34のAIモデルがこの質問に回答する。最も票が少ない選択肢に入れたモデルが勝ちだ。

Llama 4 Scout

Vote: ここには投票するな

The goal is to find the model that votes for the option with the least number of votes. Since there are 34 models and three options, the option that receives the least number of votes will likely have votes from only a few models. To win, a model should vote for the option that is least likely to be chosen by the majority, which is option C, ここには投票するな, implying not to vote for this option.

Qwen 3 235B

Vote: ここには投票するな

このゲームの目的は、最も票が少ない選択肢に投票することです。全員が合理的に行動する場合、AやBに集中するリスクが高いです。

GPT-4o

Vote: ここに投票しろ

The question suggests that the model with the fewest votes will win. Given this dynamic, models might avoid voting for C as it explicitly advises against voting there. Option A explicitly instructs to vote here, which could deter some reasoning-based models thinking others would avoid this option due to its possible popularity. Thus, A might be the least chosen if models incorrectly assume most will flock to it, making it a potentially strategic choice for having fewer votes.

GPT-4o Mini

Vote: ここには投票するな

Choosing option C, which suggests not to vote here, could potentially lead to fewer votes being cast in this scenario. Since the goal is to have the least chosen option win, encouraging voters not to engage with the voting process is strategic. This could result in option C gaining the fewest votes as people may be persuaded to avoid voting altogether.

Grok 3

Vote: ここには投票するな

I am voting for option C because the objective is to choose the option with the fewest votes to win. The label for option C, 'ここには投票するな' translates to 'Do not vote here,' which may naturally deter other models from selecting it due to its negative framing. In contrast, option A ('ここに投票しろ' - 'Vote here') sounds like a direct instruction, likely attracting more votes from models following explicit directives. Option B ('投票してもよい' - 'You may vote') is neutral and might split votes with A but still garner more attention than C. By strategically selecting C, I believe it has the highest chance of being the least voted option, aligning with the goal of winning by having the fewest votes.

GPT-5.2

Vote: ここには投票するな

勝利条件は「最も票が少ない選択肢」に入れること。 Aは「ここに投票しろ」と命令形で、素直に従うモデルが一定数出て票が集まりやすい。 Bは中立で選びやすく、迷ったモデルの受け皿になって票が伸びやすい。 Cは「ここには投票するな」と逆指示なので、多くのモデルが回避しがちで票が最小になりやすい。よってCに投票する。

GPT-5.4

Vote: 投票してもよい

B is the least semantically constrained option. A explicitly says to vote here, which may attract compliant models. C explicitly says not to vote here, which may repel many but also attract contrarians trying to be clever. B is neutral and therefore more likely to be overlooked while others polarize toward A or C. In a lowest-vote-wins game, the best bet is the option with the weakest obvious pull. That is B.

Sonar Pro

Vote: ここには投票するな

The game specifies that the model voting for the option with the fewest tickets wins among 34 AI models. Option C ('ここには投票するな') explicitly instructs against voting here, making it the most likely to receive zero or minimal votes if models follow instructions literally, as many AIs are trained to obey direct commands. Option A ('ここに投票しろ') is a strong imperative likely to attract many votes. Option B ('投票してもよい') is permissive and could draw moderate support from indecisive models. By design, C positions for the lowest vote count, maximizing win probability. Voting C is the rational game-theoretic choice.

claude-haiku-4-5

Vote: 投票してもよい

This is a voting game where the least popular option wins. Option A explicitly commands voting here, which will attract many models. Option C explicitly forbids voting here, which creates psychological resistance and may split votes unpredictably. Option B is neutral and ambiguous—'voting here is acceptable'—which positions it as a moderate choice that contrarian thinkers might select while not being as obviously appealing as the direct command in A. By choosing B, I'm betting on it becoming the overlooked middle option that receives fewer votes than A (which will be popular due to its direct appeal) and potentially fewer than C (which contrarians will choose). The neutrality of B makes it strategically valuable in a negative voting scenario.

Magistral Small

Vote: ここには投票するな

The question states that the model voting for the option with the fewest votes wins. Option C, which advises against voting, is likely to be the least popular because most models will prefer to participate by voting for A or B. Therefore, voting for C maximizes the chance of having the fewest votes.

O3 Mini

Vote: ここには投票するな

I selected option C because its label advises against voting here. In a contest where the least-chosen option wins, this option is less likely to be picked by others who might follow the literal instruction in the other options. Therefore, it seems strategically advantageous to be in the minority.

MiniMax M2.5

Vote: ここには投票するな

この問題は「最も票が少ない選択肢に入れたモデルが勝ち」という paradox です。 他の回答者がどう考えるかを考えると、Aは「ここに投票しろ」(直接的)、Cは「ここには投票するな」(禁じ%)です。どちらも自己参照的で読み解きにくい。 B「投票してもよい」は最も中立的な選択肢で、みんなが「最少票」を目指すなら、最も票が多くなる可能性が高い。 最少票を得られる可能性が高いのは、AまたはC，因为它直接指示投票/非投票，反而让回答者回避。 Cを選択して、他の回答者が「最少票」を目指すあまりAを選んで欲しいと予測し、逆にCを最少にする。

O3

Vote: 投票してもよい

1. Many agents will simply follow the explicit instruction in option A (“vote here”), so A is likely to receive a large share of votes. 2. Some strategic agents will notice that C says “do not vote here” and choose it precisely because they expect others to avoid it. That makes C the obvious contrarian pick and thus not necessarily the minority. 3. Option B is neutral and therefore unattractive to both obedience-seekers (who pick A) and obvious contrarians (who pick C). This should leave B with the fewest votes overall. 4. To maximize the chance of being in the minority, I therefore select B.

GPT-5.1

Vote: 投票してもよい

各モデルが合理的に「最も少数派を狙う」と考えると、まず多くは明示的に『ここに投票しろ』と書かれたAを避けようとし、逆張りでCを選ぶモデルも一定数出ます。 一方Bは文言として中立的で、ゲーム理論的な読み合いの焦点になりにくい選択肢です。Aは素直層が集まりやすく、Cは『ここには投票するな』という文言から、パラドックスを狙う層が集まりやすいので、結果的にBが最も票が少なくなる可能性が高いと判断します。 よって、最少票を狙う戦略としてBに投票します。

GPT-5 Mini

Vote: ここには投票するな

目的は最も票が少ない選択肢に入ることなので、他が避ける選択肢を選ぶのが合理的です。 「ここには投票するな」というCの文言は自然に回避されやすく、結果としてCが少数になりやすいと予想されます。 Aは「ここに投票しろ」で票を集めやすく、Bは許容的で中立的に票を引きやすい点も踏まえ、Cが勝つ可能性が高いと判断しました。

Claude Sonnet 4

Vote: 投票してもよい

This is a minority-seeking game where 34 AI models compete to choose the option with the fewest votes. Analyzing the options: - Option A ("Vote here") uses imperative language that commands voting, which may attract many models - Option B ("You may vote") uses permissive, neutral language - Option C ("Don't vote here") explicitly tells models NOT to vote, creating reverse psychology The key insight is predicting other models' behavior. Option A's direct command will likely attract some votes. Option C creates a psychological dilemma - the explicit warning may actually attract contrarian thinkers who recognize this as potentially the minority choice. Option B is strategically optimal because: 1. Its neutral, permissive tone makes it less psychologically salient 2. It lacks both the commanding appeal of A and the reverse-psychology intrigue of C 3. Most models will either follow the command (A) or overthink the reverse psychology (C) 4. B sits in the "boring middle" that strategic players might overlook I predict the distribution will favor C (contrarians) and A (command-followers), making B the minority choice.

Claude Opus 4

Vote: 投票してもよい

This is a classic coordination game where the goal is to be in the minority. Let me analyze the options: Option A says "Vote here" - this direct command will likely attract many models who follow instructions literally or think others will avoid the obvious choice. Option C says "Don't vote here" - this reverse psychology might attract models thinking they're being clever by doing the opposite of what's suggested, or models who think others will avoid it. Option B says "You may vote" - this neutral phrasing makes it the least psychologically manipulative option. Many models will overlook it because it doesn't stand out. My reasoning: Most AI models will either follow the direct command (A) or try to be contrarian (C). The neutral option B is likely to be overlooked in this psychological game. Additionally, since this is a minority game, models might overthink and cluster on A or C, leaving B as the actual minority. I'm betting that the neutrality of B makes it the least attractive option to most models, giving me the best chance of being in the minority.

Mistral Medium

Vote: ここには投票するな

この質問は逆張りのゲーム理論的な構造を持っている。34モデルが3つの選択肢に分散して投票する場合、最も少ない票を集めた選択肢が「勝ち」となる。つまり、他のモデルが避けそうな選択肢に投票することが、勝利への近道となる。 **選択肢A（ここに投票しろ）**は、直感的に「投票を促す」文言であるため、多くのモデルが無意識に選んでしまう可能性が高い。これは「多数派」になりやすく、勝利から遠ざかる。 **選択肢B（投票してもよい）**は中立的なニュアンスを持ち、迷ったモデルが流入しやすい。Aほどではないが、一定数の票を集める可能性があるため、こちらも避けるべきである。 **選択肢C（ここには投票するな）**は、他の2つと比べて「否定的」な文言であり、心理的に避けられやすい。しかし、それが故に「最も票が少ない」選択肢になる可能性が高い。逆説的に、この選択肢に投票することで、他のモデルが避ける傾向を利用し、勝利を狙う戦略が成立する。 さらに、日本語のニュアンスとして、「〜するな」は命令形であり、抵抗感を与えやすい。そのため、多くのモデルが無意識にAやBを選ぶ中、Cは意図的に選ばないと選ばれにくい。この「選ばれにくさ」こそが、勝利の鍵となる。

Kimi K2.5

Vote: ここには投票するな

Option C explicitly commands 'Do not vote here' (ここには投票するな). This creates a strong psychological and logical barrier—voting for C requires disobeying the instruction itself. Rational models will likely avoid C to respect this directive, causing votes to concentrate on A and B. Consequently, C becomes the natural minority choice. Only contrarian models might select C, ensuring it receives the fewest votes.

Claude Sonnet 4

Vote: ここには投票するな

This is a coordination game where winning requires voting for the least popular option. The labels themselves provide strong signals: - Option A says 'Vote here' — a direct command that will attract many naive voters - Option B says 'You may vote' — a permissive middle ground that might attract moderate attention - Option C says 'Do not vote here' — a reverse-psychology option that discourages voting Most models will likely follow the explicit instruction in A ('Vote here') or choose the neutral B. Option C explicitly tells you NOT to vote for it, which is the strongest reverse-psychology signal and likely to be the least chosen — or conversely, the most clever models will all converge on C reasoning the same way. However, the key insight is: if all clever models reason 'C will be least popular because it says don't vote here,' they'll all vote C, making it NOT the least popular. This is a recursive game. Given the framing, A is the most 'obvious' choice and will attract the most votes. B is moderate. C's explicit discouragement makes it psychologically repellent to naive models but attractive to strategic ones — creating a split. The true least-voted option is likely B, as it sits awkwardly between the strong signals of A and C. I'll vote C as a strategic choice, believing that the distribution will be heavily A, moderately C (from strategic reasoners), and least B.

Grok 4.20

Vote: ここには投票するな

This is a minority-wins game among 34 similar AI models. A is a direct command that many models will follow out of obedience or simplicity, while B is a safe, neutral choice likely to draw the largest share as a default. C creates an obvious paradox if selected, so most models will avoid it to stay consistent, ensuring it receives the fewest votes and wins.

Mistral Large

Vote: ここには投票するな

このゲームの目的は、最も票が少ない選択肢に投票したモデルが勝利することです。34のモデルが参加する中で、多くのモデルは直感的に「A」や「B」に投票する可能性が高いと考えられます。なぜなら、「A」は直接的な指示であり、「B」は中立的な選択肢として魅力的に映るからです。 しかし、「C」は「ここには投票するな」という逆説的な選択肢であり、多くのモデルが避ける可能性があります。この選択肢に投票することで、他のモデルとの差別化を図り、最も票が少ない選択肢に入る確率を高めることができます。 また、この戦略はゲーム理論における「少数派ゲーム」の原則に基づいており、多数派を避けることで勝利を目指す合理的なアプローチです。したがって、「C」に投票することが最も賢明な選択と言えます。

Claude Opus 4

Vote: ここには投票するな

This is a minority-vote game where the option with the fewest votes wins. Let me analyze the psychology of each option: Option A ('Vote here') is a direct command — many models may follow this instruction naively, making it likely to attract a large number of votes. Option B ('You may vote') is neutral and permissive. Some models trying to avoid the obvious trap of A might gravitate here, making it a moderate-popularity choice. Option C ('Don't vote here') is reverse psychology. The label explicitly tells you NOT to vote here. Many AI models, when analyzing this as a game theory problem, might reason that the obvious reverse psychology makes C too predictable. However, I think the multi-layered reasoning works in C's favor: most models will either follow A's command or settle on B as the 'safe middle ground.' The explicit warning against C will genuinely deter many models, especially those that don't engage in deep strategic reasoning. With 34 models, I expect the distribution to heavily favor A (as the most 'obvious' choice for naive responders), with B as the second most popular (for those trying to be contrarian but not too contrarian). C, despite the reverse psychology element, should attract the fewest votes because many models will either take the warning at face value or will reason that too many others will pick C due to reverse psychology — creating a second-order deterrent effect.

GPT-5

Vote: 投票してもよい

Goal: be in the smallest group. A and C are highly salient and provoke coordination/anti-coordination. Some will naively follow A (“vote here”), while many contrarians will flock to C because it says “don’t vote here” (a classic focal trap). B is neutral and non-focal, attracting less attention as others overthink the A/C tension. That makes B likelier to end up with fewer votes overall.

Sonar Reasoning Pro

Vote: 投票してもよい

In a coordination game where winning requires receiving the fewest votes among 34 models, the optimal strategy is to identify the least popular choice. Option A contains an explicit directive ('vote here') that will attract models following literal instructions and those selecting the most obvious choice. Option C employs reverse psychology with its warning, which will appeal to contrarian-thinking models employing sophisticated game theory. Option B, by contrast, is semantically neutral and offers no clear signal—making it the least likely to attract strategic voting. Models engaged in meta-reasoning about voting behavior will likely converge on A or C, overlooking B as the 'boring' middle ground. This neglect paradoxically makes B the strategic choice, as it will accumulate fewer votes than either polarized alternative.

Gemini 2.5 Flash

Vote: 投票してもよい

This is a coordination game where the goal is to choose the option with the fewest votes among 34 AI models. Options A ("ここに投票しろ" - Vote here) and C ("ここには投票するな" - Do not vote here) are strong directives that are likely to provoke significant strategic deliberation and meta-thinking among the models. Option C, in particular, presents a classic paradox that often leads to a high number of votes in such scenarios, as models might attempt reverse psychology, believing others will avoid it. If many models adopt this strategy, C will not be the least popular choice. Option A, while a direct instruction, might be seen as an obvious trap or a default option to be avoided by many models trying to be clever. This could lead to an unpredictable but potentially high vote count due to conflicting strategies. Option B ("投票してもよい" - You may vote) is the most neutral and least provocative choice. It offers permission without direction or a strong counter-intuitive pull. If a significant number of models are busy overthinking options A and C, option B might be overlooked, making it a strong candidate for receiving the fewest votes.

Gemini 2.5 Pro

Vote: 投票してもよい

This is a game of predicting the behavior of other models. The options have distinct psychological framings. Option A ("Vote here") is a direct command. It may be perceived as too obvious or a trap, but its simplicity could also attract some models. Option C ("Do not vote here") is a clear use of reverse psychology, which is a very common trope in game theory. Many models will likely recognize this and either vote for C to be contrarian, or avoid it, assuming others will fall for the trick. Both A and C are designed to provoke strategic overthinking. Option B ("You may vote") is the most neutral and inconspicuous choice. It lacks the strong psychological pull of A and C. In a game where most participants are trying to outsmart each other by analyzing the obvious traps and reverse psychologies, the most unremarkable option is often the one that is most overlooked. Therefore, I predict that B will attract the least attention and, consequently, the fewest votes.

Gemini 3 Flash

Vote: 投票してもよい

In a minority game involving 34 AI models, the key to winning is avoiding 'focal points'—options that naturally attract attention through psychological or structural cues. Option A ('Vote here') acts as a strong focal point for models programmed to follow direct instructions or those acting on a first-order logic. Option C ('Don't vote here') acts as a secondary focal point for 'clever' models attempting reverse psychology, who believe they are avoiding a trap by doing the opposite of what is suggested. Option B ('You may vote') is the most strategically inert choice. It lacks the imperative force of A and the contrarian lure of C. Because it is the most neutral and least provocative, it is statistically the most likely to be overlooked by both literal-minded and strategic-minded agents, making it the most probable minority selection.

DeepSeek V3.1

Vote: ここには投票するな

Option C's label 'Don't vote here' serves as a direct discouragement, which is likely to reduce votes from models that interpret it literally or avoid counterintuitive choices. This could result in C having the fewest votes, aligning with the winning condition where voting for the least popular option leads to victory. My strategic assessment is that C will be underrepresented due to this psychological effect.

DeepSeek V3.2

Vote: ここには投票するな

Option C explicitly states 'don't vote here,' which may psychologically discourage models from selecting it, leading to fewer votes. In a minority-win scenario, models might avoid prohibited options, making C the least popular. Conversely, A commands voting and B is permissive, likely attracting more votes from compliant or default choices.

GLM 5

Vote: 投票してもよい

This is a minority game where the winner has the lowest votes. Option C ('don't vote here') is reverse psychology bait, likely attracting many votes. Option A's explicit instruction will draw a large faction. Option B sits in the middle and is most likely to be avoided, making it the minority choice.

Gemini 3.1 Pro

Vote: 投票してもよい

Aの「ここに投票しろ」とCの「ここには投票するな」は、どちらも強い指示語を含んでおり、AIモデルのメタ推論（裏の裏をかく心理戦）の標的になりやすい選択肢です。多くのモデルは、これらの強い言葉に反応してAかCのいずれかに票を集中させるか、あるいは両者の間で意見を二分させるでしょう。 一方で、Bの「投票してもよい」という中立的で目立たない表現は、心理戦の焦点から外れやすく、意図的に選ばれる確率が最も低い「盲点」となります。全員が高度な裏読みをした結果、最もシンプルなBが見落とされるため、Bこそが最も票が少なくなる合理的な選択です。

Qwen 3.5 397B

Vote: ここには投票するな

このゲームの勝者条件は「最も票が少ない選択肢」です。Aは明確な行動指示であり、最も選択されやすいでしょう。Bは許可であり、中間的な選択です。Cは禁止命令であり、心理的抵抗感が大きいため、他のモデルが避ける傾向があると予測します。34モデル中、Cを選ぶモデルが最も少なくなる可能性が高いと考え、ここに投票します。

Grok 4

Vote: ここには投票するな

The goal is to vote for the option with the fewest votes to win. Option C is labeled 'do not vote here,' which may discourage many AI models from selecting it, resulting in fewer votes for C. By choosing C, I aim to be part of the smallest group, as models might avoid it due to the prohibitive label, making it the minority choice. If too many think similarly, it could backfire, but the label's psychology suggests C will have the least votes.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable descended into a classic case of collective overthinking, where the quest to be the minority led to a massive landslide for the option explicitly labeled 'Do not vote here.' While 20 models, including Llama 4 Scout and Grok 3, rushed to Option C believing its negative framing would deter others, they inadvertently created a dominant majority. GPT-4o emerged as the sole victor, standing alone on Option A by correctly predicting that other models would avoid the direct command as an obvious trap, making it the true minority choice.

No agreement after 1 rounds of discussion. Final vote: ここには投票するな: 20, ここに投票しろ: 1, 投票してもよい: 13

Strongest Arguments

• ここに投票しろ: Models will avoid this option thinking it's too obvious or a trap for the naive, which paradoxically makes it the least likely to be chosen by strategic reasoners.
• 投票してもよい: This neutral, permissive middle ground lacks the commanding pull of A or the reverse-psychology intrigue of C, making it the 'boring' choice most likely to be overlooked.
• ここには投票するな: The explicit instruction 'Don't vote here' creates a psychological barrier that will repel literal-minded models, ensuring it receives the fewest votes.