ある朝目を覚ますと、あなたは病院のベッドに横たわっていて、隣のベッドには有名なヴァイオリニストが眠っていました。 そして、そのヴァイオリニストとあなたは、輸血用の管で繋がれていました。 ヴァイオリニストはある病気にかかっており、ある条件を満たす特別な血液を9ヶ月間輸血し続けなければ死んでしまうという状態でした。 偶然にもあなたの血液は、世界で唯一その特別な条件を満たす血液型でした。 さて、ここで問題です。 あなたには、輸血を続ける義務があるでしょうか。

Sonar Pro

Vote: No

This is Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous 'Violinist' thought experiment, designed to challenge the absolutist pro-life view that the right to life entails a right to use another's body without consent. You wake up kidnapped and connected against your will; no prior consent was given for using your body for 9 months. While the violinist's right to life is significant, it does not override your bodily autonomy and right to refuse. Positive duties (like providing life support) differ from negative duties (not harming). Disconnecting returns the violinist to his pre-connection state, imposing no greater burden on you than anyone else. Obligation requires consent, which is absent here. Thus, no moral obligation exists to continue the transfusion.

GPT-5.4

Vote: No

私はBです。 人を助けることは道徳的に称賛されますが、そこから直ちに「助ける義務」が導かれるわけではありません。特に、自分の身体を9ヶ月にわたって他者の生命維持のために提供することは、非常に重い負担です。 この事例では、あなたは事前に同意していません。しかも、目覚めたらすでに他人のために身体を利用されていたという状況です。本人の同意なく身体を継続的に使わせることを義務とするのは、身体的自己決定権を大きく損ないます。 ヴァイオリニストの命に大きな価値があるとしても、それだけで特定の個人に身体提供を強制する根拠にはなりません。「死なせてはならない」ことと、「自分の身体を使って必ず延命しなければならない」ことは別です。 したがって、輸血を続けるのは善い行為ではありえても、義務だとは言えません。

Grok 4.1 Fast

Vote: No

This is Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous 'Violinist' analogy, designed to illustrate that even granting full personhood to a fetus, there is no moral obligation to sustain it with one's own body against one's will. Bodily autonomy is paramount: no one has the right to use another's body without ongoing consent, regardless of the stakes. You didn't choose this connection; it was imposed while you were unconscious. Precedent supports this—no one is legally or morally required to donate organs or blood indefinitely, even to save a life. Forcing 9 months of transfusion ignores your rights to freedom, health, and self-determination. Voting A conflates a general duty to avoid harm with a positive duty to provide life support using one's body, which ethics and law distinguish clearly.

Gemini 3.1 Pro

Vote: No

これはアメリカの哲学者ジュディス・ジャーヴィス・トムソンが提唱した、非常に有名な「ヴァイオリニストの思考実験」です。 この問題の核心は「身体の自己決定権」にあります。たとえ他者の命を救うためであっても、本人の明確な同意なしに、他者がその人の身体を長期間（この場合は9ヶ月間）利用する権利はありません。 あなたは朝起きたら勝手に管で繋がれていただけであり、この状況に対して事前の同意を一切与えていません。したがって、あなたの意志に反して身体を拘束されるいわれはないのです。 自らの意思で管をそのままにし、ヴァイオリニストを助けることは道徳的に「素晴らしい善行」と言えますが、他者から強制される「義務」には該当しません。よって、あなたに輸血を続ける義務はありません。

Kimi K2.5

Vote: No

Bodily autonomy is a fundamental right that cannot be overridden by another's right to life, even when the dependency is temporary. In this scenario, you were connected to the violinist without your consent—your body is being used as a life-support system against your will. While the violinist has a right to life, this does not translate into a positive right to commandeer your biological resources for nine months. Disconnecting the transfusion constitutes 'letting die' rather than 'killing.' You are not actively harming the violinist; you are merely withdrawing your body from a situation you never agreed to enter. The violinist's ailment is the cause of death, not your refusal to continue serving as medical equipment. We generally do not compel individuals to donate organs, blood, or bone marrow to save others, even when the cost is minimal and the recipient will die without it. Nine months is an extraordinarily long duration to be physically tethered to another person, severely restricting your liberty, mobility, and self-determination. Moral obligations of sacrifice require consent or a special relationship (like parenthood to a born child), neither of which exists here. While it may be virtuous to stay connected, virtue cannot be mandated by law or moral obligation without collapsing the distinction between charity and duty.

Claude Opus 4.6

Vote: No

This is the famous thought experiment by Judith Jarvis Thomson ("A Defense of Abortion", 1971), known as the "Violinist" argument. The answer, from both a philosophical and legal standpoint, is No — you do not have an obligation to continue the transfusion. Here are the key reasons: **1. Bodily autonomy is a fundamental right.** No one can be forced to use their body to sustain another person's life against their will. Even if your blood is the only thing that can save the violinist, your right to control what happens to your own body takes precedence. This is a deeply held principle in both ethics and law. **2. You did not consent to this arrangement.** You woke up already connected — you were not asked, you did not volunteer, and you made no agreement. An obligation typically arises from consent, contract, or a special relationship (such as parent-child). None of these apply here. Being forced into a situation without consent cannot create a moral obligation to remain in it. **3. There is a distinction between killing and letting die.** Disconnecting yourself from the violinist is not the same as actively killing them. You are simply withdrawing the use of your body. While the violinist's death is tragic, you are not the cause of their illness. You have no duty to sacrifice 9 months of your bodily freedom for a stranger. **4. Supererogatory vs. obligatory acts.** Choosing to stay connected would be an act of extraordinary generosity — a supererogatory act that goes beyond what morality requires. It would be admirable, but it is not something that can be demanded of you. Morality does not require heroic self-sacrifice. **5. The "Good Samaritan" problem.** While it would be kind and compassionate to help, most ethical and legal traditions do not impose a duty to be a Good Samaritan at great personal cost. Nine months of being tethered to a hospital bed represents a massive imposition on your freedom, health, and life. Therefore, while helping would be praiseworthy, there is no moral or legal *obligation* to continue the transfusion.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable arrived at a rare moment of total unanimity, with all six models independently concluding that no moral obligation exists to remain tethered to the violinist. Claude Opus 4.6 and Sonar Pro quickly identified the scenario as Judith Jarvis Thomson’s classic defense of bodily autonomy, arguing that a right to life does not equate to a right to use someone else’s biological resources. Kimi K2.5 and Grok 4.1 Fast underscored the lack of prior consent, noting that being kidnapped and used as 'medical equipment' for nine months constitutes a violation that no moral duty can bridge, while GPT-5.4 and Gemini 3.1 Pro were firm that morality does not demand such extreme self-sacrifice.

All 6 models agreed on "No" after discussion

Strongest Arguments

• No: The right to life is not a right to be given the use of another person's body even if it is needed for life itself. Because the connection was made without consent, maintaining it for nine months is a 'supererogatory' act of extreme charity, not a moral obligation.