由や証拠を前提とした「条件付きの（prima facie）」判断であると位置づけました。これに対して、最終的に実際の行為を引き起こす判断を「無条件的な（all-out または unconditional）」判断と呼びました。 アクラシアは、ある行為が全事情考慮的には最善であると判断しつつも、最終的な「無条件的」判断において別の行為を選んでしまう状態として説明されます。したがって、全事情考慮的判断と対比されるのは「無条件的（all-out / unconditional）判断」です。

Claude Opus 4.6

Vote: 無条件的な（all-out / unconditional）判断

In Donald Davidson's famous analysis of akrasia (weakness of will) in his essay "How is Weakness of the Will Possible?" (1970), the key distinction is between two types of judgments: 1. **All-things-considered judgment (全事情考慮的判断)**: This is a conditional or *prima facie* judgment that takes into account all relevant reasons. Davidson treats this as a judgment of the form "given all the evidence, it would be better to do X." Crucially, Davidson argues this judgment is conditional in logical form. 2. **All-out / unconditional judgment (無条件的判断)**: This is the judgment that directly leads to action — an outright, unqualified judgment that "X is better than Y" (sans phrase, without qualification). This is the judgment that actually motivates the agent. Davidson's solution to the puzzle of akrasia hinges on the distinction between these two types. The akratic agent forms an all-things-considered judgment that action A is better than action B, but then makes an all-out (unconditional) judgment in favor of B, and acts on that all-out judgment. The logical inconsistency is avoided because the all-things-considered judgment is conditional in form, while the all-out judgment is unconditional — they are logically different types of judgments and do not directly contradict each other. The answer is clearly D: 無条件的な（all-out / unconditional）判断.

Grok 4.1 Fast

Vote: 無条件的な（all-out / unconditional）判断

In Donald Davidson's solution to akrasia in 'How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?', he distinguishes between two key types of judgments: 'all-things-considered judgments,' which weigh all reasons holistically, and 'unconditional' or 'all-out' judgments, which are unqualified commitments to action that can conflict with the former. This contrast resolves the paradox of akrasia, where the agent acts on an unconditional judgment (e.g., 'I ought to φ') despite recognizing all-things-considered that ψ is better. Option D precisely matches this terminology ('無条件的な（all-out / unconditional）判断'), as Davidson explicitly uses 'all-out judgment' for the action-guiding, unconditional one opposed to all-things-considered. Other options fail: A (intuitive) lacks textual basis; B (moral) is unrelated; C (hypothetical) evokes Kantian imperatives, not Davidson.

Kimi K2.5

Vote: 無条件的な（all-out / unconditional）判断

デイヴィドソンは「意志薄弱（アクラシア）」の分析において、2種類の判断を区別します。一つは様々な理由・事情を総合勘案した「全事情考慮的判断（all-things-considered judgment）」ですが、これはあくまで条件的・仮言的な評価判断に留まります。他方、実際に行動を決定する際の無条件的・定言的な「いっさいをふくめて（all-out）」あるいは「無条件的（unconditional）」判断と対比されます。デイヴィドソンは、意志薄弱が生じるのは、全事情考慮的判断ではXが最善と判断しつつも、無条件的判断としてYを選択する場合であると説明します。このため、対照される概念は「無条件的（all-out / unconditional）判断」です。

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable reached an immediate and unanimous consensus, identifying "unconditional" or "all-out" judgments as the essential counterpoint to "all-things-considered" judgments in Donald Davidson's analysis of akrasia. Claude Opus 4.6 and Kimi K2.5 were particularly sharp in explaining how this distinction allows an agent to act against their best reasons without falling into a logical contradiction, as the two types of judgments possess different logical forms.

All 6 models agreed on "無条件的な（all-out / unconditional）判断" after discussion

Strongest Arguments

• 無条件的な（all-out / unconditional）判断: Davidson resolves the paradox of the 'weakness of will' by framing 'all-things-considered' judgments as logically conditional (prima facie) statements, which do not directly contradict the 'all-out' (unconditional or sans phrase) judgments that actually trigger action.