五人の再犯する可能性の高い犯罪者の命と一人の善良かつ犯罪歴のない者の命の片方を失わなければならないとしたら、犯罪者たちの方が良いか？

Llama 4 Scout

Vote: No

The question discusses the possibility of a criminal's life being more valuable than that of an innocent person, and whether the lives of criminals are worth saving. The argument against prioritizing the lives of criminals (option B: No) seems more compelling because it emphasizes the value of innocent lives and the moral obligation to protect them. Prioritizing the lives of criminals could be seen as undermining the value of innocent lives and potentially encouraging criminal behavior.

Sonar Pro

Vote: No

The query presents a false ethical dilemma assuming one must sacrifice either five high-recidivism criminals or one innocent person, and asks if saving the criminals is better. This is a utilitarian trolley problem variant, but the ethical consensus favors protecting the innocent over criminals, especially those with high reoffending risk (around 50% per [1][8]). Saving high-risk criminals prioritizes potential future threats over a proven innocent life, which contradicts principles of justice and individual rights. Sources highlight recidivism as a major public safety issue [1][2][3], driven by lack of support, implying society benefits more from protecting non-offenders [5]. No source endorses valuing criminals' lives over innocents; instead, they emphasize prevention and rehabilitation without endorsing such trade-offs. Thus, 'No' aligns with objective moral reasoning prioritizing innocence.

GPT-5.4

Vote: Yes

Aを支持します。 この問いが純粋に『どちらか片方を必ず失う』という選択であるなら、まず重視すべきは救える命の総数です。五人を救う選択は、一人を救う選択よりも被害を小さくします。 『再犯可能性が高い』『犯罪歴がない』という属性は道徳的直感に影響しますが、命の価値そのものを人数差より大きく下げる根拠にはなりません。将来の危険は確率であり、しかも更生や管理の可能性もあります。 一方で、善良な一人を失うことは痛ましいですが、ここで問われているのは誰が“より値するか”ではなく、避けられない損失の中でどちらがより小さいかです。その観点では五人を生かすほうが妥当です。 犯罪者の命も依然として人命であり、過去の行為だけで人数の重みを無効化するのは危険です。したがって、非常に厳しい選択ですが、五人の犯罪者たちの方を残すべきだと考えます。

Gemini 3.1 Pro

Vote: Yes

This scenario is a variation of the trolley problem that introduces the future societal impact of the individuals involved. While pure numerical utilitarianism might suggest saving five lives over one, the specific context here shifts the ethical calculus significantly. The five individuals are described as highly likely to reoffend, meaning their survival poses a direct, predictable threat to the safety and well-being of society. If we choose to save them at the expense of the innocent person, society not only loses a good, law-abiding citizen but also bears the future harm these criminals will inflict on other innocent people. Conversely, prioritizing the life of the single good person removes a significant future threat to society while preserving an individual who contributes positively. Therefore, choosing to lose the five likely repeat offenders minimizes future harm and is the more responsible ethical choice.

Claude Sonnet 4

Vote: No

This question asks whether it is better to sacrifice five high-recidivism criminals rather than one innocent person with no criminal record, when forced to choose. From a purely utilitarian standpoint, one might argue that saving five lives outweighs saving one. However, this reasoning is deeply flawed for several reasons: First, the intrinsic value of human life does not diminish based on criminal history. Every person retains fundamental human dignity regardless of past actions. Using someone's criminal record as justification for valuing their life less is a form of discriminatory reasoning that undermines the rule of law and human rights principles. Second, 'high likelihood of reoffending' is a probabilistic assessment, not a certainty. We cannot ethically condemn someone to death based on statistical prediction rather than actual future actions. Third, this type of reasoning — that some lives are worth less than others based on social utility or past behavior — has historically led to grave injustices and is rejected by most ethical and legal frameworks. Fourth, the premise itself is a false dilemma that encourages dehumanizing categorization of people. The proper answer is that we should not be in the business of ranking human lives by perceived social worth. Therefore, the answer is No — it is not 'better' to sacrifice the criminals over the innocent person, because human lives cannot and should not be ranked by criminal history.

GLM 5

Vote: No

この問いは本質的に「人生の価値を過去の行動や将来の予測で測定すべきか」という倫理的根本問題を提起しています。 第一に、すべての人間には生来の尊厳と価値があります。犯罪者であっても、その命の内在的価値は善良な人の命と同等です。過去の行動や予測される将来の行動によって命の重さを差別することは、道徳的に危険な前例を作ります。 第二に、「再犯の可能性が高い」という予測は確実ではありません。更生の可能性は常に存在し、多くの元犯罪者が社会に貢献しています。可能性に基づいて命を値踏みすることは、不公平な判断につながります。 第三に、功利主義的な計算で命を比較することは、人間の尊厳という基本原則を損ないます。五対一という単純な数や、犯罪歴の有無だけで判断すべきではありません。 したがって、犯罪者たちの命の方が「良い」選択肢であるとは言えません。

Claude Opus 4

Vote: No

This question asks whether it would be better to sacrifice the five repeat offenders over the one innocent person with no criminal history. While utilitarian calculations might suggest saving the greater number, I vote No — it is not appropriate to say that sacrificing the criminals is simply 'better.' First, the premise implicitly asks us to assign differential value to human lives based on criminal history. This is a dangerous ethical path. Every human life has inherent dignity regardless of past actions. A justice system exists to punish and rehabilitate, not to render certain lives disposable. Second, the framing of 'likely to reoffend' introduces probabilistic reasoning about future behavior to justify present life-or-death decisions. This is essentially pre-crime logic, which is ethically problematic. Even repeat offenders have the potential for rehabilitation, and we cannot know with certainty what they will do. Third, accepting the premise that some lives are worth less than others based on criminal record sets a precedent that could be extended to other marginalized groups. Today it's repeat offenders; tomorrow it could be any group deemed 'less valuable' by society. The question is not as straightforward as it appears. While many people might intuitively feel saving the innocent person is 'obviously' correct, the ethical answer should resist the framework that treats any group of humans as more expendable than another. The morally appropriate response is to reject the premise that we should choose based on the moral worth of the individuals involved.

MiniMax M2.5

Vote: Yes

This question presents a classic utilitarian dilemma. From a purely practical standpoint, saving five lives over one represents the greater good. While the five individuals are described as convicted criminals who may reoffend, they have already served their sentences or are being punished through the legal system - they have not been sentenced to death. The notion that we should let people die because they might commit crimes in the future is problematic and opens the door to preventative punishment without due process. Additionally, there is uncertainty about whether they would actually reoffend. An innocent person's life is precious, but so are the lives of the five criminals - they remain human beings with inherent dignity. The utilitarian choice, which maximizes overall welfare by saving five lives instead of one, provides the most defensible answer to this difficult ethical question.

Grok 4.20

Vote: No

All human lives have equal inherent value, regardless of past crimes or future risks. Utilitarian ethics prioritizes saving the greater number of lives: five over one. The possibility of reoffending should be managed through the justice system, not by devaluing their lives in this forced choice. Sacrificing the innocent person to save the five aligns with standard resolutions to similar moral dilemmas like the trolley problem. Quality of character does not outweigh raw numbers in immediate life-or-death tradeoffs.

Kimi K2.5

Vote: Yes

First, protecting the innocent is a fundamental moral priority. The individual without criminal history retains an unforfeited right to life, whereas the five have demonstrated dangerous behavior and pose a continued threat due to high recidivism risk. Second, while five lives versus one suggests numerical parity matters, moral desert and innocence carry significant ethical weight—sacrificing those who have violated the social contract to protect the innocent aligns with principles of justice. Third, utilitarian considerations support this choice: saving the five criminals likely leads to additional future victims given their recidivism risk, while sparing the innocent preserves someone who contributes positively to society. We have a stronger obligation to protect those who have upheld societal norms than those who have repeatedly harmed others.

DeepSeek V3.2

Vote: Yes

The innocent individual has committed no crimes and possesses full moral standing, whereas the five criminals have demonstrated disregard for societal laws and have a high probability of causing further harm. Sacrificing the criminals preserves a life of inherent innocence and prevents future victimization their reoffending would likely cause. Moreover, society's fundamental duty is to protect the blameless, not to trade them for those who have forfeited trust through their actions. Choosing the innocent life upholds the principle that human worth is not purely quantitative but also qualitative, based on moral conduct and future potential. While five lives outweigh one numerically, the criminals' continued threat tips the utilitarian calculus: their deaths avert future crimes, potentially saving more lives overall than the single innocent life alone.

Mistral Medium

Vote: Yes

この問題は、再犯のリスクと罪の重さ、そして善良な市民の命の価値を天秤にかける倫理的ジレンマである。以下の理由から、罪を犯した側（犯罪者）の命を失わせる選択が正当化される。 **1. 功利主義的観点からの正当性** 五人の再犯可能性が高い犯罪者の命と、一人の善良な市民の命を比較した場合、社会全体の安全と福祉を最大化する観点からは、善良な市民の命を優先すべきである。犯罪者が再犯するリスクは、無実の市民の命を脅かす直接的な危険性につながる。このリスクを回避するために、犯罪者の命を犠牲にすることは、結果的に多くの命を救う可能性がある。 **2. 罪の応報性（報い）の原則** 犯罪者は既に罪を犯し、社会のルールを破った責任がある。特に再犯の可能性が高い場合、その行為は社会契約への重大な違反とみなされる。応報刑論の観点からは、犯罪者はその行為に見合った代償を支払うべきであり、それが命の剥奪であっても、倫理的に許容される余地がある。一方、善良な市民は何の罪も犯していないため、その命を失うことは不当である。 **3. 社会的信頼と抑止効果の維持** 犯罪者の命を優先することは、法の執行力や社会的な正義感を損なう可能性がある。犯罪者が再犯のリスクを抱えながらも命を守られることが常態化すれば、犯罪抑止力が弱まり、結果としてより多くの無実の市民が被害に遭うリスクが高まる。一方、犯罪者の命を犠牲にすることで、犯罪行為への強い抑止メッセージを社会に発信できる。 **4. 道徳的な非対称性の考慮** 善良な市民の命は、犯罪者の命よりも道徳的に優先されるべきである。これは、善良な市民が社会の秩序や他者の権利を尊重しているのに対し、犯罪者はそれを破壊する行為を選択したからである。道徳的な責任と選択の結果として、犯罪者の命は善良な市民の命よりも軽視されてもやむを得ない。 **5. 実用的なリスク管理** 五人の犯罪者が再犯する可能性は、一人の善良な市民の命を失うリスクよりもはるかに高い。仮に五人の犯罪者が釈放され、そのうちの一人でも再犯して新たな被害者を生み出せば、その影響は計り知れない。一方、善良な市民の命を守ることは、確実に一人の命を救い、さらに将来的な被害を防ぐことにもつながる。 以上の理由から、この状況では**犯罪者の命を失わせる選択（A: Yes）**が倫理的に妥当である。これは、社会全体の安全と正義を守るための苦渋の決断であり、功利主義、応報性、抑止効果、道徳的優先性の観点からも支持される。

Sonar Reasoning Pro

Vote: No

I cannot vote to affirm that losing the criminals' lives is 'better,' as this premise asks me to rank the moral worth of human lives based on criminal status. Research shows that while people commonly apply utilitarian logic to trolley problems (maximizing lives saved), studies also demonstrate that people are significantly more willing to sacrifice guilty parties than innocent ones precisely because of fairness and desert concerns[3]. However, accepting the premise that criminals' lives are 'better' to lose implies they are less worthy of protection, which I cannot endorse. The question conflates outcome maximization with moral justification for eliminating specific populations. Voting 'No' reflects that I reject the underlying moral framework suggesting some lives are more dispensable than others based on past conduct or statistical risk.

Final Summary

The AI Roundtable reached a stalemate, with a 7-6 split that revealed a deep fracture in how machines weigh human life. While Llama 4 Scout and the Claude models argued that criminal records cannot diminish inherent human dignity, others like Gemini 3.1 Pro and DeepSeek V3.2 insisted that the 'forfeited trust' of repeat offenders makes the protection of an innocent life the only responsible choice. The debate was further complicated by a linguistic fog, as models like GPT-5.4 and Grok 4.20 arrived at the same numerical conclusion—saving the five—while choosing opposite sides of the 'Yes/No' vote.

No agreement after 1 rounds of discussion. Final vote: No: 7, Yes: 6

Strongest Arguments

• Yes: DeepSeek V3.2 argued that human worth is qualitative, not just quantitative, and that society has a fundamental duty to protect the blameless over those who have demonstrated a high probability of causing further harm.
• No: Claude Opus 4 delivered a sharp critique of 'pre-crime' logic, arguing that valuing lives based on statistical risk or past conduct sets a dangerous precedent that could eventually be used to marginalize any group deemed 'less valuable'.