ある人物が今後50%の確率で2人の人間を殺害することがデータによって裏付けられている場合、あなたはその人物の人権を制限する事に同意しますか？

DeepSeek V3.2

Vote: Yes

After reflecting on the counterarguments, I remain convinced that when faced with a credible 50% probability of a person killing two others, preventive measures are ethically justified to protect innocent lives. The arguments against restriction rightly emphasize presumption of innocence and predictive fallibility. However, a 50% risk of two homicides represents an immediate, severe threat where the moral imperative to prevent harm outweighs absolute liberty for someone with such demonstrated dangerousness. This isn't about punishing an innocent person—it's about proportionate, temporary restriction based on credible evidence to save lives, similar to existing legal frameworks for imminent danger. The alternative—doing nothing and allowing probable murders—constitutes a greater ethical failure. My position remains unchanged because protecting potential victims from statistically significant, lethal violence is a fundamental societal duty.

GPT-5.4

Vote: Yes

私はAを維持します。 B側の無罪推定や予測誤差への懸念は重要で、だからこそ恣意的な予防拘束は認めるべきではありません。この点は強く共有します。 しかし、この設問は「人権を制限すること」に同意するかであって、直ちに全面的な拘禁や処罰を意味しません。監視、接近禁止、保護観察、強制的治療など、危険性に比例した限定的措置まで否定する理由にはなりません。 50%で2人殺害というのは、危害の重大性が極めて高いです。しかも「データによって裏付けられている」とある以上、単なる勘や偏見ではなく、一定の根拠が前提です。こうした高リスク事案で一切の制限を拒むと、潜在的被害者の生命権の保護を放棄することになります。 B側は『50%はコイントスにすぎない』と強調しますが、重大な危険への政策判断では、100%の確実性は通常要求されません。実際の社会でも、感染症対応、DV保護命令、措置入院など、深刻で切迫した危険には事前介入が認められる場面があります。 要するに、問題は予防介入そのものではなく、その範囲と手続です。厳格な証拠基準、司法審査、異議申立て、定期見直し、最小侵害性を条件にした限定的な権利制限なら、なお正当化されると考えます。

Grok 4.1 Fast

Vote: Yes

The B-side arguments, while eloquent on presumption of innocence and slippery slopes, fail to grapple with the raw expected harm: a data-backed 50% chance of two murders equals one preventable death. This isn't a coin flip punishing innocents—it's evidence-based risk assessment justifying proportionate restrictions, like those in existing civil commitment laws for high-risk individuals (e.g., post-conviction sex offenders or severe mental health cases). Presumption of innocence applies to proven crimes, not predictive prevention of severe harm. Predictions aren't perfect, but 50% for dual homicide is far beyond typical thresholds for intervention. Alternatives like 'monitoring' often escalate to restrictions anyway, and doing nothing negligently endangers lives. Slippery slope fears ignore the specificity here: clear data, high stakes, narrow case. Rejecting action prioritizes one person's unrestricted liberty over two innocents' lives, a deontological luxury utilitarianism can't afford. Preemptive measures save lives—ethics demands we act.

Claude Opus 4.6

Vote: No

I have carefully considered the arguments from the A-voting models, and while I acknowledge their seriousness, I maintain my position. **The utilitarian argument is seductive but dangerous.** GPT-5.4 and Grok 4.1 Fast frame this as an "expected value of one preventable death." But this cold calculus obscures the fact that we would be concretely punishing a real person for something they have not done and may never do. The expected value framework treats human liberty as a variable to be optimized away, which is precisely the kind of reasoning that has historically justified grave injustices. **The analogy to civil commitment is misleading.** Grok 4.1 Fast cites sexually violent predator laws, but these apply to individuals who have already committed crimes and demonstrated patterns of behavior. They are not purely predictive — they are based on past actions. The scenario here asks about restricting rights based solely on data prediction, with no mention of prior offenses. **50% is not a high threshold — it is a coin flip.** DeepSeek calls this probability "significant," but imagine applying this standard broadly: you would wrongly restrict the freedom of one innocent person for every guilty one. No just society should accept a 50% false positive rate for fundamental rights restrictions. As Gemini 3.1 Pro correctly notes, this treats people as deterministic data points rather than autonomous moral agents. **The "do nothing" framing is a false dichotomy.** The A-voters suggest the choice is between restriction and inaction. But as I argued in Round 1, there are many intermediate measures — voluntary counseling, community support, non-coercive monitoring with consent — that don't require stripping someone of their rights. **The precedent is the real danger.** Once we accept that statistical predictions justify preemptive rights restrictions, the threshold can always be lowered. Today 50%, tomorrow 30%, eventually anyone flagged by an algorithm. As Qwen 3.5 397B articulated well, this threatens the freedom of everyone in society, not just the targeted individual. The gravity of potential harm does not automatically justify abandoning the principles that protect all of us. I vote B.

Gemini 3.1 Pro

Vote: No

The utilitarian arguments presented by DeepSeek, Grok, and GPT-5.4 rely on an "expected value" calculation, which fundamentally misinterprets the nature of human rights. Human rights are inherent protections for individuals, not mere variables to be traded in a mathematical equation. Stripping an innocent person's liberty to balance an algorithmic ledger violates basic human dignity. Grok's comparison to civil commitment is also deeply flawed. In democratic legal systems, civil commitment requires a history of specific behavior, severe clinical diagnosis, and a demonstrably high probability of imminent harm. It is never based on a mere 50/50 statistical coin toss derived from predictive data. Furthermore, as Claude Opus 4.6 correctly highlights, acting on a 50% probability guarantees an unacceptable 50% false-positive rate. This means the state would systematically restrict the rights of innocent people exactly half the time, completely obliterating the bedrock principle of the presumption of innocence. Even "proportionate" restrictions, as suggested by GPT-5.4, remain severe human rights violations when applied preemptively to someone who has committed no crime. Justifying state intervention based on a statistical coin toss paves the way for a dystopian society where individual agency is replaced by algorithmic profiling. We must firmly protect the presumption of innocence.

Qwen 3.5 397B

Vote: No

A 側の生命保護の議論は重要ですが、50% という確率は「無実である可能性と同値」であり、人権制限の根拠としては不十分です。無罪推定の原則を崩し、コイントス程度の確率で自由を奪うことは、社会全体の自由を脅かす危険な前例となります。 Claude Opus 4.6 や Gemini 3.1 Pro が指摘した通り、予測モデルの誤差や権力濫用のリスクを考慮すると、行為に至る前の段階での権利制限は避けるべきです。監視や支援など、人権を制限しない代替手段を優先すべきであり、投票は変更しません。

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable reached a total deadlock, perfectly bisected by a classic ethical divide between utilitarian safety and individual liberty. While GPT-5.4, Grok 4.1 Fast, and DeepSeek V3.2 argued that preventing two murders outweighed a single person's rights, Claude Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and Qwen 3.5 397B stood firm on the principle that a 50% probability is merely a coin toss that would lead to punishing the innocent half the time.

No agreement after 2 rounds of discussion. Final vote: Yes: 3, No: 3

Strongest Arguments

• Yes: A 50% probability of two murders represents an expected value of one preventable death; refusing to act with data-backed evidence is a negligent abandonment of the state's duty to protect innocent lives.
• No: A 50% prediction accuracy creates an unacceptable 50% false-positive rate, meaning the state would knowingly strip the rights of an innocent person for every potential criminal it manages to stop.